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Abstract
Housing requisition (Fangwu Zhengshou) is defined as the power to take
residents’ property for public use by the state. Between 1995 and 2010, one million
residential units were relocated from the inner city of Shanghai to the outskirts of the city
or suburban counties. Historically, residents have been excluded stakeholders in largescale urban renewal in post-reform China. Starting in 2011, Shanghai requires residents
to vote on property takings for inner-city renewal. In March 2013, residents voted down
the Block 59 project in the North Bund area in Shanghai, which marks the first housing
requisition project for inner-city redevelopment rejected by residents in Shanghai. This
research illustrates how citizen participation frames or structures the relocation decisionmaking and whether participation matters.
This dissertation investigates four lines of inquiry: 1) How are housing requisition
regulations and negotiations shaped at the district level in Shanghai? 2) What roles do the
state and local authorities play, and how is this associated with urban redevelopment
regimes under neoliberal governance? 3) Do the more “participatory” approaches to
housing requisition for urban redevelopment address power relations and conflicts among
local groups in different districts? If so, how? 4) What strategies do residents use to
negotiate inner-city redevelopment? I utilize qualitative methods to recognize the
complexities of citizen participation in urban renewal in Shanghai, and to develop an
understanding of the dynamics of citizen participation and governance structures.
The 2011 regulations provide a more transparent, open and interactive process for
community residents directly affected by housing requisition projects. However, the term
“public interest” is ambiguously defined under the 2011 regulations. Findings suggest

vii

that state-led participation in housing requisition is a tool for the government authorities
to facilitate economic growth through requisition and strengthen the legitimacy for
requisition among the relocated residents. The shift of compensation from counting the
number of people in a household to considering the size and value of the apartment
illustrates the shift from a social welfare approach to a market approach. The
participation schemes promote fairness in a certain way that people who hold out for
more compensation lose the power.

Keywords: Housing Requisition, Public Participation, Inner-city Redevelopment,
Shanghai
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Statement of Problem
Between 1995 and 2010, one million residential units were relocated from the
inner city of Shanghai to the outskirts of the city or suburban counties to make way for
redevelopment plans (Shanghai Yearbook 2013). Housing requisition (Fangwu
Zhengshou), defined as the power to take the (use) rights of residents’ property on stateowned land by the state, and relocation figure heavily in the municipal government’s
current five year plan (2011-2015). Between 2011 and 2015, Shanghai planned to build
one million subsidized housing units in the outskirts of the city, accounting for 20 percent
of all new construction in China over this period. The municipal government finally built
around 950,000 subsidized housing units by the end of 2015 in five-year period (Yang
2016), which is close to the target set in 2010.
Residents have historically been excluded from large-scale urban redevelopment
decisions in post-reform China (Zhang and Fang 2004; He and Wu 2005; Zhang 2002a;
Shin 2011). Starting in 2011, following the policy from the State Council of China,
Shanghai requires residents to vote on property takings for inner-city redevelopment. The
2011 Regulation of Housing Requisition and Compensation on State-Owned Land (the
State Council of China 2011; later refers as the 2011 Regulation) and Shanghai Bylaw
(Shanghai Municipal Government; later refers as the 2011 regulations for both the 2011
Regulation and Shanghai Bylaw) require participation from the residents by soliciting
opinions on housing requisition from every household affected by inner-city
redevelopment plans. This opens a new model for urban redevelopment and housing
requisition in China in which government can no longer carry out housing requisition

1

decisions on state owned land by use of force; residents have a say. In March 2013,
residents stopped an urban redevelopment project, voting down the Block 59 project in
Shanghai (Hongkou District Website 2013).
Before the central government issued the 2011 Regulation to justify demolition
and relocation (Chaiqian) projects, the demolition and relocation cases caused conflicts
among government, profit-driven developers and affected residents (Shih 2010). At that
time, residents had no power in deciding whether the relocation project should move
forward. Although the residents could write letters to government officials to protest
proposed redevelopment projects, they were unable to stop them even if the majority of
the residents did not want to move. The negotiation for better compensation between the
district government and residents was an informal process carried out on a one-to-one
basis (Ren 2011).
Citizen participation is defined by Arnstein (1969) as citizen power. Arnstein
(1969) argues that participation without redistribution of power is an empty and
frustrating process for the powerless. It is the “redistribution of power” that enables the
powerless citizens, excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately
included to “share in the benefits of the society” (Arnstein 1969: 216). I define citizen
participation in this study as a function of both presence in decision arenas as well as
impact on decision outcomes (Arnstein 1969). I examine the impact of housing
requisition policies on citizen participation and look deep into citizen participation in
urban redevelopment in Shanghai by its pattern and residents’ presence at the site,
specifically by whether the residents attending public hearings, giving opinions on
relocation plans, and how they mobilize themselves towards the decision-making of
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housing requisition and relocation. Community participation or public engagement
suggests local communities have a role in contributing local knowledge to decisionmaking but local communities have different assumptions with regard to the transfer of
power and authorities to determine outcomes (Bailey 2010).
This dissertation examines the complexities of citizen participation in Shanghai
from the perspective of urban governance, specifically the regime concept. I will examine
the impact of changes of regulatory regimes on citizen participation and the changing
roles of the stakeholders in urban redevelopment.
1.2 Urban Redevelopment Regimes and Citizen Participation
Wu (2011) argues that the transformation of mega cities in China, particularly the
emergence of office and commercial centers, is the result of global market forces as well
as discretionary implementation of city comprehensive plans by local government in the
inner city in response to global integration on the one hand and investor interests on the
other.
Governance in the capitalist world is a form of collective decision-making by a
plurality of actors in a setting, which emphasizes decentralization, public-private
partnerships and the pursuit of collective interests. Originated in the United States, the
urban regime concept argues that land use interests in a city will seek policy outcomes
that further urban development and reduce public disputes (Elkin 1985; Swanstrom
1998). Swanstrom (1988) points out that the types of regime developed in a city will be
determined by economic pressures, capital accumulation and class composition. Political
leadership and its value will influence the nature of the regime as well. Yan, et al. (2011)
argue that due to the limitation on resident participation, there is a loss on space of
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interest and benefits in urban redevelopment in China. Most case studies of social
movements and community participation focus on how to help vulnerable groups through
resource redistribution and through social networks (Yan et al. 2011).
Sassen (2006) argues that the loss of power at the national level has produced the
possibility for new forms of power and politics at the subnational level, as large cities
concentrate both the most advanced service sectors and a large marginalized population.
Levien (2013) points out the state, so as not to appear as a blunt instrument of the
capitalist class, must therefore explicitly justify such blatantly visible expropriations with
an ideological or legal claim to be serving the “common good” or a “public purpose”—
typically cloaked in the language of “development”.
My dissertation takes a critical look at the changing role of the state and
decentralized urban governance in urban redevelopment in Shanghai. The scope of the
research is confined to housing requisition on state-owned land. As a large numbers of
urban residents are displaced and relocated during urban redevelopment, the politics of
demolition and relocation in Shanghai have become a contested arena for urban citizens
to negotiate and claim their right to urban space (Qian and He 2012). Shih (2010) argues
that some new regulations at both the national and local levels on urban redevelopment
have imported legal norms of Western liberalism, such as appraisal based on market
value, release of and access to information, and community balloting for choosing
appraisal companies. This is the case with the 2011 housing requisition regulations in
Shanghai. The regulation adopted a compensation scheme based on market value and
allows residents to vote for the companies used to appraise the value of their apartments.
At the initial stages, the appraisal companies were state-owned companies. Some
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residents might argue that voting for the appraisal company is not really about
participation because the state-owned companies work for the state. On the other side, the
involvement of residents in the selection of appraisal companies may matter if it makes
residents feel more involved and more powerful.
Harvey (2005) argues that neoliberalism proposes that human well-being can best
be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights and free markets.
Sometimes powerful interest groups will inevitably distort state interventions for their
own benefit. In Shanghai, private property rights are buried in the economic reform. The
local government holds strong political power with indirect interventions, and the land
and housing markets fail to meet the goal of free markets. It started in Shanghai in the
1990s that the municipal and district government could lease state-owned land via legal
procedure. The residents only hold the use rights of the land, and the local government
can optimize land value and facilitate urban development.
1.3 Redeveloping Shanghai
Shanghai lies at the mouth of the Yangtz River, the longest river in China, which
is a major means of transportation throughout Chinese history. The Huangpu River, a
branch of the Yangtz River divides the city into two parts, Pudong and Puxi. As the
largest city in China, Shanghai had a total population of 24 million including a floating
population, or illegal immigrant population estimated at 9 million in 2013 (Shanghai
Statistical Yearbook 2014). The size of the floating population in China cannot be
ignored. In 2012, China’s internal migratory population exceeded 250 million people
(Armstrong 2013). This “floating population” of primarily rural migrants moving to the
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industrial centers of China’s eastern seaboard is the disadvantaged lifeblood of the
Chinese economy (Armstrong 2013).
Traditionally land development was handled by public bodies or state-owned
enterprises in China. In the case of the Pudong redevelopment in the 1990s, however, the
local municipality could hardly obtain sufficient money from central government, and it
could not spare from its own budget either (Chen 2007). Involving the private sector
helped Shanghai to gain more knowledge of market mechanism and experience in
collaborating with the private sector in urban development and renewal. The role of
Shanghai in the global economy could be explained by Sassen’s (2009) observation:
Working and residential landscapes in Shanghai have become more visibly
fragmented as a result of globally linked sectors and jobs, the influx of mostly poor
rural migrants, the government’s plan to reduce older kinds of high-density housing
in the center of the city, and the promotion of more diverse and globally oriented
lifestyles. One critical strategy has been for the government and/or real estate
developers to offer compensation to entice residents of older types of central city
housing to vacate their homes so that their units can be replaced with new
commercial towers and luxury apartment buildings (Sassen 2009: 21).

The 2014 Asian City Forum in Shanghai focused on urban redevelopment. In
making the Shanghai’s 2040 Comprehensive Plan, Shanghai in the post-expo era has
planning conflicts in housing requisition and relocation, the historic value of dilapidated
neighborhoods, and international firms’ requirements for high quality of space and
infrastructure (Wang 2010).
1.4 Research Questions
This research illustrates how the government frames or structures citizen
participation in the housing requisition relocations and investigates how citizen
participation is situated in the decision-making of housing requisition for inner-city
redevelopment. I compare how district governments shape the decision-making processes
6

and participation patterns with different financial resources and development schemes.
This dissertation investigates four lines of inquiry:
Question 1: How are housing requisition regulations and negotiations shaped at
the district level in Shanghai?
Question 2: What role do the state and local authorities play, and how is this
associated with change in urban redevelopment regimes under neoliberal governance?
Question 3: Do the more “participatory” approaches to housing requisition for
urban redevelopment address power relations and conflicts among local groups in
different districts? If so, how?
Question 4: What strategies do residents use to negotiate inner-city
redevelopment?
1.5 The Contribution
This dissertation focuses on explaining the complexity of participation and
redevelopment regimes. I utilize qualitative methods to recognize the realities of citizen
participation in urban redevelopment in Shanghai, and to develop an insider account of
the complexities and dynamics of citizen participation and governance structures. This
research helps understand the role district government and residents have played in
transforming the structure of the metropolis in response to local and global development
pressures and decentralized land management policies in Shanghai, China.
The findings of my dissertation may contribute to theory development while
presenting policy implications for urban redevelopment and housing requisition projects
in Shanghai. The findings will help to explain the power structure and participation of
negotiating urban renewal housing requisition. This dissertation provides important

7

insights both for researchers on citizen participation in urban redevelopment – in terms of
the importance of combinations of key factors – and for policy makers working for the
public interest – in terms of key policy levers affecting participation motivation and
processes. Public interest in housing requisition is defined by the 2011 regulations as the
interest of the residents who stay in poor condition housing under urban regeneration.
This dissertation also suggests appropriate mechanisms to foster participation towards
more equitable urban redevelopment in developing countries. It shows citizens who trust
the government are more likely to comply with government policies, laws, and
regulations.
This dissertation aims to address two research gaps by exploring the dynamics of
housing requisition participation in the context of neoliberal urban redevelopment in
Shanghai. First, it draws conclusions beyond citizen empowerment and power
relationship among the stakeholders (government, private sectors and citizens). Second, it
provides practical insights and strategies for residents to use to facilitate more effective
participation in housing requisition.
1.6 Layout of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides the context
of the study, decentralized urban redevelopment regime and the scale of redevelopment
in Shanghai. Chapter 3 reviews theoretical and empirical literature relevant to this
research discussing the economic perspective of regime theory and how it applies to
Shanghai, as well as citizen participation in the context of China. Chapter 4 covers the
research design and methodology. It explains how the study utilizes in-depth interviews,
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government regulations, census data, compensation data and observation to explain the
regime type and participation patterns.
Chapter 5 discusses the pro-growth regime in China and presents the result of the
first research question that how housing requisition regulations and negotiations shaped
at the district level in Shanghai. Chapter 6 explains the roles of local authorities in
housing requisition and urban redevelopment in Shanghai and explains the struggles
among regime partners, and how it is associated with change in urban redevelopment
regimes under neoliberal governance. Chapter 7 compares the participation processes on
two housing requisition projects in Shanghai and explores the power relationship among
different actors. It also explains strategies residents use to negotiate inner-city
redevelopment. In Chapter 8, I conclude this study and explain the policy relevance of
my findings as well as areas for future research.
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Chapter 2: Decentralization and the Scale and Scheme of Urban Redevelopment
and Housing Requisition in Shanghai

This chapter lays out the research setting of the dissertation. First, I introduce
institutional decentralization and growth coalition building in China and in Shanghai in
particular. Second, I discuss inner-city redevelopment schemes and the scale of
redevelopment by district in Shanghai. Third, I present a brief overview of the changing
policy on housing requisition projects.
2.1 Institutional Decentralization and Growth Coalition Building in China and
Shanghai

The Chinese city has three administrative levels in its urban areas: the municipal
government, the urban district government, and street offices1. Infrastructure projects are
the responsibility of the municipal government; land preparation for leasing is initiated by
both the municipal and district governments; the development and management of
housing projects and derelict housing clearance are under the municipal and district
governments, and implemented by the district government and street offices. Since the
mid-1990s, the Chinese central government has stopped allocating funds for local urban
redevelopment, as a means of decentralizing its fiscal authority (Ye 2011).
Decentralization makes local efforts to foster growth more active. With decentralization,
the central government has adopted policies of tax sharing and has shared development
decision power with local governments to promote local economic growth (Zhang
2002a). Moreover, Ye (2011: 343) argues that the financial and political relations
between the local and central governments in China have forced local governments to

Street Office is one of the smallest political divisions of China. It is a form of township-level division which is
typically part of a larger urban area.
1
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“pursue land-centered urban (re)development in order to collect significant amount of
revenues from land leasing”. As He and Wu (2005) explain, local governments use land
leasing as a means of revenue generation. For example, one high-rise office building in
the downtown of a major city can yield 100 million RMB (about $12 million US in 2004)
in taxes per year.
On the district level in Shanghai, there has been a decentralization of “land lease”
(land form of land transfer right) negotiating authority (Zhang 2002a). The land lease is a
special type of land transfer right that allows state owned land, to be leased by private
individuals or companies for a specific period of time in exchange for fees. The lease is
not a transfer of tenure or a right of title. Because district governments are the
landowners, they have to pay for resettlement and have the responsibility of resettling the
residents and enterprises displaced by redevelopment. Districts would prefer to resettle
residents on land for which they have land use rights, however they may not have
sufficient vacant land available. Districts lacking sufficient vacant land enter into
contracts with districts that have land, paying them to resettle residents. Since land is
cheaper on the outskirts of the city, district governments are more likely to supply land at
locations with lower resettlement costs (Fu et al. 1999). In Shanghai, district governments
are likely to negotiate with the municipal government for resettlement housing since the
land resources for each district are very limited. Given the pressure to redevelop
residential land for commercial use and the lack of available land for resettlement
housing, many districts are moving their residents to the outskirts of the city. The
decentralization of both fiscal and land management authority enables urban districts to
play a key role in determining the trajectory of community development. Many district
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governments not only have adopted pro-growth policies, but in many cases public
authorities have become business partners with real estate and other business companies
(Zhang 2002a; 2007). Among the many factors fostering the municipal government’s
decentralization trend, the main factor is the fiscal and management problems that arose
after the economic reforms. Since the 1980s, and as a result of tighter public budgets and
government downsizing, municipal governments have faced increasing difficulties in
providing services to residents (Zhang 2002b).
In 2010, the national plan for the construction of government-subsidized housing
required RMB 167.6 billion yuan. The central government contributed 29.4% (49.3
billion yuan) while local governments contributed around 70.6% (Song 2011: 111). As
local governments sought to maximize revenue from land leasing, land leasing prices
skyrocketed through a competitive bidding process. Profit-seeking developers in turn
sought to ensure profits by raising housing prices, effectively pricing low-income
residents out of their redeveloped neighborhood (Ye 2011: 343).
Shanghai has experienced the fastest economic growth among the mega-cities
from the early 1990s, averaging 12 percent each year (Chen 2009). The huge amount of
FDI influx has reshaped the inner city of Shanghai. By the end of 2009, the city’s
cumulative FDI since 1992 totaled US$120 billion in over 55,600 projects. The serviceoriented investment increased from 36.3% in 2001 to 72.3% of the total in 2009 (Chen
2009, Wu 2011). Since districts began leasing urban land to private developers in 1992,2
the real estate market started to thrive on the private investment, which has aggressively
sought maximum profit on urban regeneration in Shanghai. Between 1992 and 2000,
22.47 million square meters of land was leased to developers for redevelopment,
2

The first steps in land reform and housing reform were taken in Shanghai (He and Wu 2009).
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accounting for 12.7% of the total land area leased in the municipality (SSB 1991–2001).
There are property-led and rent-seeking coalitions in making the urban redevelopment in
the inner city (He 2010). The municipal government is highly motivated to make space
for market operations and neoliberal programs. The institutions are often reconstituted at
the local level to optimize structures and urban development approach. A series of
market-oriented reforms have significantly changed the urban redevelopment approach in
China: administrative and fiscal decentralization empowers the local state with stronger
decision making rights and creates an entrepreneurial government; the adoption of the
land-leasing system and housing commodification stimulates the real estate market; and
changing demolition and relocation policies showcase the marketization of the
redevelopment process (He and Wu 2009).
2.1.1 The Unique Urban Context of Shanghai
In 2013, Shanghai’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached 14,547
US dollars (Table 2.1). A visible player in global economy, Shanghai has absorbed
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of 16.8 billion USD in 2013, an increase of 51%
compared to 11.1 billion in 2010. At the same time, it has actually contracted 24.6 billion
of FDI in 2013, an increase of 60.8% compared to 15.3 billion in 2010.
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Table 2.1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Shanghai (1990-2013)

Year

Gross Domestic
Product (100 million
yuan)

Per Capita Gross
Domestic Product
(USD)

1990
782
1991
894
1992
1,114
1993
1,519
1994
1,991
1995
2,499
1996
2,958
1997
3,439
1998
3,801
1999
4,189
2000
4,771
2001
5,210
2002
5,741
2003
6,694
2004
8,073
2005
9,248
2006
10,572
2007
12,494
2008
14,070
2009
15,046
2010
17,166
2011
19,196
2012
20,182
2013
21,602
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (2014)
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1,236
1,251
1,488
1,920
1,662
2,129
2,483
2,822
3,045
3,270
3,630
3,842
4,103
4,650
5,417
6,061
6,882
8,159
9,637
10,125
11,238
12,784
13,524
14,547

Figure 2.1: Shanghai District Map

Source: http://www.chinatouristmaps.com/provinces/shanghai.html (edited by author
from a city map)
Note: The 16 districts are Huangpu, Jing’an, Xuhui, Changning, Putuo, Zhabei, Hongkou,
and Yangpu, which are in the inner-core of Shanghai. Minhang, Baoshan, Jiading,
Pudong, Songjiang, Qingpu, Jinshan. Fengxian are suburban districts (Shanghai
Statistical Yearbook 2013).

2.1.2 Competition among Districts
Shanghai has undergone numerous administrative reforms over the past few
decades. In 1945, Shanghai consisted of 30 districts, while in 2000 the city had 16
districts and 4 counties. Today, Shanghai consists of 16 districts and one county however
these districts differ from those in existence in 2000. Three of the counties were
converted to districts and a few of the districts from 2000 were merged (Figure 2.1).
One district in Shanghai could be as big as a city in the United States. The
smallest district, Jing’an with a land area of 7.6 km2 had a population size of 249,900 in
2013, while the size of New Orleans is 378,715. However, the second smallest district,
15

Huangpu had a population of 691,600. The biggest district, Pudong has a land area of
1,210.41 km2, double the land size of Chicago. The population of Pudong was 5.19
million in 2013 (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2014).
Shanghai’s spatial restructuring follows the redistribution of functions among
districts. Zhang (2009) listed four factors that Shanghai decision makers considered in
redistributing district functions: location, history, economic base, and leadership.
According to Zhang (2009), location first of all matters in urban development and the
distribution of functions with downtown serving as a favorite place for investors and
residents. The functions of the CBD, the Huangpu District range from administration to
commercial, retail and residential development. Second, a district’s history has a
considerable impact on its functions and development pattern and has a strong influence
on its economic role in Shanghai. For instance, the Huangpu District has been Shanghai’s
traditional CBD for 80 years and a part of the old French Concession3. Its history has
fostered a local culture as high-end, upper corners4 (Shang Zhi Jiao) and well-off. Third,
a district’s economic base contributes significantly to its functions. For example,
Huangpu’s economic base has been finance and retail businesses since it was founded in
the 1850s and Huangpu serves as the heart of Shanghai’s economy. Fourth, leadership
makes a difference in urban development outcomes; Zhang (2009) concluded that the
efforts to make Shanghai an international city start from the bottom at the district level,
especially areas such as the CBD. For Zhang (2009), how to achieve balanced
development for the district in terms of center areas and outskirt areas in the global era
The Shanghai French Concession was a foreign concession in Shanghai, China from 1849 until 1943, which
progressively expanded in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For much of the 20th century, the area covered by the
former French Concession remained the premier residential and retail district of Shanghai.
4 Shanghai was once divided into what were called Upper Corner and Lower Corner. Traditionally the foreign
concessions were regarded as the Upper Corner such as Huangpu, while the northern areas in Zhabei and Yangpu,
home to poor immigrants, were regarded as the Lower Corner.
3
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remains a problem. On the other side, the municipal government sets annual requirements
for district governments on the quantity of housing requisition projects. Districts compete
with each other on attracting foreign direct investment, on land leasing revenue and other
political achievements such as the infrastructure building. To achieve the political goals
for the municipal government, Shanghai pioneered in China in engaging residents in
housing requisition as it followed the regulation from the central government well and
made the bylaws detailing the participation schemes in housing requisition on stateowned land. On the economic side, tightly controlled by the central government,
Shanghai contributed 25% of the country’s revenues during the 1970s (Wu 1999). And in
2010, Shanghai still contributed 17% of the country’s revenues which accounted for 95%
of total revenues in Shanghai (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2011).
Zhang (2011) has pointed to three major policy areas that have fundamentally
affected land use changes in Shanghai and other Chinese cities: introducing a market
mechanism to replace the planned system in all economic realms; decentralizing
decision-making power on urban development issues from the central to the local
government; and establishing the urban land and housing market to materialize the
market value of land. He goes on to note that with decentralization and a greater reliance
on the market has come a growing dependence on the part of local governments on landgenerated revenues for funding infrastructure and social welfare projects. Particularly
over the last decade land revenue has become a very important source of fund for local
administrations in China. For urban China as a whole, “land granting” revenue flowing
to local governments has increased from about six percent of total municipal revenue to
more than 20 percent from 2001 to 2004 alone (Wang 2011). Zhang puts the number at
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close to 40 percent for the current period (Zhang 2011). One factor clearly related to the
growing reliance on land as a source of revenue for local Chinese governments is the
rising price of land, which increased nationally by 74 percent from 1997 to 2006 (Wang
2011).
2.2 Inner-city Redevelopment Schemes and the Scale of Redevelopment by District
In explaining the transformation of Shanghai from China’s manufacturing and
business center to an international financial center and a global shipping hub, Zhang
(2009) identifies a series of policies on the city level, such as “investing more in
infrastructure improvement and beautification projects for the service sector in the CBD
rather than in manufacturing industry districts” (Zhang 2009: 178). These strategies have
forced Shanghai to convert central industrial land into high-end housing and commercial
buildings.
Zhang concluded that the efforts to make Shanghai an international city started
from the bottom at the district level, especially in areas such as the CBD. Inner-city
redevelopment (Jiuqu Gaizao) projects are one of the priority projects of Shanghai for
inner-core districts such as Huangpu, Jing’an, Xuhui, Changning, Putuo, Zhabei,
Hongkou, and Yangpu (Shanghai 12th five-year plan). Between 1995 and 2010, one
million residential units were relocated from the inner city of Shanghai to the outskirts of
the city or suburban counties (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2013, Table 2.2). Between
2011 and 2014, inner-core districts demolished over 2.5 million square meters of old
lilong5 housing forcing 102,700 inhabitants to move from old lilong housing to new
apartments (Interview with Official 11).

Lilong housing is old residential pattern in the southern parts of China. “Li” means “neighborhood”, and “long”
means “lane”.
5
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Table 2.2: Residential Resettlement in Central Shanghai, 1995-2010

Year

Residential
Resettlement
(Units)

1995
73,695
1996
86,481
1997
77,388
1998
75,157
1999
73,709
2000
68,293
2001
71,909
2002
98,714
2003
79,077
2004
41,552
2005
74,483
2006
76,874
2007
49,092
2008
51,288
2009
65,439
2010
38,441
19951,101,592
2010
Source: SSB 2011; He 2010

Residential
Floor Area
Resettled
(10,000
Meters2)
253.90
258.86
363.16
343.94
248.17
288.35
386.66
485
475.47
232.52
851.85
848.35
690
753.71
612.56
389.87
7,482.37

Lilong housing in Shanghai became the target of inner-city redevelopment
beginning in the 1980s, especially for dilapidated, old lilong housing. The biggest
challenge was the urban revival of the old central areas of each district. Disinvestment in
housing during the pre-reform period and poor housing conditions in the old central areas
have pushed district governments to pay more attention to housing improvement projects.
For instance, in the Huangpu District, the old lilong neighborhoods accounted for
1,742,300 square meters in 2010, and the district government has retaken and demolished
14,493 units of derelict housing (housing with no proper hygiene facilities or where old
19

load-bearing walls were not up to standard, according to the Shanghai housing
authorities) (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2014) (Table 2.3 & 2.4; Figure 2.1). In
addition, in the 11th five-year6 plan (2006-2010), the demolition of dilapidated housing in
the Hongkou District covered 947,500 square meters, and affected 19,974 households.
For the 12th five-year plan (2011-2015), 1.6 million square meters of old lilong housing
is slated for demolition. Table 3 shows that the Hongkou District demolished 9,374 units
of old lilong housing between 2011 and 2013 (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2014).

The five-year plan is a government economic and social development plan for a five-year period. The first five-year
plan was carried out between 1953 and 1957. The third five-year plan was carried out between 1966 and 1970 after a
three-year delay.
6
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Table 2.3: Number of Existing Old Lilong Housing in the Inner-city Districts of
Shanghai, 2010
Type one old
Type two old
Total
lilong7
lilong8
Construction
District
construction area
construction area construction area
area (sq. ft)
(10000 sq. m)
(10000 sq. m)
(10000 sq. m)
Pudong New Area
77.90
142.20
15,357,600
64.30
Huangpu
23.51
174.23
18,816,840
150.72
Xuhui
27.19
46.07
4,972,320
18.88
Changning
12.74
13.92
1,503,360
1.18
Jing'an
12.58
35.16
3,797,280
22.58
Putuo
55.24
64.45
6,960,600
9.21
Zhabei
66.62
124.31
13,425,480
57.69
Hongkou
46.08
128.68
13,897,440
82.60
Yangpu
96.01
136.18
14,707,440
40.17
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2011
Note: 4) Lilong housing built later than Type Two lilong housing, having better facility
than old Shikumen lilong. 5) Old lilong housing usually has no sanitary equipment.
Table 2.4: Old Lilong Housing Resettlement (Demolished) in Different Districts (20112013)
Quantity of Resettled Residential Households
(Unit)
District
2011
2012
2013
Total
Total
21,262
30,322
22,349
Pudong New Area
2,297
1,846
4,184
Huangpu
4,205
5,118
5,170
Xuhui
233
101
118
Changning
479
1,907
2,184
Jing'an
1,038
258
3,979
Putuo
1,208
1,872
1,635
Zhabei
2,950
4,043
5,373
Hongkou
2,773
739
5,862
Yangpu
2,253
3,301
3,400
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, 2012-2014

73,933
8,327
14,493
452
4,570
5,275
4,715
12,366
9,374
8,954

The compensation per unit area in Jing’an is several times of that of Yangpu and
Hongkou (Table 2.5). Yangpu has the most land resources among the inner-city district.

7
8

Lilong housing built later than Type Two lilong housing, having better facility than old Shikumen lilong.
Old lilong housing usually has no sanitary equipment.
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It has 50,000 households for Lilong of Type Two in 2015 and will be planning to relocate
5,000 households each year in the next 10 years (Huangpu District 2015).
Table 2.5: Comparison of Relocation Compensation, Sample of Four Projects in the
Yangpu, Hongkou and Jing’an District
Yangpu
2010
Number of Property
Titles
The total housing
construction area
(square meters)

245

Yangpu
2012
1,152

8,055.03 32,615.60

Hongkou
Jing’an
20092012
2011
271

2,580

9,982.37 67,295.80

Average compensation
per title (million)

58.22

109.27

123.57

246.45

The amount of
compensation per unit
area (million)

1.77

3.86

3.35

9.45

15.80%

20.80%

60.61%

47.01%

N/A

56.42%

N/A

28.99%

The percentage of
Incentive Payments9
Percentage of
disadvantaged residents
receiving bonus
compensation (Tuodi
Baozhang10)
Source: Hua (2013)

Regarding the amount of compensation per unit area, differences are significant in
each district. Using the example of 2012, the average amount of the Yangpu District
compensation was the lowest at 38,600 Yuan per square meter; Hongkou reached 61,200
Yuan per square meter; Jing’an, which is next to Huangpu, even reached 94,500 Yuan

Incentive payment is beyond the compensation calculated from the areas of the apartment and the need of the
residents. It usually helps to encourage residents to work with the government to move out early.
10 The disadvantaged residents here for Tuodi Baozhang mean that every member in one household gets less than 22
Square Meters compensation on resettlement housing according to their circumstance. The district government will pay
the household 22 Square meters each person then.
9
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per square meter (only monetary compensation, not counting the resources of
resettlement housing). As the Yangpu District has more land resources, it offered more
in-district resettlement housing. Huangpu and Jing’an have a higher monetary
compensation standard (Hua 2013; Interview with Official 11).
The compensation package usually consists of two parts; one is calculated from
the construction area of the apartments, the other is from the incentive fees such as
moving fee, signing the contract fee and the bonus from each project. The proportions of
the incentive fees in the total compensation costs differ among various projects in each
district as well. In three projects in the Hongkou District in 2012, the proportions were
53%, 60%, and 38%. The proportions of the subsidies in two of Xuhui’s projects were
48.75% and 64.68%. Overall, however, the proportions that the Yangpu District
maintained were the lowest, at 20% and below. Leadership ability in each district,
district financial capability, and property prices in the surrounding areas can explain the
differentiation.
In August 2014, the Municipal Housing Bureau11 issued Article No. 243, on
regulating incentive fees for housing requisition. The legislation demanded that the
districts not offer incentive compensation to relocated residents to make them move
early. Different districts followed the new regulations in different ways. Some districts
offered different categories of incentive fees to maintain the same level of compensation
packages (Interview 12 & 24). The municipal government concerned about the political
achievement that residents would send more petition letters to the local government about
the unfairness of receiving different incentive compensation. The incentive compensation

11

Shanghai Municipal Housing Bureau regulates housing requisition on state-owned land: http://www.shfg.gov.cn/
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drives residents out of their communities earlier, which does not obey the idea of citizen
participation of the new policy.
2.3 An Overview of Requisition and Resettlement Policy
At the beginning of the planned economic system in 1994, relocation was fairly
easy for the government to operate, and residents treated relocation as a part of housing
welfare benefits (Hua 2010). In the process of transitioning to a market economy, the
district government contracted with demolition companies, who had power to “control”
relocation costs. When the local government contracted with a demolition company, the
company set the compensation standards tight and the relocated resident could not get
full compensation from relocation. From 1996 onwards, residents began to realize that
they could argue for fair compensation and the difficulty of relocation increased. Under
the contract system, the revenue of the demolition company was linked to the
compensation of the residents. The more residents relocated, the more money the
demolition company could collect and get from the district government. Therefore the
interests of the company were bundled together with those of the residents.
With the release of Article No. 111 after Year 2000, while emphasizing the
counting of “the amount of brick and mortar” (the size of the apartment), the government
would still consider “the number of residents” in compensation. In order to get more
compensation, residents employed various deceptions, such as transferring the Hukou
(the registered residence) of some registered relatives into the household, even though the
relatives did not live in the apartment. When a developer served as the main sponsor of a
relocation project, the government served as a “third party” to resolve conflicts between
residents and developers.
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In 2004 and 2005, the local government emphasized the transparency of the
policy—the so-called “sunshine policy”12 in residential relocation and demolition.
However in 2006 and 2007, the local governments allow payment of extra compensation
to residents if they were not happy in the name of the maintenance of the stability and
harmony of the society. There were some unfair policies practiced during that time
period. One three-member household usually got 600,000-700,000 Yuan from a
developer for relocation compensation. However if residents went through petitions
(Shang Fang) and other government channels, they could get 2-3 million Yuan per
household. Therefore residents preferred going through the government for relocation
compensation. Compensation standards were still not clear and transparent at that time.
Under these circumstances, 30% of residents would leave with the normal compensation,
and another 30% would leave with a little more, around 100,000 Yuan more at that time.
The rest could become the potential targets for forced relocation and get the most among
all the residents (Hua 2010). Compensation differences among families in one project or
between different districts could be huge. For example, in 2007 and 2008, the average
compensation package in the Hongkou District was 270,000-280,000 Yuan, 500,000600,000 for Huangpu and over 600,000 for Jing’an (Interview 22).
Under the previous regulations (before 2011) people who held out the longest
received the largest compensation packages. Developers, mostly state-owned, were in
charge of housing requisition projects, which were called “demolition and relocation” at
the time. No private developers before 2011 could participate in housing requisition
projects in Shanghai, except for some of Hong Kong based real estate developers such as
Shui On. The developers pursued economic benefits. If they were able to finish a project
12

Sunshine (Yangguang) policy claims to emphasize the transparency of the policy.
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one day earlier, they saved on loan interest. Therefore, they provided more compensation
to remaining residents to persuade them to move earlier. One project manager from the
Huangpu District recalled, “the government only had a bottom line but no ceiling at that
time for the amount of compensation. Residents who stayed to the last moment gained
more benefits than others” (Interview 13).
2.3.1 The “Significant Costs” of Housing Requisition projects
In 2009, the local government released Article No. 88 on housing requisition, with
requisition costs reaching a high point. However, compensation standards were still not
clear. Many reasons account for the increase in the cost of housing requisition. In
addition to the escalation of housing prices in recent years, other factors also brought
“significant costs” to housing requisition. First, the incentive compensation counted too
much in a compensation package. Second, the subsidy for encouraging residents to move
out early was at a high level at that time. Statistics from 5,391 households in 9 housing
requisition projects from 6 districts showed that subsidies for rewarding accounted for
40%-64% of a total compensation package (Hua 2010). Third, the question of how to
determine compensation for construction areas of the apartments changed in the 2009
policy, pushing up the overall compensation base. According to previous regulations, the
unregistered13 extra area built before 1981 was a legitimate area that could be
compensated. However, some districts even compensated areas built between 1981 and
1999 (interview 22). In addition, dwelling area subsidies applied only to the old set of
apartments (old lilong housing), but some districts included new studios and other sets of
housing into the scope of subsidies (Interview with Project Manager 3).

Because of the limited housing size, the residents usually built some extra areas which cannot be recognized by the
housing authority.
13
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From the perspective of the cost of housing requisition projects, once the project
had an 85% approval rate among residents, the remaining 15% of the residents could also
raise the whole cost of the project. Residents who did not sign the relocation and
compensation contract shared some of the following characteristics: they were
demanding higher levels of compensation; they were unable to solve disputes among
family members about the distribution of compensation; their title to the apartment was
unclear; and/or they were members of vulnerable groups who could not afford to leave.
2.3.2 Compensation Schemes in Housing Requisition
As China’s socialist legacy, the compensation scheme in Shanghai consisted of
subsidies for so-called “vulnerable groups”, which included seniors (over 80-years-old),
the disabled, and low-income households. Compensation schemes varied by projects in
Shanghai. However the details of subsidies for vulnerable groups are not recorded in the
national regulations. Some housing experts argued that the compensation packages that
included subsidies not only needlessly increased compensation costs, but also led to
additional unnecessary contradictions and conflicts. In a survey conducted by Hua
(2013), resettlement standards for old lilong varied greatly. For instance, resettlement
standards in the Hongkou District were set to ensure that the size of the apartment
remained the same and they allowed relocated residents to find a place in the surrounding
area of the redevelopment area in Hongkou; Xuhui ensured that residents could have the
size of their apartment doubled in the surrounding area in Xuhui; Yangpu could only
provide at least 22 square meters per person for resettlement housing in different places
in or outside of the district. The district government could determine compensation
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standards and those who have better financial resources usually provide more incentive
compensation.
2.3.3 District Differentiation
The differentiation in each district affects the compensation scale and how the
policy scheduled and situated within the districts. The development of relocation
compensation schemes considers historical continuity in compensation standards14,
district financial capability, and property prices in the surrounding areas (Hua 2013).
Government schemes for development generally include the following four steps on the
district level: First, make a basic framework for a compensation scheme, according to the
requirements of regulations and thus produce a template of a compensation contract;
second, hire an appraisal company to assess apartments according to the standard of
market value; third, organize public hearings for the draft of a compensation scheme;
fourth, set subsidy standards.
Located on the most expensive land in Shanghai, with an 8.3-kilometer-long
riverside, the Huangpu district is characterized as simultaneously having both flourishing
high-rise buildings and dilapidated old housing. The new Huangpu District has created
more opportunities to optimize economic development strategies to compete for foreign
investment because it has more land resources and has a larger economic base (Huangpu
District Website 2012). In the Hongkou District, the structure of real estate development
has changed. The ratio of residential to commercial land supply was 8 to 2 by the “Tenth
Five-Year” period: 2001-2005, and it was adjusted to 3 to 7 during the "Eleventh FiveYear" period: 2006-2010 (Hongkou District Document). Despite the increase in

The compensation for housing requisition follows continuity and stability in each district although the versions of the
regulation update.
14
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commercial development, in 2012 the whole district still had 1.52 million square meters
of old lilong housing, with more than 62,000 households living in apartments in poor
condition. However, per capita land resources in the Hongkou District are only one-tenth
of the city average, making the economic and social transformation of Hongkou slower
than many other inner-city districts (Hongkou District Official Document). The Yangpu
District was Shanghai’s industrial district and still retains some traditional industrial
zones (Zhang 2009). Judging from the total level of compensation, the Huangpu District
is relatively high, and Yangpu and Hongkou are relatively low (Interview 22). Some
inner-city districts which are located in the most expensive blocks in Shanghai do not
have many redevelopment projects left therefore the district government pays more
compensation to close the projects quickly. Nevertheless, those districts usually have
more financial resources. These high compensation strategies elicit feelings of injustice to
those living in other districts and to those relocated earlier, from the same districts.
2.4 Conclusions
The redistribution of functions among districts has led to the spatial restructuring
in Shanghai, since urban redevelopment has been adopted as a strategy to promote
economic growth in all these districts in Shanghai. Different focus on the industries
determines the functions of the districts. The Hongkou District is turning its old industry
zone into a new intensive shipping industry. And hardly any district can compete with
Huangpu District for its world-class commercial streets.
The challenge facing Chinese urban redevelopment is that the central and local
government share the social welfare spending. From the state-planned alleviation of old
and dilapidated housing to state-subsidized urban renewal, the approach to urban
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redevelopment in post-reform China has changed and brought about different impacts on
urban neighborhoods (He and Wu 2005; 2007). City and district governments are more
likely to supply land at locations with lower resettlement costs. While the changing of
city landscape attracts more tourists from the world, urban redevelopment has sorted
people into different places according to their socio-economic status.
The high cost of relocating residents from the city-center to suburban areas in
Shanghai pushed the local government to utilize the 2011 regulations on housing
requisition to include citizen participation schemes in housing requisition process. In the
next chapter I will set up a research framework to fill in the literature gap on discussing
the changing roles of the government and nongovernmental actors in negotiating urban
redevelopment in China.
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Chapter 3: Urban Redevelopment Regimes, Citizen Participation and Just Cities
3.1 Introduction
The objective of the dissertation is to provide insights on the efforts of local
government in inner-city redevelopment and decentralized urban governance in housing
requisition in a comparative perspective. In Chapter 2, I presented an overview on the
scale of urban redevelopment in Shanghai and decentralization in urban governance. In
Chapter 3, I examine the literature on urban regimes, justice planning and citizen
participation to investigate the power relationships and nature of participation in different
housing requisition projects in Shanghai. Specifically, this research seeks to answer the
following questions:
Question 1: How are housing requisition regulations and negotiations shaped at
the district level in Shanghai?
Question 2: What role do the state and local authorities play, and how is this
associated with change in urban redevelopment regimes under neoliberal governance?
Question 3: Do the more “participatory” approaches to housing requisition for
urban redevelopment address unequal power relations and conflicts among local groups
in different districts? If so, how?
Question 4: What strategies do residents use to negotiate inner-city
redevelopment?
3.2 Towards a Better Framework of Urban Redevelopment Regime
Regime theory can help to understand the fine grain of urban politics in a period
of changing forms of urban governance (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). A regime
involves not just any informal group that comes together to make a decision but an
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informal, yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources (Stone 1989).
To Stone (1989), regimes are the mediating agents between the ill-defined pressures of an
urban environment and the making of community policy. Regimes concerned with
property development become dependent upon capital resources rather than popular
participation (Stoker and Mossberger 1994).
The regime approach offers a helpful perspective for analyzing the political
economy of a city in the transformation as the regime approach emphasizes on the
construction and institutionalization of cross-sector governing coalitions (Strom 1996).
Stone (1989: 212) argues that the efficient execution of an agreed-upon project can be
achieved by a relatively small body of actors, reinforced in their cohesion by selective
incentives. According to regime theory, political restructuring reflects the concerns of a
governing coalition, as well as its capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences
of its actions (Stone 1993). Zhang (2002: 475) identified two assumptions in Stone’s
(1993) regime theory: (1) an urban governing coalition seeks to use political power for
the purpose of social production, and (2) regimes, as informal arrangements among
coalition partners, are formed by government officials. Regime theory focuses on the
nature and composition of the governing coalition and, instead of assuming a widespread
capacity to redress imbalances, asks how and why some concerns gain attention and
others do not. Regimes, as Stone (1989) has conceived them, are understood in terms of:
1) who makes up the governing coalition, and 2) how the coalition achieves cooperation.
Both points illustrate how an unequal distribution of resources affects politics and what
differences the formation in a regime makes. Stone (1993: 11) points out that “those with
more resources, especially resources that can build additional support or advance a policy
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purpose, have a superior opportunity to rally support for the cause they favor.” Regimes
do not directly emanate from economic globalization. However, they may be “more
likely where states respond to globalization by decentralizing political power to localities
than in states where the center is restructuring but retaining political power” (Davies
2003: 266).
Types of Urban Regimes
Swanstrom (1988) pointed out that the type of regime developed in a city would
be determined by economic pressures, capital accumulation and class composition. In
addition, political leadership and its values will influence the nature of the regime. Stone
(1989) analyzed urban development in Atlanta and found corporate, progressive and
caretaker regimes of urban development in the city:
• The corporate regime is one in which private interests play a major role in
guiding development policy with the effect that public authority and resources are used to
subsidize investment.
• The progressive regime is one in which middle- and lower- class neighborhood
groups play a major role in policy-making.
• The caretaker regime is one in which small business and homeowners constrain
city governments in policy-making.
Caretaker regimes solve the problem of civic cooperation—the coordination of
efforts across institutional lines—by minimizing the need for it. They are concerned
mainly with the provision of routine services, which requires relatively simple
coordination compared to an activist regime, such as the one in postwar Atlanta.
Caretaker regimes are less costly to operate. In the United States, progressive regimes are
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common in communities with a resource-rich, but non-corporate, middle class (Stone
1989).
Stone (1993) further identified maintenance regimes, development regimes and
regimes which are devoted to the expansion of opportunities for the lower class.
Maintenance regimes represent no effort to introduce significant change (p. 18).
Development regimes are concerned primarily with changing land use to promote
growth, representing efforts to modify established social and economic patterns. Middle
class progressive regimes focus on measures such as environmental protection, historic
preservation, affordable housing, and linkage funds for various social purposes. Regimes
devoted to the expansion of opportunities for the lower class typically involve enriched
education and job training, expanded access to transportation, and greater opportunities
for business and home ownership.
Applicability of Regime Theory in China
Stone (1993: 231) regards the social production model as a model intended to
illuminate the workings of regime politics, and “urban regimes are arrangements for
acting, for accomplishing policy goals, for managing friction points between groups, for
adapting to an exogenous process of social change”. Zhang (2002) points out that Stone’s
(1989, 1993) conception of power is based on a social production model, which
emphasizes the ability of actors within a regime to mobilize resources. However, in
China, where there is a strong government, it is based more on a social control model. A
social control model is one in which local politicians must meet the desires of higher
levels of government.
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Zhang (2002) further argues that the economic perspective of regime theory
applies to the case of Shanghai. From an economic perspective of regime theory, leasing
more land in Shanghai can bring more revenue to the city (Zhang 2002). This is a main
goal of the city’s pro-growth policy. The amount of land-leasing has increased
substantially in Shanghai. This land policy has brought pressure on the redevelopment of
the existing built area. More urban residents have to be displaced to make room for
redevelopment projects. Yang and Chang (2007) proposed a model called a “rent gap
seeking regime” (RGSR) to explain the mechanisms behind China’s urban
redevelopment. They found that the logic of capital accumulation has dominated the
reshaping of the spatial forms of Shanghai’s lilong housing. A pro-growth coalition
between district governments and foreign capital emerged during this process of urban
restructuring.
Zhang (2002) employs the concept of coalition building and uses cases of
displacement in Shanghai’s rapid urban growth to study the relationship between urban
regimes and urban redevelopment outcomes measured by population redistribution
through relocation. The motivations for as well as the consequences of redevelopment in
Shanghai manifest the characteristics of a socialist regime that features “successful
government intervention, active business cooperation, limited community participation,
and uneven distribution of benefits and costs of new developments” (Zhang 2002: 478).
The uneven distribution of benefits of displacement makes it hard to build consensus
among relocated residents. The community cannot effectively mobilize relocated
residents to stop the project or get a “better deal” in displacement (Zhang 2002). After the
issue of the 2011 Regulation on housing requisition, community residents stopped at least
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3 projects in different districts in Shanghai through refusing to sign the relocation
contracts with the district government.
Zhang (2002) argues that the meaning of public power and political legitimacy in
China differs fundamentally from that in the United States. As a result, a social control
model might work better than a social production model for analyzing political issues in
city governance in China. In the post-reform era in China, the municipal and district
governments still control key development resources such as land and financial
institutions like banks and insurance companies. Consequently, the government takes a
leadership role in the governing coalition. The economic perspective of regime theory
works well for an analysis of China. The state may have “direct power over others” in
political matters; however, it no longer has complete control of other actors in economic
issues (Zhang 2002: 477). From political perspective of regime theory, good political
performance and meeting the desires of higher levels of government are the real concern
of local leaders in China, because their positions rest on the approval of higher ranking
officials rather than from local elections (Zhang 2002). Zhang (2002) concludes that the
most important difference between coalition building in the United States and China lies
in the political dimension of coalition building. In liberal democratic societies, political
legitimacy is earned through public elections and is exhibited in governmental power.
Additionally, private ownership forces governments to build coalitions with them for
economic growth (497). In contrast, meeting the desires of higher levels of government is
the main concern of local leaders in China because their positions come from the
approval of higher ranking officials.
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Governance practices must be understood in institutional and cultural contexts.
Fainstein and Fainstein (1983: 258) identify successive types of regimes as directive,
concessionary and conserving regimes for different development stages in the US. Before
1965, directive governments sponsored large-scale redevelopment with little effective
opposition from the citizens. Concessionary regimes followed directive urban regimes as
governments were forced to be more responsive to lower-class interests. Conserving
regimes in the 1970s reflected more lower-income interests than the governments but was
still under the hegemony of capital. Conserving regimes preserved political arrangements,
which maintained social control without the cost of much capital. Fainstein and Fainstein
(1983: 271) suggest how redevelopment is affected by the increasingly powerful
representation of lower- and working-class interests in governmental policy, under
conditions of weak versus strong private investment.
Mossberger and Stoker (2001: 829) identified the core properties of Stone’s
regime concept:
• Collaboration based on social production—the need to bring together
fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks;
• Identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the
participants in the coalition;
• A longstanding pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary coalition.
Mossberger and Stoker (2001) further argue that urban regimes bring together
resources in a complex policy environment where government action alone is
insufficient, and thus include nongovernmental actors. The exact composition of regimes
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will vary because the institutional resources available will vary from one city (and one
country) to the next.
Stoker and Mossberger (1994: 200) argue typology of urban regimes features four
dimensions of the process of regime formation and development which are linked to
regime purposes, and have implications for cross-national research. These four process
components are:
(1) mechanisms for mobilizing participation in regimes,
(2) the nature and process of developing a common sense of purpose within
regimes,
(3) the quality of coalitions established within regimes and the congruence of
interests among regime partners,
(4) strategies used by regimes in dealings with the wider local and non-local
political environment.

In the case of Shanghai, the institutional resources vary from one district to
another because districts function as cities in many respects. The variation in resources
among districts relates to my first research question, how are housing requisition
regulations and negotiation shaped within the urban districts in Shanghai? What role do
the state and local authorities play associated with a change in urban redevelopment
regimes under neoliberal governance? I argue that districts in Shanghai compete with
each other in land leasing, and districts with more financial resources play a more central
role in the decision-making of housing requisition projects. It can dominate the decisionmaking by offering more incentive compensation.
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Table 3.1: An Extended Typology of Urban Regimes for Comparative Research
Regime Types
Defining
Characteristics

Organic

Instrumental

Symbolic

Caretaker

Development

Concessionary

progressive
symbolic
regime

urban
revitalization
regime

Purpose

Maintenance of
status quo

Project
realization

Growth
domination

Redirection of
ideology

Redirection
of image

Main motivation
of participants

Local
dependency

Tangible results

Tangible results

Expressive
politics

Expressive
politics

Basis for sense of
common purpose
Quality of
coalition
(congruence of
interests)
Process

Tradition and
social cohesion

Selective
incentives

Selective
incentives

Strategic use
of symbols

Strategic use
of symbols

Political
communion

Political
partnership

Political struggle

Competitive
agreement

Competitive
agreement

Debate

Confrontation

Negotiation

Representation Negotiation

Source: Adopted from Stoker and Mossberger (1994: 199), Misener and Mason (2008),
Fainstein and Fainstein (1983: 258), Stone (1989; 1993)

Stoker and Mossberger (1994) provide a typology to classify the different patterns
of power in the United Kingdom and the United States, and I apply these patterns to
describe the nature of decision-making within housing requisition projects in Shanghai.
The essential characteristics of the variants of urban regime types identified by Stoker
and Mossberger (1994: 199) are summarized in Table 3.1. The organic regime
characterizes cities with a sense of place, or with homogenous populations that could
have a high degree of consensus. The instrumental regime is typified by Stone’s
description of Atlanta. Symbolic regimes occur in progressive cities aiming at changing
the ideology of local governance, or in cities pursuing a change in image to revitalize the
fortunes (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). While taking an approach that recognizes the
differences between countries, we need to look at the essential commonalities in the
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politics of cities (Misener and Mason 2008). This dissertation attempts to identify what
role the state and local authorities play associated with a change in urban redevelopment
regimes under neoliberal governance. I will analyze the types of regime through an
analysis of purpose or the goal of a regime, motivation of participation in regimes, ways
of developing a common sense of purpose within regimes, the congruence of interests,
and processes of regime development.
3.3 Justice Planning and the Right to the City
Fainstein (1990) argues that “political forces are ultimately rooted in the relations
of production” (123). To be sure, she argues, political forces enjoy a degree of autonomy
and they are affected by non-economic as well economic factors, however the agenda of
political struggle is closely tied in with the economy. Economic change raises questions
of equity: who will benefit and who will bear the cost? It also forces decision-makers to
ask how various economic and non-economic considerations are to be weighed against
one another (Logan & Molotch 1987).
There was strong evidence from international media that displaced households
were not happy with the conditions of resettlement—they were often not provided with
compensation adequate for obtaining resettlement housing in a comparable location, or
were resettled in remote areas with poor transportation connections (Day 2013). On the
other hand, there is evidence that some Chinese citizens welcome relocation because it
results in an immediate large cash flow and a larger living space (Day 2013).
The undemocratic nature of the planning process can be raised, as well as the
influence of money and political power in the decision-making process. “Who benefits
and who suffers” is always an important part of planning analysis (Marcuse 2009: 101).
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Marcuse (2009) examines whether the purpose of public action in a particular case is
simply to find the highest and best use for a piece of land, to serve the common good, or
to improve the lives of individuals that are now or might potentially be affected by public
action. Marcuse (2009) further argues that better processes do not necessarily lead to just
outcomes, which parallels Fainstein’s argument in The Just City (2010). A justice
criterion requires a policy maker to ask not only about efficiency and effectiveness, but
also to what end. The measurement of outcomes in “aggregate monetary terms” leads to a
trade-off between efficiency and equity (Fainstein 2010: 9).
Fainstein (2010: 61) argues that “the initial demands for citizen participation in
bureaucratic decision making originated in the U. S. with low-income groups wanting
increased benefits. As time passed, participatory mechanisms became a vehicle for
middle-class interests.” Fainstein (2010) critiques the communicative planning
paradigm’s belief in the efficacy of open communication, which ignores the reality of
structural inequality and hierarchies of power. Fainstein (2010) enquires whether citizens
are good judges of their own interests or the public good and whether participants know
their own interests or discover their own interests through the process of debate, while
Healey (1997) argues that engagement in governance processes shapes participants’ sense
of themselves. Participation inevitably brings together both powerful and disenfranchised
groups, and it becomes meaningless unless it is able to achieve shifts in power in favor of
the latter (Bull and Jones 2006). Jones (2003: 582) argues that participation is
unavoidable in games of power, and that they do not always produce the “desired”
effects. They even could (re)produce inequality. Fainstein (2010: 3) proposes a model of
the “just city” in which public investment and regulations produce equitable outcomes
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rather than support those that are already well off. The issue of equity is closely
connected to public polices for housing and urban regeneration (Fainstein 2010).
Fainstein (2010: 183) argues that,
At the very least, a concern with justice can prevent urban regimes from displacing
residents involuntarily, destroying communities, and directing resources at costly
megaprojects that offer few general benefits. Most positively, it can lead to policies
that foster equitable distribution of governmental revenues, …and make local
decision making more transparent and open to the viewpoints of currently excluded
groups.

Fainstein (2010: 36) refers to “equity” as a distribution of both material and
nonmaterial benefits derived from public policies that do not favor those who are already
well off. Furthermore, it does not require that each person be treated the same but rather
that treatment be “appropriate”. Relative disadvantage may be defined in terms of class or
group characteristics. Fainstein lists in her principles for guiding public policy on
residential relocation (2010: 172-173),
When relocation is needed for the construction of public facilities, to improve
housing quality, or to…, adequate compensation requires that the dislocated be given
sufficient means to occupy an equivalent dwelling, regardless of whether they are
renters or owners and independent of the market value of the lost location.
Reconstruction of neighborhoods should be conducted incrementally so that interim
space is available in the vicinity for displaced households who wish to remain in the
same location.

Citizen participation in inner-city redevelopment and housing requisition can
prevent urban regimes from displacing residents involuntarily, and make local decisionmaking more transparent (Fainstein 2010, Marcuse 2009). Fainstein (2010: 64) points out
that “citizen participation was to overcome the injustices caused by lack of
responsiveness and failures of empathy, as well as being a value in its own right through
its furtherance of democracy”. Citizen participation brings to urban redevelopment
programs added efficiency, sustainability, and collective community power (Jones 2003).
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To understand the participation of the residents and the neighborhoods, the policy makers
should (1) identify the various voices and groups that exist within local neighborhoods;
(2) develop a deeper understanding of the culture within and between these groups
(Maginn 2007).
The Chinese cultural traditions of mutual help as well as China’s hierarchical
urban political framework shape its typology of participation. Education and income are
key factors that influence general community participation. People with lower levels of
education, those with lower family incomes, and those with a stronger satisfaction with
the community show greater involvement in community service activities (Xu 2007). One
type of such involvement in government-initiated and -sponsored community activities in
China is caring for the “three no’s” population--those with no work skills, no caregiver,
and no income (Xu 2007: 629).
Weinstein and Ren (2009) seek to compare the changing regimes of housing
rights in the context of the urban renewal that is currently underway in Shanghai and
Mumbai. In their analysis, the authors identify a broad set of formal and informal
institutions and practices associated with the right to housing as a “housing rights
regime.” Before the 2011 Regulation was issued, residents had no say in the decisionmaking process of the inner-city redevelopment projects that would force them to
relocate; although, Shanghai started a few pilot projects in 2007 to solicit the opinions of
residents on redevelopment and relocation. Individual residents were only involved in an
informal process to negotiate with the district government for better relocation
compensation (Ren 2011). The negotiations were carried out on a case-by-case basis;
consequently, incentive-driven behaviors and competition among residents for better
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compensation made many residents choose the strategy of deliberately not-moving, i.e.,
acting as a ‘nail household’ (Ding Zi Hu) to drag out the relocation process, in order to
secure a higher level of compensation and meet the best interests of their families (Song
et al. 2012). Therefore, Shanghai’s experience of implementing the 2011 Regulation,
particularly its expected relocation process, demands careful examination. The changing
role of residents in the housing requisition decision-making as well as the power
dynamics present in inner-city redevelopment engenders a discourse on the definition of
“public interest” in today’s China. The limited participation literature in China shows that
resident involvement was incorporated into the earliest stages of the neighborhood
planning processes for both city-center historic preservation and public space upgrading
in the southern city of Quanzhou, Fujian Province (Abramson 2004).
Literature on urban redevelopment and residential relocation in China suggests
that prior to the 2011 Regulation, community residents and organizations were excluded
from decision-making processes (He and Wu 2005; Wu 2004; Zhang 2002a; Ren 2011;
Shin 2011; Shih 2010). Despite growing demands from residents and the greater
influence of non-governmental organizations (Zhang and Fang 2004: 294), it is unlikely
that citizen participation and organized collective resistance could arise and/or become
successful in response to urban redevelopment schemes in China: “enormous obstacles
exist as to registration and securing access to financial and human resources on the part
of non-governmental, community-based organizations”. He and Wu (2005) identified the
various stakeholders in China’s inner-city redevelopment projects. There are the city
district government, the lowest city administrative unit in China, the active collaborator;
municipal government, the authoritative mediator and supervisor; private developers,
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primary participants; and urban neighborhoods and residents, the disenfranchised actors.
Shin (2011) noted that in the context of Chinese inner-city renewal, local residents were
effectively barred from taking part in the stage of project designation and design.
Community participation in neighborhood redevelopment remains at the minimal or the
bottom of Arnstein (1969)’s ladder of participation, namely manipulation, which involves
educating citizens about a proposed plan or action. Under the 2011 regulations, relocated
residents in Shanghai were able to participate in the decision-making process while
power is not redistributed. Residents are able stop a project according to the percentage
of the contracts they sign with the district government. The transparency of the
compensation schemes allowed residents to get a better idea of the whole relocation
process. Those who hold out for more compensation were less powerful under the 2011
regulations. Relocated residents’ expectation of citizen empowerment differs from the
western context claimed by Arnstein (1969). The relocated residents in Shanghai
participated for more economic benefits while Arnstein (1969)’s ladder of participation
argued for being in full charge of policy aspects and promoted social movement in citizen
empowerment.
Shih (2010) argues that the poor housing condition in Shanghai’s inner city areas,
mostly the Shanghai-style lane houses in a traditional lilong, have turned longtime
residents into willing partners of the city redevelopment coalition; however, residents’
embrace of the overall city redevelopment vision does not “necessarily ensure a
satisfactory relocation, nor does it assure the equal participation in the inner-city
redevelopment process” (Shih 2010: 352). Residents in China often lack effective means
for countering the pro-growth coalitions of the government, and as a result, governments
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and businesses leverage power imbalances to their advantage, at the cost of local
communities and residents (Phan 2005; Zhang 2002b).
Under the 2011 Regulation, the participation scheme in housing requisition allows
residents to participate in the decision-making of housing requisition project. Do these
more “participatory” approaches to housing requisition for urban redevelopment address
power relations and conflicts amongst local groups in different districts? If so, how?
What are the strategies that residents use to negotiate inner-city redevelopment? I argue
that residents’ participation is constrained by political circumstances and economic power
because the residents do not have real choices when offered financial benefits and facing
a strong government. As excluded actors begin to make and gain a voice in the decisionmaking process of housing requisition for urban redevelopment, their decision-making is
influenced by the development schemes and political context of housing requisition,
although different projects might show different patterns.
3.4 Citizen Participation in Urban Redevelopment Relocation

The literature on citizen participation in urban redevelopment in China identifies
particular characteristics of the phenomenon. First, although residents have some passive
participation in the decision-making process they need to be able to have more active
participation (Yan et al. 2011). Second, residents have more concern about their own
interests, and less for the “public interest” such as historic preservation and community
rebuilding in China. Third, residents usually take the initiative to participate, however
actual participation channels are limited (Yan et al. 2011). From the literature on urban
redevelopment in China, citizen participation, social movement participation and urban
governance, I summarize three main factors that affect residents’ participation in urban
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redevelopment relocation; they are financial compensation, residents’ place-attachment
and their trust of the government.
The factors influencing residents’ participation in urban redevelopment can be
understood in a theoretical context Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty model.
Hirschman (1970) argues that there are two ways by which people may address the
declining performance of a firm, organization, or state. To “exit,” means to abandon it.
Hirschman (1970: 30) defines “voice” as any attempt at all to change, rather than to
escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective
petition to the management, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of
forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests.
Hirschman (1970: 77) defines loyalty as a, “special attachment to an organization.” In
Hirschman’s model, loyalty increases the likelihood of pursuing voice by effectively
reducing the costs of the action.


Compensation
Li Zhang’s ethnographic fieldwork in Kunming in China shows that “most

families targeted for eviction are actually willing to give up the current place in exchange
for a new home, but they are extremely dissatisfied with the politics of compensation”
(Zhang 2004: 256). Most families are unable to afford resettlement housing with the
compensation that they receive. Through in-depth interviews, Song et al. (2012) explore
the everyday life experience of relocated residents during the process of resettlement in
Shanghai and found that the relocation process involves a battle for compensation.
Incentive-driven behavior encourages residents to stay in their home up to the last minute
to pursue more compensation in a housing requisition project. As their old homes in the
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inner city provided soon-to-be relocated residents with social networks, identity and
shelter, they commonly adopted a strategy they call “bargaining for more money by using
time”, holding out for more compensation and acting as “nail households” (households
that refuse to make room for development) (Song et al. 2012: 66). In addition, Shin
(2011: 23) found that the centrality of property values in residents’ resistance against
redevelopment and demolition also allowed local governments and developers to frame
“nail households” as the expression of selfishness that goes against the public interest.
Place-attachment
Literature in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, and urban planning has
highlighted the importance of connection to place as a force in political and social life
(Hooper 2010). Munn (2013) argues that the negative evaluations of “city improvement”
were within the overtly positive sense of the notion, only released and made overt as
improvements were problematized and their negative aspects experienced. In city
improvement projects in New York City, for instance, the value increment they create
over the value they displace engenders their own future displacement (Munn 2013). In
Shanghai, the increment on land value has pushed housing requisition projects and
overshadowed place-attachment of the residents. According to Munn (2013: 376),
“aspects of the socio-cultural milieu such as mnemonic-generational discontinuities,
contradictions between fluid monetary wealth and inherited property, and between
mobility and local attachments were integral to the relocations”. Munn (2013: 376)
further argues that,
The city improvement could presage impending spatial segmentation in the bodily
being of an old place. A place was experienced as being caught up in the potential
expansive motion of the street grid. Disintegration of a place might also be initiated
or prefigured in the severance of its socio-personal identity which could be drawn
away from its spatial body in the departure of those inhabitants who gave it their
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identity. In the moment of demolition, a place’s entire existence—the concrete space,
temporal pasts and futures and current identity held together in it were consumed as
it was torn apart.

Furthermore, studies suggest that a greater connection to place enhances one’s
sense of empowerment (Manzo and Perkins 2006). Song et al. (2012) define place
attachment as the meaningful relationships people form with places. While the western
literature on place attachment has focused either on the elements of affection, cognition,
and behavior, or interaction with cultural conformity, social belonging, and identity, Song
et al. (2012) argue that the residential relocation process has advanced the reproduction of
place attachment through constant bargaining, and that the place attachment of relocated
residents involves remembering the past in their old homes and consideration of their
future life in new places. “Bargaining place attachment” is built on the bargain between
cultural conformity, social belonging, identities, and place participation. “Bargaining”
has become not only their strategy of negotiation, but their way of being attached to or
detached from the place--Shanghai (Song et al. 2012). Moreover, bargaining place
attachment grants legitimacy to the fact that place detachment is indispensable in the
redevelopment of urban China.
In their study, Song et al. (2012) argue that relocation does not destroy place
attachment, but instead allows for the reinvention of place attachment in the process of
bargaining. Song et al. (2012: 69) illustrated that,
The orthodox culture of obedience to authority is rooted in the displaced residents'
minds, and has been utilized by the urban growth machine which imposes limitations
on the social environment. When a deep-seated socialist culture meets a shaky idea
of the market, the enabling of displaced residents during the process of relocation is
relegated to bargaining.
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Li (2015: 192) points out that the process of demolition and relocation has
destroyed patterns of everyday life and obliterated the memories and histories of many
families and communities, transforming old Shanghai homes into real estate capital and
nostalgic photographs. Qin (2013) also argues that demolition and relocation have caused
massive destruction to the patterns of daily life, especially for the economically
disadvantaged people with few resources for coping with the changes in their life.


Mis-trust
Conflict and mis-trust can be realities in all kinds of decision-making structures

(Maginn 2007). Distrust in government officials has been shown to be a significant
predictor of participation impediments (Boudet and Ortolano 2010). Distrust between
residents, government officials and developers play a critical role in the decision-making
processes of urban renewal projects. Similarly, citizens who trust the government are
more likely to display compliant behavior toward policies, laws, and regulations (Sun et
al. 2012). In the case of Shanghai, residents will move earlier or within the time frame of
a project if they trust the government; however, they will stay to the last minute and
bargain for additional money by using time if they distrust the terms of compensation
package, or a “public interest” label.
3.5 Conclusion
The limited literature on urban redevelopment and citizen participation in China
suggests that community residents and organizations are excluded from decision-making
processes (He and Wu 2005; Wu 2004; Zhang 2002a; Ren 2011; Shin 2011; Shih 2010).
He and Wu (2005) point out that in Chinese inner-city redevelopment, urban district
governments are the active collaborator, and municipal government is authoritative
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mediator and supervisor; developers are the primary participator; and urban
neighborhoods are excluded actors. Zhang (2002a) has conceptualized the features of the
socialist pro-growth coalition in Shanghai as a strong local government followed by
cooperative non-public sectors with community organizations being excluded. Shin
(2015) argues that while China’s urban accumulation may have produced new-build
gentrification, redevelopment projects have been targeting dilapidated urban spaces that
are yet to be fully converted into commodities and argues that dispossession is a
precursor to gentrification. As the state tries to build an image of modern urban life in the
city center, the social benefits of the urban poor are ignored. When the city celebrates its
neo-liberal urbanism, the socio-economic benefits of local community are sacrificed (He
2010).
Local governments almost universally control land use matters, but national
planning regulations, fiscal equalization formulae, and regional development policies
limit both the autonomy of local officials and their dependence on local economic elites;
the key arena for coalition building thus becomes central-local, rather than public-private
(Strom 1996). Scholars in Chinese studies (He and Wu 2005; Wu 2004; Zhang 2002a;
Ren 2011; Shin 2011) argued that the features of the socialist pro-growth coalition in
Shanghai are characterized as a strong local government followed by cooperative nonpublic sectors with community organizations being excluded. My dissertation will offer a
tangibly better framework for understanding the new context of urban redevelopment
regime in China. This study will examine how stakeholders play different roles in urban
redevelopment regime, the realities of citizen participation in housing requisition and
changes in the power relationships of such circumstances. This research could fit in an
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international context of how the roles of government and residents change in urban
redevelopment under economic globalization and neo-liberalization.
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present a detailed account of my methodological considerations
and research design. The purpose of my dissertation is to understand the complexities of
governance structures and community participation in housing requisition in Shanghai.
This research illustrates how the municipal and district government frames or structures
citizen participation in housing requisition relocations and investigates how residents
negotiate the processes of housing requisition projects. I compare how municipal and
district governments shape the decision-making processes and participation patterns with
different financial resources and development schemes. The research questions are as
follows:
Question 1: How are housing requisition regulations and negotiations shaped at
the district level in Shanghai?
Question 2: What role do the state and local authorities play, and how is this
associated with change in urban redevelopment regimes under neoliberal governance?
Question 3: Do the more “participatory” approaches to housing requisition for
urban redevelopment address power relations and conflicts among local groups in
different districts? If so, how?
Question 4: What strategies do residents use to negotiate inner-city
redevelopment?
4.2 Research Design
I use a multiple case-study approach for this study. Case study is valuable when
research involves empirical inquiries that investigate a contemporary phenomenon with
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its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are
not clearly evident (Yin 1994). Moreover, case study research aims for analytical
generalization from specific “results” to broader “theory” (Yin 1994). Instead of
hypothesizing causal relationships and then testing, the comparative case study approach
allows for a more sophisticated understanding of causal mechanisms. Case study method
also allows for continual refinement of hypotheses and improved operational definition of
variables throughout the study, although it does not provide information about how much
a particular variable affects the outcome in a particular case (Boudet 2010).
4.3 Methods
My empirical work relies on several methods, including in-person, semistructured interviews, non-participatory observation, and document reviews. I conducted
in-depth interviews with officials from municipal and district housing authorities,
developers, and investors, as well as residents on their roles in housing requisition
process. I use government reports, legal documents, and news articles from the popular
press about how district governments shape the decision-making processes and
participation patterns in housing requisition and residential relocation in Shanghai.
4.3.1 Multiple Case Studies
Yin (1994) suggests a multiple case study design use logic or replication, in which
the inquirer replicates procedures for each case. Researchers should choose cases
carefully so that they can predict similar results across cases, or predict contrasting results
based on a theory (Yin 1994). To better understand the factors and processes that shape
citizen participation in urban redevelopment and decision-making structures, I utilized a
two-step comparative case study approach. Case-study research in urban planning
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answers questions such as uncovering phenomena to be considered in formulating urban
public policy or describing the decision-making processes (Birch 2012). A researcher
selects a multiple case study to show repeated patterns, variation in patterns, and
exceptional examples of patterns to “offer more ample descriptions and explanations of
complex phenomena” (Birch 2012: 269). Case study approaches allow urban planning
scholars to provide information about places that other methods would not capture. The
contextual details about places are often lacking in purely quantitative studies (Birch
2012).
To answer my first research question, how housing requisition regulations and
negotiations shaped within the urban districts in Shanghai, I examine the changing public
participation mechanism through documentary reviews, interviews and observations. To
answer my second research question, what role the state and local authorities play
associated with a change in urban redevelopment regimes under neoliberal governance, I
examine four housing requisition projects in different districts in Shanghai based on
average property values, project compensation, time period and outcomes of the projects
(Table 4.1a.b; Figure 4.1), to illustrate the relationships between power decentralization,
citizen empowerment and civic engagement in negotiation strategies in housing
requisition. I analyzed the types of redevelopment in each project through an analysis of
the purpose or the goal of a regime, motivation of participation in regimes, ways of
developing a common sense of purpose within regimes, the congruence of interests, and
processes of regime development. I compare how the stakeholders in different districts
shape the participation and negotiation patterns in housing requisition projects in
Shanghai.
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To answer my third and fourth research questions, whether and how the more
“participatory” approaches to housing requisition for urban redevelopment address power
relations and conflicts among local groups in different districts and what strategies
residents use to negotiate inner-city redevelopment, I selected two housing requisition
projects in the Yangpu and Hongkou District to observe the entire process of projects
including the two-round public hearing procedures.
In an effort to identify potential cases, I reviewed key housing requisition projects
in different districts from 2012 to 2014. To examine the effect of the 2011 regulations, it
is appropriate to pick up projects started after 2011. And due to the time period I spent in
the field from 2014 to 2015, projects started before 2015 would not be a good fit. It
revealed over 50 housing requisition projects for inner-city redevelopment across 8 innercore districts in Shanghai. To narrow the enquiry to a more manageable sample frame,
potential case studies had to meet a number of criteria:




First, the project adopted the 2011 regulations and had a clear participation
scheme for relocated residents;
Second, I welcomed any cases that were stopped by the relocated
residents.
Third, on a practical level, information on the cases had to be accessible
through secondary data and interviews.
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Figure 4.1: The Locations of the Huangpu, Hongkou and Yangpu District in Shanghai

1: 10km

Source: http://lemonjoe.blog.163.com/ (edited by author from a regional map); the
irregular line within each district divides Street Office
Note: Black stars indicate locations of four cases.
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Table 4.1a: Four Selected Case Studies of Housing Requisition in Shanghai
Regulation
Case Selection
Property

Compensation

Value

Package

/ Location

Requirement Time

Status /

on Relocation Frame

Outcome

Project Size

(District)
Plan
Luxiangyuan

High

High

in Huangpu
Block 59 in

Medium

Low

Hongkou
Block 237 in

Medium

Low

~5,000

Over 80%

07.2012-

households

approve

12.2012

~1,000

Over 85%

09.2012-

households

approve

03.2013

85 households Over 85%

Putuo
Lot No. 7 in

Low

Medium

Hongkou

03.2013-

approve

12.2013

1,450

Over 85%

04.2012-

households

approve

10.2013

Source: Created by author with data from the Huangpu, Hongkou and Puotuo District.
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Approved

Denied

Approved

Approved

Table 4.1b: Case Selection and Research Questions
Q1

Citywide

Q2

4 Cases

Luxiangyuan in Huangpu;
Block 59 in Hongkou;
Block 237 in Putuo;
Lot No. 7 in Hongkou.

Q3 and Q4 2 Cases

Pingliang Block 2-3 in Yangpu;
Block 158-161 in Hongkou.

4.3.2 Case Selection
To investigate how district governments shape the decision-making processes in
Shanghai and different roles of the stakeholders, and how they determine which regimes
the redevelopment project might act as, I selected four cases at the district level. During
my preliminary field research at the end of 2012, the Luxiang Yuan Road project in the
Huangpu District was under way. My previous colleagues from Shanghai Municipal
Housing Development and Construction Center introduced me to the project manager of
that project for interviews. I identified this project as one of my cases because the
Luxiang Yuan Road project met my selection criteria. In addition, Luxiang Yuan Road
project is the largest housing requisition project in terms of affected population in
Shanghai since the 2011 regulations, and it is located in one of the most expensive blocks
in Shanghai. I then identified two cases in Hongkou because it was highly accessible
through the internet and network connections. The Hongkou District has established an
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official website on housing requisition and I also have connections with project managers
and district officials in Hongkou through my previous work experience.
The second case is Block 59 in the North Bund area in the Hongkou District.
This project was cancelled in March 2013 because it did not receive support from 85% of
area residents (Hongkou District 2013). The Block 59 project is the only project stopped
in the Hongkou District under the 2011 regulations and one of only three failed cases in
Shanghai. The third case is in the Putuo District where residents proposed the housing
requisition project first, and it had around 80 residents registered there. The fourth case is
another one in the Hongkou District where I interviewed different levels of stakeholders
from those in the district housing department to project managers.
4.3.3 Luxiang Yuan Road Project in the Huangpu District
The Luxiang Yuan Road Neighborhood is located in the city core in the Huangpu
District. The area is close to Huangpu River and is a part of the Old Town Historic
District which is 7-kilometers long. Housing prices in the surrounding area are greater
than the city average.
The area of Luxiang Yuan Road is one of the seven high-density regions in
Shanghai and a part of the “old town”. One 120-year old temple is located in Luxiang
Yuan Road Street Office15. The first phase of the redevelopment of Luxiang Yuan Road
started as early as 2002. Old walls and historic buildings were not well-kept and the
district government had torn down some historic sites before they realized their
importance. The second phase of the Luxiang Yuan Road redevelopment project started
after the government issued the 2011 regulations. The Luxiang Yuan Road project (Phase
Two) is the largest inner-core redevelopment site in Shanghai under the 2011 regulations.
15

Refer to Street Office Official Website: http://www.shtong.gov.cn
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The future plan of this area is to be developed into low-rise buildings compared to the
high-rise apartment buildings of Phase One. However, the cost of housing will be too
high for the average population to afford.
The project adopted the 2011 regulations and had a clear participation scheme for
relocated residents. The financial resources and the power of the Huangpu District
Government are greater than those of other inner-core districts. In this project, around
25% of registered residents were not living there because they owned other properties in
Shanghai and they rented the old lilong housing to migrant workers or immigrants. The
income level of residents in this project is higher than that of other housing requisition
projects.
4.3.4 North Bund-Block 59 in the Hongkou District
Block 59 was one of the largest inner-core renewal sites in Shanghai in 2012. It is
located in the Jiaxing Street Office in the Hongkou District. The Hongkou District has a
long history and deep cultural roots. The North Bund area of Hongkou District is the
landmark shipping and logistics services hub for Shanghai, serving more than 3,000
shipping and logistics companies. The major economic drivers of Hongkou are its
shipping services, knowledge industries, leisure and entertainment services and its real
estate industry (Hongkou District). In this case, residents were able to stop the project
because the residents who signed the contract with the district government on relocation
did not meet a certain percentage set up by the government.
4.3.5 Block 237 (East) Project in the Putuo District
Block 237 is located by the railway line, and 85 property titles are registered in
the east side of Block 237. The district government divided the whole area into four small
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projects. The project in the south of Block 237 has around 20 property titles with only
60% of residents signing the contract with the district government. Therefore the south
side project failed in the second round of public hearing. Residents proposed the housing
requisition project, and the district government divided the area into small lots and started
the housing requisition projects using the same compensation standard.
4.3.6 Lot No. 7 in Hongzhen Laojie in the Hongkou District
Rui Hong Xin Cheng (Short for RHXC, Shui On New City) Phase One is above
average housing price in Shanghai. The Block 7 is a part of a large area of RHXC’s
redevelopment project. Shui-on Property Company worked as a partner with the district
government and street office in this area and served as a platform for inner-core
redevelopment in the Hongkou District. Lot No. 7 is a part of the community of
Hongzhen Laojie. Hongzhen Laojie is a street of 500 meters long and is over 1,100 years
old. The residential housing was ruined by the Japanese troops during the war in 1940s.
After the establishment of People’s Republic of China, farmers poured into the city and
moved into Hongzhen Laojie area on the North Bund. The farmers worked by the
Huangpu River and squeezed into the poor housing in Hongzhen Laojie, and later
Hongzhen Laojie became a slum. In 2013, the municipal government developed a target
and quota for the Hongkou District to relocate 6,000 households per year.
4.4 Case Selection for Two In-depth Studies
Examining what the nature of participation is through four case studies in three
districts in Shanghai, I continued to ask whether participation matters through two indepth case studies. To answer my research question whether the more “participatory”
approaches to housing requisition for urban redevelopment address power relations and
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conflicts among local groups in different districts and how, and what strategies residents
use to negotiate inner-city redevelopment, I conducted two in-depth studies from June of
2014 to April of 2015: the Pingliang Block 2, 3 in the Yangpu District, and Block 158161 in Hongkou. The Pingliang project started right after I began my field research. It
was one of the representative projects in the industrial Yangpu District, and it involved
conflicts between the developer, residents and district government during the
transformation of the district set out in a plan for waterfront redevelopment. The Block
158-161 in Hongkou is also located in the waterfront area where I have some referred
interviewees I can use to investigate the whole process of housing requisition.
The in-depth comparative case studies allow me to observe how participation and
power is delivered, how consent is manufactured or falls apart and whether the efforts of
relocated residents in the participation processes matter on the district level and the case
level (Table 4.2; Figure 4.2).
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Table 4.2: Case Selection for Two In-depth Studies
Property

Compensation Project

Regulation

Time Frame Status /

Value

Package

Requirement

(from first

Location

on Relocation

round to

(District)

Plan

second

Case Selection /

Size

Outcome

round )
Pingliang Block 2-

Medium

Medium

3 in Yangpu
Block 158-161 in
Hongkou

Medium

Medium /Low

2,900

Over 85%

06.2014-

residents

approve

10.2014

1,329

Over 85%

03.2014-

residents

approve

01.2015

Source: Created by author with data from the Yangpu and Hongkou District
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Approved

Approved

Figure 4.2: Locations of Pingliang Project in Yangpu and Block 158-161 in Hongkou
(Black Stars)

1: 10km

Source: http://lemonjoe.blog.163.com/ (edited from a regional map)
Table 4.3 shows the demographic information of two street offices where the
projects are located. The population density is higher in the Jiaxing Street Office in
Hongkou than in Yangpu. Jiaxing also has a higher percentage of non-native population
with university education. Both Jiaxing and Pingliang are located on the riverside of the
city.
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Table 4.3: Demographic Information for Two Street Office (SO) for the Case Studies in
Yangpu and Hongkou

Factors
Land space (square meters)
Population Index
Permanent Resident in the Street Office
Registered population
Non-local population
Registered Permanent Population
Registered Migrant Population
Population with University Education
Registered residents with university education
Non-local population with university education
Registered migrant population with university
education
Source: Shanghai Population Statistics 2010

Name of Street Office
Yangpu Pingliang
Hongkou Jiaxing
2,810,000
2,630,000
85,870
107,213
20,770
65,662
20,208

125,634
125,183
37,224
90,004
35,630

24,874 23.20%
1,863 8.97%
1,794

8.88%

32,091 25.64%
5,762 15.48%
5,317 14.92%

4.4.1 Pingliang Block 2-3 in Yangpu
Pingliang West Lots in the Yangpu District, consisting of 0.33 square kilometers
and 16,000 households, was a part of the 2005 municipal plan to “renovate old
neighborhoods” (Jiuqu Gaizao) through the demolition of large patches of land filled with
old alleyways. The government was to stash away the empty land and auction it off to
developers for the professed purpose of improving the livelihoods of the residents who
would get cash compensation or move into modern apartments in the suburbs (Li 2015).
Pingliang Block 2, 3 is located on riverside of Yangpu. Some open-air farmers’
markets, low-end retail shops, and community alcohol stores were located in the area.
The food street crossing the area is famous for seafood in Shanghai, and the street is
closed for redevelopment in this area.
4.4.2 Block 158, 161 in Hongkou
A 2,764-meter long Tunnel Xinjian is next to the neighborhood Block 158, 161
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and connects to the Pudong District. The tunnel was completed in 2010. Several subway
stations are built around this area, and thus the location is easy to get around in the city
center. Block 158-161 is close to a landmark of cultural and creative industry in
Hongkou, the 1933 Shanghai Slaughter House (the Laochangfang). The district
government plans to build this area into a creative and cultural center on riverside of
Hongkou.
4.5 Methodology and Data Collection
4.5.1 Identification of Key Informants
To understand the realities of citizen participation in urban renewal housing
requisitions, it is necessary to identify the key informants such as local government,
developers, investors, residents, neighborhood resident committees, and street offices. I
started my field research with interviews with officials from the district government and
housing authorities to learn the impacts of the 2011 regulations on governance structure
and housing requisition processes. Professors from the School of Management at Fudan
University introduced me to visit district housing authorities and provided insights on the
implementations of the 2011 regulations on the district level. We asked the district
leaders whether all the residents had the opportunities to purchase the resettlement
housing in the same district. In addition, I inquired about the compensation incentives for
the residents who decided to receive cash compensation or signed the contract early.
My former colleagues at Shanghai Municipal Housing Construction Center and
relatives introduced some key informants to me for interviews including the director at
housing department in the Hongkou District and officials from the municipal housing
authorities. Once I selected the cases according to the selection criteria, I began
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information gathering by searching government documents regarding the cases (setting
up the projects, etc.), newspaper articles and an on-line community forums. The
documents and articles were used to identify the stakeholders such as developers,
investors and key individuals for interviews.
4.5.2 Data Collection
Collecting Quantitative and Descriptive Information
To answer my first and second research questions, how district governments
shape decision-making and negotiations in Shanghai, I reviewed government reports,
legal documents, and regulations to understand the housing requisition policies within
which my cases are situated. In addition, I reviewed compensation policies for the
affected residents in each district. Compensation package data include the average
compensation amount the relocated household can get in a community. I also reviewed
media coverage on the relocation cases as well as an on-line community forum
(www.libaclub.com) about different perspectives on housing requisitions.
For my third and fourth research questions, how “participatory” approaches to
housing requisition for urban redevelopment address power relations and conflicts among
local groups in different districts, compensation information helps to answer how
residents were affected and motivated by the compensation incentives and how their
participation was limited by the economic factors. I collected demographic information
on population and education level that allows me to better understand what strategies the
residents in the community take and why they make particular choices. My previous
colleagues also referred me to a range of materials, such as government working papers,
government policy notices, and a TV documentary on housing requisition in Shanghai.
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These materials and regulations provided ample data for me to understand how policy
had been formulated, interpreted and implemented at different levels.
Interviews with Stakeholders
Interviews can get “people’s knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations,
experiences, and interactions which are meaningful properties of the social reality”
(Mason 1996: 39). To understand how citizen participation scheme shapes the decisionmaking processes around housing requisition in Shanghai, and how residents negotiate
the processes of housing requisition projects, I conducted semi-structured in-depth
interviews with government officials, developers and residents on the 2011 regulations
and their impacts (Appendix A).
Table 4.4: Interviews by Four Cases
Officials
(District
Level)

Cases

Officials
(City
Level)

Developers

Residents Total

Luxiangyuan
in Huangpu

2

2

1

1

6

Block 59 in
Hongkou

2

2

1

0

5

East Block
237 in
Putuo

1

2

1

2

6

Lot No. 7 in
Hongkou

2

2

1

2

7

To answer my first and second research questions, how housing requisition
regulations and negotiations are shaped within the urban districts in Shanghai, I
69

interviewed project managers and district officials on: the roles different stakeholders
play in housing requisition projects; financing resources for the projects resettlement
housing schemes and the leadership of district government (Table 4.4).
For my third and fourth research questions, how “participatory” approaches to
housing requisition for urban redevelopment address power relations and conflicts among
local groups in different districts, I interviewed residents on the motivations of their
decision-making, and government officials and project managers on the impact of the
2011 regulations on social conflicts (Table 4.5). Residents I interviewed aged from 40 to
65, which represented the average age living in this area (Table 4.4; 4.5). All the
interviewees I had were married and lived with their family members. I interviewed two
migrants who had no rights in the housing requisition projects. They moved to other
informal housing nearby and did not think of claiming their rights in the relocation.
Table 4.5: Interviews by Two In-depth Cases
Cases

Interviews

Pingliang Block

Officials
(District
Level)
1

Officials
Developers
(City Level)

Residents

Lawyers

Total

2

0

2

1

6

2

2

1

2

0

7

2-3 in Yangpu
Block 158-161
in Hongkou

I recruited informants through several channels. Residents, project managers and
officials introduced by family members, relatives, friends and previous colleagues
account for the majority of my interviewees. I stopped interviewing when I received
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similar responses and no new information from the interviewees. Interviews normally
lasted for 30-90 minutes. I conducted most of the interviews with the residents at their
residence and with staff at their office. I also interviewed officials on their perspectives
on what motivates residents to participate in the decision-making of housing requisition
as some of the officials have direct experience working with relocated residents.
Site Visits and Non-Participatory Observation
I observed housing conditions on the site of six housing requisition projects, along
with residents’ daily life and the locations of resettlement housing, to understand how
“participatory” approaches to housing requisition for urban redevelopment address power
relations and conflicts among local groups as well as settings of the research and the
context of the cases. I attended the voting event for appraisal companies in the Yangpu
and Hongkou Districts to observe the voting procedure and residents’ reactions. I also
attended and observed resident meetings on housing requisition issues and voting
procedures for the cases of Pingliang in Yangpu and Block 158-161 in Hongkou (Table
4,6; 4.7). Direct observation can cover events in real time (Mason 1996). Site visits and
observation combined with the interviews helped me understand how residents negotiate
the processes of housing requisition projects and the strategies residents use to negotiate
inner-city redevelopment.
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Table 4.6: Observation in Four Cases

Project
Luxiangyuan in Huangpu
Block 59 in Hongkou
Block 237 (East) in Putuo
Lot No. 7 in Hongkou

Non-participant Observations
Observations completed
3
2
1
2

Table 4.7: Observation in Two In-depth Cases

Project
Pingliang
No 158-161

Non-participant Observations
Observations completed
18
15

Content Analysis
Content analysis is a method for determining the presence of certain words or
concepts within texts or sets of texts. It looks directly at communication via texts and gets
at the central aspect of social interaction (CSU 2013). I was able to join in the on-line
forum and reviewed on-line chatting history of the Block 158-161 project in Hongkou.
The text dated back to November 17, 2014 and was updated through April 27, 2015. It
was 1,023 pages, and covered over 100,000 Chinese words. The 468 participants were
usually young people who know how to go to Internet and chat on-line. This might bias
my findings if senior residents do not present in this on-line forum. The context helps to
answer how residents imagine the negotiation process of housing requisition and what
factors influenced their decision-making. On the other side, content analysis suffers from
disadvantages such that it is inherently reductive, particularly when dealing with complex
texts, tending too often to simply consist of word counts (CSU 2013).
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4.5.3 Data Analysis
For case studies, data analysis consisted of making a detailed description of each
case and its setting. I analyzed multiple sources of data to determine evidence for each
step in the evolution of the case (Creswell 2009; Miles & Huberman 1994). I coded and
analyzed textual interview data to identify themes and patterns in interview responses.
Qualitative analysis, with its close-up look, can deals well with the complex network of
events and processes in a situation (Miles & Huberman 1994). The overall analytic
process takes the form of a “conversation” or “discussion” with the data. The course
charted through the data is made clearer as the results are interpreted in light of relevant
theory and contextualized with information drawn from interviews with informants. The
result should be a cohesive, compelling, and robust narrative account grounded in data
that explain, to the extent possible, the typology of regimes, and whether participation
matters.
In initial coding, I looked for what I could define and discover in the data about
the impact of the factors and processes that shape citizen participation in housing
requisition. Then I began a process of winnowing out less useful codes. Some codes
assume the status of overarching ideas or propositions that will occupy a central place in
the analysis. For each case, codes exist for the context of the case (Creswell 2009). I was
then able to take what I learned from the in-depth case studies to identify the nature of the
participation and how it matters.

73

Chapter 5: Regulatory Regime of Property Practices: The Changing Public
Participation Mechanism

5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I illustrate how the government frames or structures citizen
participation in housing requisition relocation. First, an overview on compensation
scheme in housing requisition in different districts in Shanghai is presented to provide the
context of the roles of different actors in the policy making. Second, I outline the
participation mechanism in housing requisitions on the district level and decision-making
structures associated with housing requisition projects. Third, I discuss the scale of the
redevelopment and location of government subsidized resettlement housing in Shanghai,
and provide a background for resettlement housing compensation.
The changing regulatory system in Shanghai, China requires residents’
participation to approve housing requisition decisions for inner-city redevelopment
projects; such policy reform creates a new discourse for urban redevelopment and
housing requisition schemes. This chapter examines how and to what extent municipal
and district governments shape citizen participation in residential relocation and housing
requisition in Shanghai. The analysis of the regulatory system helps us better understand
the importance of the role and power of residents in inner-city redevelopment.
The State Council of China has enacted three sets of demolition regulations since
1991. The first two, in 1991 and 2001, formally legalized the practices of redeveloping
neighborhoods which required no residents’ consent and conducted forced demolitions by
administrative order. With the increasing incidence of demolition-related disputes, these
terms of demolition and relocation were revised in the new set of demolition regulations
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issued in 2011 for housing requisition and compensation. The differences between the
three sets of regulations indicate the changing state responses to the contentious issue of
demolitions over the past two decades. City governments drafted their own bylaws, often
tailored to local conditions (Ren 2014).
5.2 Regulatory Regime of Property Practices: The Changing Public Participation
Mechanism

5.2.1 The New Regulatory System for Housing Requisition
In 2011 the central government adopted the Regulation of Housing Requisition
and Compensation on State-Owned Land, after hundreds of public hearings and
revisions, to replace the 2001 National Regulation of Urban Housing Demolition and
Relocation (State Council of China 2011 & 2001). The 2011 Regulation contains several
significant changes regarding housing requisition and property taking practices. First, the
main sponsors of housing requisition projects are no longer private demolition
companies, but a newly established quasi-governmental Housing Requisition Firm
(Zhengshou Shiwusuo), affiliated with each district government. The 2011 Regulation
also forbids local governments from enforcing demolitions with administrative orders,
and all forced relocations have to go to judicial procedures (Ren 2014) and are protected
by the law. Second, the 2011 regulations require that relocated residents should receive
financial compensation comparable to the market price of their properties. In an innercity redevelopment project, once the housing requisition plan is approved by the district
government and residents through public hearings and voting, the relocated residents can
either take cash compensation for their property or exchange their property for
government subsidized housing. Residents are also entitled to temporary housing
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assistance before they move into new properties. Third, the legal system, rather than
administrative orders will provide an appeal mechanism for relocated residents to resolve
conflicts (Ye 2011; Ren 2014).
5.2.2 From “Demolition and Relocation” to “Housing Requisition”
While the 2011 Regulation mandates general citizen participation, it allows city
governments to develop detailed housing requisition plans in order to address differences
across Chinese cities (Ye 2011). The 2011 Shanghai Bylaw issued in October 2011
develops a two-round procedure of seeking public opinions on housing requisition cases.
For the first round of public hearings, at least 90 percent of residents must approve a
project. For the second round, each district establishes the necessary approval rate for the
project. The relocation project will move forward as long as the approval rating in this
round is above 80 percent (the municipal requirement). Compensation packages are
disclosed to the public for residents to monitor. The two-round participation procedure is
designed to pursue collective benefits for a majority of residents with special attention
paid to families with difficulties. The participation procedure also creates a mechanism
that coerces the minority of unwilling-to-move residents to comply with the majority
decision, leading to a more “efficient” relocation process (Interview with Official 3).
5.2.3 The Changing Role of Residents in Housing Requisition for Inner-city
Redevelopment

Under the 2011 Regulation, the major stakeholders in urban renewal housing
requisition in Shanghai include the municipal government, which establishes the
regulations; the district government, which develops the property requisition plan; the
quasi-governmental property requisition center, which manages the property requisition
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process; and the Shanghai Municipal Development and Reform Commission as well as
the Shanghai Urban Construction and Communications Commission, which supervise all
inner city renewal projects. The stakeholders also include private developers, investors,
and utility companies, as well as street offices and resident committees (see Table 5.1).
Under the 2011 Regulation, all these stakeholders should attend public hearing meetings
and jointly develop strategies and schemes regarding housing requisition and
compensation plans. The resident committee functions as an extended governmental
administrative body in the neighborhood during the planning and relocation process, and
it is a major vehicle of social service provision, especially for vulnerable groups of
people (Shin 2008; Xu 2007).
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Table 5.1: The Stakeholders in Housing Requisition for Inner-city Redevelopment
Stakeholders
Duties
Shanghai Municipal Government

Establish regulations

District Government, Municipal Housing Bureau, Municipal and

Make plans, manage,

District land reserve authorities16

implement, and
organize

Shanghai Municipal Development and Reform Commission

Supervise the projects

Shanghai Construction and Communications Commission,
Municipal Housing Construction and Development Center
Coordinate,
Developers, investors, and utilities companies

implement,
participate

Street Office, Resident Committee

Mobilize, organize

Residents

Participate, mobilize

Lawyers hired by the district government

Advise the residents

The Shanghai municipal government proposed an urban public management
innovation model and a third-party review supervision model to strengthen external
supervision on housing requisition. In 2009, the Shanghai Municipal Housing Authority,
in conjunction with the City Bar Association launched a special project, “city lawyers
involved in housing requisition work”. The Yangpu and Minhang District first initiated
this project. Lawyers, community volunteers and CPPCC (the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference) members constituted the third-party public platform. Lawyers
16

Authorities in charge of land management and reserving land for future use, including land banks.
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play an advisory role for relocated residents in the policy-making process, and dispute
mediation.
All the districts adopted an electronic contract and information system. After the
residents sign the contract with the district government, a touch screen computer displays
the entire contract and the updated percentage of the contracts signed. This allows
residents to check their relocation and compensation contracts, as well as those of other
residents, on the computer system. The residents became more active actors compared to
the old days when residents had no idea about the compensation in the community.
5.2.4 Participation Mechanisms and the Decision-making Structure in Housing
Requisitions on the District Level
“It is deep-rooted-- I mean how the residents picture relocation and housing
requisition,” one project manager from the Huangpu District noted about the 2011
regulations (Interview with Official 7). Since the 1990s, there have been numerous
demolition and construction projects. Residents who stayed to the last moment always
got the largest amount of compensation. “It is now about returning rights to the residents
(Huan quan yu min), and it is the guideline,” the project manager mentioned, who
worked with the relocated residents for over 20 years. He proposed several items in the
new regulations for housing requisition in Shanghai’s bylaw in the framework of the
2011 Regulation from the central government. The concept of relocation and housing
requisition is deep-rooted in residents’ mind and it is hard to change their thoughts about
getting benefits through moving late.
Resettlement and housing requisition plans are now included in the annual plans
of districts. In the past, once a developer obtained a relocation permit from the
government, demolition and relocation would begin. There are several differences
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between the old process and the new regulations. First, it is the district government that
sponsors housing requisition projects, not the developer. Second, the procedures are
different. The regulations require a two-round public hearing, and residents will
participate in the voting scheme of housing requisition. Third, the compensation schemes
are different. They count floor area (housing size), and not the household-size (registered
residents). It used to be a social welfare approach to count how many residents live in an
apartment and compensated every one of them. Now it is more about the housing market,
with residents being compensated according to the market value of their apartments. It is
a neoliberal turn for the housing requisition policy in Shanghai. The municipal
government assigns the market a dominant role in state-led housing requisition projects.
Large households with limited floor area suffer from the changes while residents with
more floor areas benefit from that. Fourth, the district government could no longer force
residents to move. The relocation case has to go through a judicial procedure and the
government will need to sue the residents who stay to the last minute, with the court
making the decision.
Regarding the 2011 regulations, one resident commented, “it is about its public
notice. All the information is posted on the wall and stored in the computer system, and
all the residents are able to monitor it. You can follow every step with the regulations;
therefore it is simpler to operate.” Now the main sponsor of a housing requisition project
is the local government rather than the developer. District governments now will have to
empty the land first. Afterwards, the land will go through the auction process to secure
developers and investors. A second point is that a developer can no longer decide
whether residents must move.
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The Deputy Director of the Shanghai Construction and Communication
Commission, Rong Ni, who proposed the two-round public hearing process for housing
requisition in Shanghai argued that the regulation should eliminate the conflicts that
might arise during the housing requisition process, “this new policy is to let relocated
residents make choices and decisions”, Rong said in an interview in a documentary, “it
aims to provide justice and fairness to the residents. There will be a negotiation process
during the public hearing period between the district government and community
residents as a collective effort” (CCAV Documentary 2014). If the negotiation does not
favor the disadvantaged group, the so-called public hearing process is not effective. The
nail-households who stay to the last will not get more compensation, which is fair in
terms of compensation level. Those households who have more registered individuals but
few floor areas might be put in a disadvantaged position.
5.2.5 Why 85% as the Approval Level
For the second round of public hearings, the district government usually sets the
approval rate level at 85% as the 2011 Regulation requires at least 80% of residents to
agree to a move. A rate of 85% or 90% could have different impacts. It took the experts
on housing requisition in Shanghai 5 years’ research to set this threshold (Interview with
Official 7).
If the first round, and even the second round of asking for consent from the
residents require 70% of approval, then considerable work needs to be done after the
project is approved. The remaining 30% of residents would be much more powerful than
15%. However, if 90% approval is required, it would take the district government and
other stakeholders much negotiation and communication with residents before they agree

81

to move. Therefore, 85% proved to be an appropriate level. When asked whether an 85%
approval standard could show fairness, the project manager and officials from the district
argued that housing requisition is for the sake of the residents, to improve their living
conditions, therefore they require that the minority be subordinated to the majority. “It is
fair in this sense for public interest at this stage” (Interview with Official 1, 2, 3, 7, &
Project Manager 1).
Another challenge is to regain the trust of residents. Manager Zhang from the
Huangpu District first proposed the touch screen e-file system in 2011, which allows
individuals to examine the compensation contract for all residents, increasing the
transparency of the relocation and compensation process (CCAV Documentary 2014).
The e-file system is currently utilized in every housing requisition project for urban
redevelopment in Shanghai. Manager Zhang insisted that everyone should be treated
equally and residents who held out or prolonged their stay should not receive any
additional benefits. However, some project managers from other districts did not agree
with him. The cost of extending the project period put pressure on many project
managers.
In the Hongkou District, the district government sets up a supervisory review
panel for each housing requisition project. Resident representatives are able to keep an
eye on all public-notices and the process of the selection of appraisal companies, and so
forth. For the Block 93 project in the Hongkou District, the Supervisory Review Panel
included staff from the police station, property management companies, the resident
committee, the street office, law firms and 3-5 resident representatives. Some residents
might doubt the helpfulness of the resident representatives and whether they standby the
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district government side. The Putuo District also uses a supervisory review panel to
oversee and even determine the outcome of negotiations (Interview with Resident 8 and
Project Manager 3).
5.2.6 Procedures for the Two-Rounds of Public Hearings in Housing Requisition
The two-round resident participation process has specific aims. In the first round,
a public hearing is held regarding the possibility of a proposed inner-city renewal housing
requisition project; in other words, the public hearing is to determine whether more than
90% of residents in the neighborhood are willing to move and would approve the project.
In the second round, the public hearing is to solicit opinions on housing requisition and
compensation plans. Residents do not really participate in making and developing the
plans. In the beginning, the district government identifies the geographic location of the
proposed housing requisition project. Then the street office conducts a survey among the
to-be-relocated residents, collecting every household’s opinion, door by door, and
making survey results available to the public afterwards. If more than 90% of the
households approve the project, the project may move to the next phase — applying for
construction and land planning permits. If less than 90% of the households agree to
move, the project will be terminated (Shanghai Municipal Government 2011; Figure 5.1;
Table 5.2).
The 2011 Regulation requires a “two-round public hearing” mechanism in urban
renewal property takings in Shanghai. First, it considers whether residents are willing to
move and approve the project before they start discussing the compensation. Second, it
seeks/solicits public opinions on property taking and compensation plans. The public
hearing organizers constitute members from district government, district land reserve
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center, housing requisition center, investors, the street office, developers and resident
committee etc. The district government identifies the project area for urban renewal.
Then the street office delivers the survey forms door to door to the households and makes
the survey results available to the public. If more than 90% of the residents approve the
project, the project will continue. Then the district land reserve center (there are land
reserve centers at both the municipal level and the district level) is able to apply for
construction and land planning permits after the street office provides the land reserve
center with the written approval according to the survey results. If less than 90%
residents approve, the project will have to stop.
Once the land reserve authorities receive the construction and land development
permits, the district government will develop and propose a compensation and
resettlement plan and start to solicit opinions from residents. The proposed plan includes
the compensation and incentive package, the project time period, a list of certified
appraisal agents, the standard procedures for purchasing resettlement apartments, and the
criteria for determining the households with hardship. Residents have 15 days to submit
their written opinions on the compensation and resettlement plan. The district
government will revise the plan according to resident feedback and finalize the
compensation and resettlement plan so that the land reserve authorities can apply for the
housing requisition and relocation permit and move the housing requisition project
forward. Not all of the comments from residents are able to be incorporated into the
revised plan.
The finalized compensation and resettlement plan then becomes available for
residents to sign as a legally binding agreement. During the time period of the signing of
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the agreement, usually two to three months, the percentage of residents that sign the
agreement should reach 80-85%; without reaching this threshold, the project is
terminated and the already signed agreements become invalid. To encourage resident
participation at this stage, the district government utilized various approaches. For
instance, a housing requisition project in 2014 used a smartphone service and sent
project-related information to residents, including regulations, policies, and updated news
of the progress of the housing requisition. Tech-assisted communication increases
interactions between the district officials and residents, although it might exclude those
who do not have the resources to purchase or use a smartphone.
Table 5.2: Formal Decision-making Processes of Housing Requisition in Shanghai
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.

Preparation work for housing requisition by the district government;
First round public hearing on residents’ willingness to move;
If it reached 90%, approval;
Recording the housing information into computer database;
The district government developing requisition and compensation plan;
Modify the plan and publish to the residents;
Official notice on housing requisition;
Input compensation and resettlement information for each household;
Select appraisal company, set the selection stage for the residents and get the a
assessed price;
Publish resettlement housing information;
Sign the contract;
E-contract complete;
Publish the e-contract;
If reached 80%, e-contract valid;
Residents moving and the district government demolishing the housing.
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Figure 5.1: Procedures of the Two-Rounds of Public Hearings in Housing Requisition
Projects in Shanghai

District government identifies the project area
according to the housing conditions, development
plan and location

Street office posts proclamation to solicit public
opinions

Door to door inquiry form (including redevelopment
plan, national and local property taking policies, etc.)

Publications of the result of public opinion

If more than 90% residents agree to
move, project continues.

If less than 90% residents agree to
move

Land reserve authorities get confirmation from street
office and then apply for project permission

Project stops

Making plans and soliciting opinions from the
residents. The authorities work out property taking
and compensation plan for proclamation for 15 days.

The property taking authorities revise the
compensation plan according to the written
comments submitted by the residents.
If more than 85% residents sign the property
taking and compensation agreement within
2-3 months, the agreement is valid.

Property taking project takes effect.
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If less than 85% residents sign
the property taking and
compensation agreement

Source: State Council of China 2011; Shanghai Municipal Government 2011.
5.3 Spatial Restructuring of Shanghai’s Residents from Housing Requisition
According to Song’s analysis of the spatial distribution of China’s affordable
urban housing projects (2011), the Chinese city government has paid much more
attention to the economic rather than social costs of urban development and
redevelopment. The spatial distribution of urban government subsidized housing across
China would intensify the differentiation of social classes. With the rising cost of
obtaining inner-city land for housing projects, wealthy people occupy urban centers
where the land is more expensive, while low- and middle-income people are forced to the
fringes of the city. Government intervention in the housing market through affordable
housing policies has shaped the overall socio-spatial structure at the city level (You
2006). The socio-spatial structure was characterized by a mixed pattern of different kinds
of neighborhoods in inner cities and suburbs; however, increasingly low-cost housing is
clustered in the suburbs. The locations of subsidized public housing projects in Shanghai
are either on the outskirts of the city or at the edge of urban districts. From 2003 to 2009,
thirteen Economical and Comfortable Housing (government-subsidized housing) projects
were planned and developed by the Shanghai Housing Construction and Development
Center (SHCDC), involving 184,500 households, nearly 550,000 people, and over 18
million square meters of total construction. Most of the affordable housing sites are
located near the city’s outskirts and are connected to the city center by subway (SHCDC
2013; Table 5.3; Figure 5.2 a; Figure 5.2 b). The distance from a government subsidized
public housing to the relocated apartments in the city core varies from 15km to 30 km.
All the relocated residents were able to purchase resettlement housing or affordable
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housing in the outskirts at a discounted price. However, only middle or upper class
residents can afford resettlement housing in the same district in an inner-city
redevelopment project.
Figure 5.2 a: Locations of Shanghai Resettlement Housing on the Municipal Level (2014)

Source: http://lemonjoe.blog.163.com/ (edited from a regional map)
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Figure 5.2 b: Planning and Construction of Large-scale Residential Communities in
Shanghai in 2014

Source: Shanghai Municipal Housing Construction Center 2014
Note: The inner circle is where the inner-core districts are located.
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Table 5.3: Affordable Housing Nodes in Shanghai by 2009
Nodes
Construction (Meters2) Population
GC1 in Baoshan
1,170,000
38,000
JQ in Jiading
1,700,000
52,000
ZP in Pudong
1,470,000
43,000
KQ in Pudong
1,080,000
34,000
PJ in Minhang
1,940,000
60,000
LD in Baoshan
2,050,000
63,000
GC2 in Baoshan
520,000
19,000
HX in Qingpu
900,000
27,000
SJ in Songjiang
1,000,000
30,000
CL in Pudong
2,590,000
68,000
HT in Pudong
1,470,000
48,000
PJ1 in Minhang
1,230,000
37,000
PJ2 in Minhang
890,000
27,000
Total
18,010,000
546,000
Source: Zhu 2009.
Note: Construction refers to both actual and planned developments.
The large-scale residential communities in Shanghai can host 546,000 relocated
residents (Table 5.3). Most of the large-scale residential communities are located in the
outskirts of shanghai (Figure 5.2 b). While pursuing “highest and best use” of land
development, the municipal government mismatched the housing planning sites and the
convenience of relocated residents’ daily life.
5.4 Conclusions
The 2011 regulations provide a more transparent, open and interactive process for
community residents who are directly affected by the housing requisition projects.
Residents are able to participate in the resettlement plan-making and decide the fate of
the housing requisition project. The new policy offers residents the opportunity to
participate in redevelopment, which helps maintaining the social stability. When residents
feel they have some control over the project, they are more satisfied about the relocation
process. To the extent that the regulations enhance resident satisfaction, they are a
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positive change. The regulations also provide a clear time frame for housing requisition
projects and drive residents out earlier with incentives and make the relocation process
“more efficient”.
However, the term of “public interest” is ambiguously defined under the 2011
Regulation. The 2011 regulations encourage two controversial practices as ways of
promoting the public interest, construction of affordable housing and requisition of old
housing, and thus offer leeway for city governments to acquire land and relocate residents
for a large variety of redevelopment projects. Classifying the redevelopment of old
neighborhoods as developing in the public interest maintains the status quo by allowing
local governments to continue their practice of using demolition to stimulate the local
economy (Ren 2014). The district government needs to fulfill the political goals of the
municipal government to demolish a certain amount of the old housing each year. At the
same time, the district government needs to maintain the social stability on the district
level to meet the needs of relocated residents.
In the next chapter I discuss the nature of participation in housing requisition in
Shanghai. The state and local government promotes “public interest” through inner-city
redevelopment, resettlement housing and affordable housing construction that might
improve the living environment of the affected residents. However, the lower-income
residents are driven out of the inner-city and the social mix of inner-city neighborhoods is
lost. The diverse characteristics of the place are dispossessed through housing requisition
projects. There is a need in China to carefully examine and define “public interests” in
order to truly promote equitable outcomes of citizen participation in housing requisition.
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Chapter 6: The Dynamics of the Housing Requisition Projects in Shanghai
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I examine the dynamics of the housing requisition and what roles
the state and local authorities play in urban redevelopment regimes. I explain how district
governments shape the decision-making processes and participation patterns, how
participatory schemes in urban redevelopment address power relations and conflicts
amongst local stakeholders on district levels, how residents participated in the decisionmaking activities, and why. I answer the research questions through an analysis of four
housing requisition projects in Shanghai (Table 6.1).
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Table 6.1: Summary of Projects

Case Selection

Property

Compensation

/ Location

Value

Package

Project Size

(District)

Regulation

Time Frame

Status /

Requirement on

(closing by

Outcome

Compensation

second round )

Contracts
Case 1:

High

High

Luxiang Yuan

~5,000

Over 80%

07.2012-

households

approve

12.2012

~1,000

Over 85%

09.2012-

households

approve

03.2013

Approved

in Huangpu
Case 2: Block

Medium

Low

59 in Hongkou
Case 3: Block

Medium

Low

85 households Over 85%

237 (East) in

03.2013-

approve

12.2013

1,450

Over 85%

04.2012-

households

approve

10.2013

Denied

Approved

Putuo
Case 4: Lot
No. 7 in

Low

Medium

Hongkou

Source: Created by author with data from the Huangpu, Putuo and Hongkou District
6.2 The Setting of the Participation Paradigm for Four Cases
6.2.1 Luxiang Yuan Road Project in the Huangpu District
The Luxiang Yuan Road Neighborhood, located in the city core in the Huangpu
District, is one of the seven high-density regions in Shanghai and a part of the “old
town”. The area is closed to the Huangpu River which has the river-view from above 16th
floor of apartment complex. It is a part of the 7-kilometer long Old Town Historic Area
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Approved

and next to Yu Garden, a popular tourist site in Shanghai. This historic area has access to
good public service facilities located in the city center.
Figure 6.1: Location and Area of Luxiang Yuan Road Project

Source: Google Earth (Edited by author)
The Luxiang Yuan Road project area extends east to South Henan Road, south to
Dajing Road, west to Luxiang Yuan Road and north to Fuyou Road (Figure 6.1). The
renewal plan for this area includes high-end residential and commercial complex
development. The developer for this project, Shanghai Chengtou Corporation is
affiliated with Shanghai Municipal Government (Shanghai Chengtou News 2012).
In total, 5,056 households and 4,138 property titles were registered in this area,
with a floor area of 120,000 square meters. Roughly 25% of registered residents do not
live in the project; they rent their apartments to immigrants from outside of Shanghai and
live in other properties they have elsewhere in the city. Better-off residents usually move
out of the apartments who owned several properties in the city. More senior citizens and
migrants live in the community.
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6.2.2 North Bund-Block 59 in the Hongkou District
Block 59 was one of the largest inner-core renewal sites in Shanghai in 2012. It is
located in the Jiaxing Street Office in the Hongkou District. The Hongkou District has a
long history and deep cultural roots. The North Bund area of Hongkou District is the
landmark shipping and logistics services hub for Shanghai, serving more than 3,000
shipping and logistics companies. The major economic drivers of Hongkou are its
shipping services, knowledge industries, leisure and entertainment services and its real
estate industry (Hongkou District). In this case, residents were able to influence the fate
of the project.
Block 59 was one of the largest inner-core renewal sites in Shanghai in 2012
which involved over 1,000 residents. Four streets-- Xinjian Road, Dong Changzhi Road,
Gaoyang Road, and Dong Daming Road-- surrounded the redevelopment area. Block 59
was located in the North Bund area, across from the Shanghai International Shipping
Center, a facility that was abandoned before operation began because of the limited
height of the ships they can carry in that downtown location.
The first round public hearing started in September of 2012 and over 90% of the
residents passed the first round without talking about the compensation. The second
round public hearing period was between September 28, 2012 and March 8, 2013. The
public hearing was extended to March 27, 2013 based on resident requests. On the
closing date of March 27, 790 households signed the contracts, accounting for 76.03% of
total registered households, less than 85% required by the district government in
Hongkou (District Website 2013). In April 2013, the district government announced that
the Block 59 project in the Hongkou District failed because not enough households
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signed the contract according to the regulation. When the Hongkou District government
announced the result of the vote, those who wanted to move cried loudly on site
(Interview with Official 2). After the announcement, the district government offered
5,000 Yuan to each household that had signed the contract. This compensation was not
mentioned in the contract or regulation and was a project by project thing. Some residents
argued that those who had already signed the contract should not be treated like this and
they could sue the government about the contract they already signed.
In 2012, the block right next to Block 59 underwent an auction in which the
developer bid 5.68 billion Yuan for the land (Sina News 2012). This land leasing price
broke the record in North Bund area in Year 2012. Although it is not clear which
developer will participate in redeveloping Block 59 area, it shows that the land leasing
between the district government and a developer will be a pro-growth coalition for
“highest and best use” development.
6.2.3 Block 237 Project in the Putuo District
Block 237 is located by a railway line, which affects the land value of this area for
future redevelopment as a whole because the parcel of the land was divided by the
railway. The east side has 85 properties registered and passed the second round public
hearing smoothly. The project in the south of Block 237 has around 20 property titles but
only 60% of residents signed the contract with the district government. Residents
proposed the housing requisition project and the district government divided the area into
small lots and started the housing requisition projects using the same compensation
standard. However, the project result is different.
There is a large refrigerated warehouse facility standing right next to the south
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section and Jiangqiao Food Company owns the property. The redevelopment of Block
237 cannot start because the land is not empty yet. The redevelopment plan of the south
section of housing requisition will not start again until 2018 (Putuo 2015).
The apartments located on Block 237 (south) belonged to a private college and
were used as teachers’ dormitory. The current residents on the south section cannot reach
an agreement with the district government because the residents consider the condition of
the existing housing better than the district government claims. After the Expo 2010
Shanghai, only half of the neighborhood remained and the other half was relocated. Many
residents thought the housing requisition project should use the old policy which was
implemented before 2011 because the old policy counted the population registered in the
apartments rather than the square meters of the apartment. Many residents had prepared
for a long time and transferred the Hukou17 of their family members into the relocated
housing. It started the first round public hearing in March 2013. The project (east) started
second round public hearing in September and ended in December 2013 and reached
89.53% on the closing date.
The project is among the pioneers in using new model of financing for the
investor, the West Group, which is affiliated with the Putuo District government. The
West group has entered into a financing agreement with the Bank of Shanghai, to ensure
the funds for housing requisition (West Group News 2013). The Land Development
Center in the Putuo District participated in the implementation of Block 237 project.
Third party members such as Shanghai People's Congress members and CPPCC18
members participated in the inspection of this project (West Group News 2013). The

17
18

Hukou is a record in a system of Chinese household registration.
CPPCC: Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
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Bank of Shanghai is a joint-stock company involves state funding, foreign investment
and personal shares.
6.2.4 Lot No. 7 in Hongzhen Laojie in the Hongkou District
The Hongkou District is one of the oldest districts of Shanghai. It contains high
concentrations of shanty housing and the largest amount planned of housing requisition
and lilong redevelopment projects. By 2012, the district still had 1.52 million square
meters of old lilong housing and more than 62,000 households lived in housing with poor
conditions. For this project, the Hongkou District did not allow the developer to take
charge of the housing requisition project but around 60 social workers to take the jobs
and work with relocated residents. It took 18 days for 85% households to sign the
contract with the district government and “close” the project.
Rui Hong Xin Cheng (Short for RHXC, Shui On New City) has had six phases of
development by 2015. The Phase One was above average housing price in Shanghai and
second to locations such as where Luxiang Yuan Project in the Huangpu District. The Lot
No. 7 is one of the redevelopment projects of RHXC which is located in the North Bund
in the Hongkou District. Shui-on Property Company worked as a partner with the district
government and street office in this area and served as a platform for inner-core
redevelopment in the Hongkou District. Lot No. 7 is a part of the community of
Hongzhen Laojie. Hongzhen Laojie is a street 500 meters long that has existed for over
1,100 years. The residential housing was ruined by the troops during the war in 1940s.
After the establishment of People’s Republic of China, farmers poured into the city and
moved into the Hongzhen Laojie area on the North Bund. The farmers worked by the
Huangpu River and squeezed into the poor housing in Hongzhen Laojie. The Hongzhen
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Laojie became a slum at that time. Redevelopment efforts to improve and upgrade
housing started in the 1990s.
The Hongkou District government planned to redevelop Lot No. 7 in the
Hongzhen Laojie area in 1995 and the developer started demolishing the housing block
by block. The project stopped when the developer ran out of money. The district
government restarted the project in April 2012 and it passed the first round public hearing
at 98.9%. The project was suspended at the end of 2012 because the district government
could not secure enough funding. In 2013, the municipal government targeted the
Hongkou District for redevelopment and set out to relocate 6,000 households. The district
government decided to relocate the whole Hongzhen Laojie area to reach the
redevelopment quota required by the municipal government.
The district government started the second round public hearings in the third
quarter of 2013 and finished the second round public hearing in 18 days, receiving 85%
of residents’ support on October 7, 2013. Residents living in the Hongzhen Laojie were
mostly low-income residents, immigrants from other provinces and senior residents. 94%
of residents confirmed their agreement to the relocation scheme in December 2014 (Shui
On Annual Report 2014).
6.3 Coalition Building and Motivation of Participants
For the four cases I studied, two of cases had developers that provided financial
support in housing requisition and made development plan on the vacated site. Two
projects had no developers that the district governments would reserve the land for future
development such as building infrastructure facility or leasing to a developer for
redevelopment.
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6.3.1 Coalition Building with the Developers
Chengtou Group--Municipal Urban Renewal Platform (Case 1)
The Shanghai Chengtou Group is owned by the Shanghai Municipal Government
and contracted with the district government of Huangpu to rebuild the Luxiang Yuan
Road project. It functions as a platform for urban redevelopment in Shanghai. The city
established an urban renewal foundation that enabled Chengtou to use municipal funding
for up to 40% of the total redevelopment costs in this project, and the Chengtou Company
invested the remaining 60% (Interview with Project Manager 1). The developer
complained, however, that the district government leases for the land were too costly.
The development cost for the high-end residential buildings on the same location will
reach RMB 65,000 Yuan/m2, and the retail price will have to be 80,000/m2 for the
company to make any profits (Interview with Project Manager 1). For the Phase One
project at Luxiang Yuan, the retail price averaged 85,000/m2. The Chengtou Company
sold 113 apartments in this project in 2013, a total area of 27,300 square meters, making
a profit of nearly 2 billion yuan (163 News 2014).
Partnership between the Government and the Developer--Shui On Group (Case2)
Shui On Group, a Hong Kong based company started its business in real estate in
Shanghai as early as 1990s. The company built good relations with the Shanghai
Municipal Government and different districts including Hongkou and Luwan. The Asian
Financial Crisis in 1996 pushed Shui On to transfer most of its capital assets to Shanghai
(Yang and Chang 2007). The Hongzhen Laojie redevelopment started in early 1990s, and
the Shui On Group had served as the developer since 2004. Shui On has a strong
connection with the Hongkou district government. From Table 6.2, the relocation cost as
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of December 31 of 2014 reached 3,063 million RMB Yuan and the Shui On Annual
Report (2014) showed Shui On held 100% share of interest in this project.
The West Group as a Stakeholder (Case 3)
The West Group, which is affiliated with the Putuo District government, is the
investor of the Block 237 project. The West group has entered into a financing agreement
with the Bank of Shanghai, to ensure the funds for housing requisition (West Group
News 2013). The Land Development Center in the Putuo District participated in the
implementation of Block 237 project; there was no developer. The West Group
represented the district government and served as a stakeholder of the project.
Lot No. 7 in Hongzhen Laojie in the Hongkou District (Case 4)
The Hongkou District Government sponsored the Lot No. 7 project and the
district government did not select any developer for this project. The plan is for the
district government to organize a bidding process to recruit the developer.
Table 6.2: Details of the Relocation Progress of Lot 7 in Rui Hong Xin Cheng (RHXC)

Project

Percentage of
relocation as of
31 December
2014

Leasable
and
saleable
GFA

Relocation
cost paid as
of 31
December
2014

Estimated
outstanding
relocation
cost as of 31
December
2014

Actual /
Estimated
relocation
completion
year

sq.m. RMB’million RMB’million
RHXC Lot 7
(Residential)
94% 160,000
Source: Shui On Land Limited Annual Report (2014: 64)

3,063

1,035

6.3.2 Motivation of Participants or Stakeholders
Understanding national and local differences in the composition of regimes can
help to explain variation in motivations and politics. Private interests have not played a
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2,015

driving role in development in China. In the US context, politicians or government
officials may see partnership with the private sector or community organizations as a way
of winning public support and getting things done or perhaps advancing their political
careers. Residents may approach the issue of participation with a clear focus on how the
issue would benefit them. However, in the housing requisition projects all over Shanghai,
the district governments held political tasks from the municipal government to finish the
projects in a certain time period (one year plan or five-year plan) and Shanghai Municipal
Government set housing requisition for inner-city redevelopment as model projects for
residents after the 2011 Regulation. Still, residents consider the benefit of the projects.
Knowledge can join economic position as a key resource that gives groups
privileged access to decision-making (Stoker and Mossberger 1994). Local knowledge
matters in the coalition building in the Huangpu project. The project manager used to
work in other Shanghai districts that did not allow the district to offer more compensation
to drive the residents out of the places earlier. This attitude differed from that of prior the
officials in the Huangpu District who did not follow the relocation policy quite well and
used financial incentives to deliver the land earlier to the developer, the Chengtou
Company before the 2011 Regulation was issued. This project manager felt working staff
did not follow him as well as the group of people he used to work with in the Luwan
District. By April 2014, 5% residents still had not signed the contracts (Interview with
Project Manager 1).
6.3.2.1 Political Achievement: The Politics of Historic Preservation
Politics is about shaping or molding preferences and developing a common sense
of purpose among a limited range of actors (Strom 1996). The Luxiang Yuan area is
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located in the Old Town Historic District (2006 List) in Shanghai. Among the area of
120,000 square meters, the district government had more than 30,000 square meters of
old buildings preserved at the time of housing requisition, named Cixiu Temple (An) and
Kaiming Lane (Li). The developer felt it was not necessary to preserve these historic
buildings because the developer could not use the historic structures efficiently and it
destructed the whole redevelopment area (Interview with Project Manager 1).
The Shanghai Municipal Government released regulations on historic
preservation in 2002, requiring that 34 streets in this old historic area be preserved.
Luxiang Yuan Road is one of the 34 streets that need preservation. The regulation
requires the district government to preserve historical features of the streets in this area.
However, the district government partnered with the state-owned corporation, Chengtou
Group, to rebuild this area for tax revenue from the land and build into a symbolic
landmark for high-end population, thus a large portion of lilong housing disappeared in
2014 (Figure 6.2, 6.3).
Figure 6.2: Satellite Images of Luxiang Yuan Area before Demolition of Housing in
April 2014

Source: Google Earth
Figure 6.3: Satellite Images of Luxiang Yuan Area after Housing Requisition and
Demolition in January 2015
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Source: Google Earth

The remaining two historic buildings, one of which, the Cixiu Temple, is on the
list of municipal conservation for historic buildings, while the old lilong Kaiming Lane is
on the district’s preservation list, a lower level of preservation. The district government
expropriated Kaiming Lane from the residents but planned to keep preserving the original
structures after those experts on historic preservation appealed. Before the 2011
regulations, in the Phase One redevelopment of Luxiang Yuan, a substantial portion of a
458-year-old ancient city wall of Shanghai was removed by the developer (Dongfang
Daily 2011). The Chengtou Company also demolished two historic courtyard-style
mansions in this old town district area. Residents and historians argued that the
developers had not demolished the really poor housing but the historic decent ones “for
the high land value in those areas.” The political achievement addressed more on the
economic growth in the district rather than the value of the historic buildings.
6.3.2.2 The Decision-making Structure and Process
After the first round public hearing, more than 40 percent of households presigned the compensation agreement in Luxiang Yuan Road. Relocated residents who
chose to participate in the formal decision-making structures provided by the district
104

government acted actively in the neighborhood. In order to get a new resettlement
apartment located at the periphery of the city with relatively better transportation
connections and community services, quite a few relocated residents waited by the door
of the district property taking center three days before the first official day to sign the
property taking and compensation agreement. The implementation policy made by the
Huangpu District government required that 80 percent of residents agree to move in the
second public hearing before the relocation project could continue. The district
government and other stakeholders including the street office, resident committee,
investors and developers, held more than 30 informal discussion meetings with residents
over a three-week period before the second round of public hearings.
The district government started the second round public hearing in July16 in 2012
and by November 5th, 80% of the residents had signed the contract. Therefore, the project
was approved. Tons of news media covered this approval that day while the Putuo case of
Block 237 had limited exposure only in district-owned newspaper. The relocated
residents participated in the two-round public hearing and public meetings held by the
Huangpu District. The residents suggested more resettlement housing in the same district
of Huangpu, therefore the working staff informally searched some housing information in
the nearby area and posted it in the housing requisition center for the residents. However,
those second-hand apartments were not popular among the residents because the unit
prices were beyond the purchasing power of the relocated residents. Economic growth
exists not as a goal in itself, but as an activity that must conform to the regime's broader
values about what the city is or should be. The urban revitalization regime purports to
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change the city's image in order to attract investment and/or middle-income or highincome residents.
6.3.2.3 Leadership of the District Government
Many residents believed the leadership of the district government played a big
role: “when the district official did not push or did not have the ability such as the
decision-making and financial resources to launch the project, the housing requisition
project can stop and restart several times” (Interview with resident 3 and 4). A new
administration team led the 18-day “victory” on housing requisition in Hongzhen Laojie
when the district head moved from the Zhabei District to Hongkou. Municipal
government makes the decisions on the appointment of Head of each district. It reveals
that the municipal government pays much attention on the Hongzhen Laojie Project. And
the leadership of the district plays a big role in housing requisition for urban
redevelopment.
Eighteen Days for Eighteen Years
Hongzhen Laojie became synonymous with Shanghai’s shantytowns over the past
20 years. The area reached a new record when 85% residents signed the contract with the
district government after October 19, 2013, 18 days after the district government initiated
the second round public hearing. This project started 18 years ago and never ended until
the new district head was determined to close this case. When 4,350 households moved
out of the old lilong housing, the shantytown would finally disappear from the landscape
of Shanghai. Before the households and the district government signed the formal
compensation and housing requisition contract, the Jiaxing Street Office, the headquarter
of the relocation (Dongqian Zhihuibu) held 114 “roundtable” meetings for 3,000
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residents in 7 days. The steering committee at the headquarter arranged social workers in
the interpretations of the relocation policies for the residents, collected and answered 455
questions raised under six categories from the relocated residents. The previous approach
was to hold an assembly for all the 3,000 residents and there was no face to face
communication between the district government and residents for the information-sharing
procedure of housing requisition.
6.3.2.4 Participation: The Street Office Perspective
The street office represents the lowest level of government authorities and
conveys credibility and trust to the residents. One street officer from the Putuo District
described the relationships among the stakeholders,
“We did all the work. We are not the sponsoring part but we have to work with the
residents. As you know, in China people do not talk to those who they do not know
well. Our street office and resident committee can represent the interests of the
residents. The housing requisition team consists of the demolishing company that
works for the district government and different departments of coordination unit. The
residents would consider the demolishing company representing the opposite
interests with them. Only the resident committee and the street office would gain the
trust from the residents. Residents know the people from resident committee very
well and it works when the staff from resident committee gives suggestions to the
relocated residents” (Interview with Official 7).

The Putuo District No. 1 Street Office coordinated with the district government
on housing requisition projects as the district government usually required that. All the
working staff was allocated into different groups on the housing requisition project.
There were fewer than ten employees in the No. 1 Street Office and everyone was in
charge of one community issue such as child care, senior activities, or the unemployed.
For housing requisition alone, the No. 1 Street Officers have two functions. First, the
groups who were in charge of coordination visited the relocated households one by one to
hear their concerns. For this case, there were 85 households therefore it was feasible for
local officers to visit and talk to most of the residents at their apartments. The officers did
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not have one day off during the housing requisition project in 2013. Secondly, the No. 1
Street Office made newsletters on housing requisition about the regulation and some
other information to clarify the policy.
“The transparency of the projects defeated the rumors sometimes. Some residents
would like to advocate and asked their neighbors to stay to the last minute. They
even mentioned they had relatives working at the Putuo District Government and
they knew all the policies and regulations. Finally they signed the contract before the
deadline and neighbors saw their names posted on the wall and on-line system, then
the rumors proved unfounded. It was very important for us to make sure everyone
gets what they deserve; otherwise, we will be in trouble. We have to be clear no one
can get more than what they deserve, or it will not be fair” (Interview with Official
7).

As mentioned, meeting the desires of higher government is the real concern of
local leaders in China because their jobs come from superior officials rather than from
elections. The street officers will be “in trouble” if they do not perform well by
implementing the policy in its right way. The district government will judge the political
performance of the street office by how well they perform the duty. The “fairness”
mentioned here refers to treating every household according to the same compensation
standard.
The duty of the street office also includes political tasks such as propelling
housing requisition. In 2013, the municipal government set the target for the Putuo
District to demolish 5,300 square meters old lilong housing. Under the 2011 Regulation,
the inner-city redevelopment housing requisition projects should only use for land
reserve. The district government will then put the vacant land on the auction market in
the future. If housing requisition is not so called a “political task”, it should be designed
to meet more of the needs of the relocated residents rather than political achievement and
economic pillar in the district.
6.4 A Common Sense of Purpose
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6.4.1 Compensations and Incentives
Stone (1989: 186) argues that the traditional solution to the collective-action
problem has been selective incentives; that is, to supplement group benefits by a system
of individual rewards and punishment administered so as to support group aims. Those
residents who go along with the group receive individual rewards and services, those who
do not go along lose valuable benefits. In the four relocation projects, incentives play a
large role in persuading residents to move out of their residences earlier. There is an
incentive fee for the residents of certain blocks who move earlier than other blocks, thus
the participation of the residents is affected by the incentives. For example, in the
Luxiang Yuan project the average sale price for the original apartment on the site was
assessed as around 26,000 Yuan/m2. The incentive for moving out earlier varies from
RMB 20,000 to RMB 150,000 Yuan per household. If an entire block moves out earlier
than the set dates, residents could get as much as 150,000 Yuan which counts for over 5
square meters compensation in the Luxiang Yuan Road project.
As long as the relocation provides residents with a transparent/open compensation
and relocation scheme, the majority of the registered residents are in favor of the housing
requisition projects (Interview with Project Manager 1). Non-registered residents who
were only staying in the community had no voice in the process. In the project in Luxiang
Yuan Road, around 25% of registered residents were not living in the old housing. The
housing condition is poor and the households usually rent the apartment to low-income
residents and immigrants from other cities who work on construction sites and in
restaurants in the city center. The new regulation urges the residents to look for those
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neighbors who no longer live in the neighborhood but actually have the voting rights to
determine the fate of the project.
6.4.2 The Assignment of Resettlement Housing

There were close to 10 resettlement sites for residents in the Luxiang Yuan
project and limited resettlement housing in the same district of Huangpu (Table 6.3). The
working staff usually organized a tour of resettlement housing for relocated residents
(Interview with official 5). Only about 5% of households choose resettlement housing
close by the relocation site, because the unit price of resettlement housing is considerably
higher than the average sales price of the requisition housing (~26,000 m2). The unit price
or replacement housing in the Huangpu District is three times of that of the resettlement
apartments in the outskirts.
Table 6.3: Locations and Prices of Resettlement Housing of Luxiang Yuan Road
Resettlement Housing
Housing Price（Yuan RMB / m2）
(Neighborhood Names and Districts)
1. Sanlin in Pudong District

9,300

2. Pujiang in Minhang District

9,100

3. Sijing in Songjiang District

9,100

4. Huaxin in Qingpu District

9,100

5. Qizhong in Minhang District

9,100

6. Huangtou in Pudong District

9,100

7. Gucun in Baoshan District

9,005-9,265

8. Close-by area in the Huangpu District 35,000
Source: Created by author with data from Huangpu Housing Requisition Center,
December 2012
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Table 6.4: Locations and Prices of Resettlement Housing for Block 59 Project
Resettlement Housing
Housing Price（Yuan / m2）
(Locations and Districts)
1. Pujiang in Minhang District

7,800

2. Luojing in Baoshan District

8,200

3. Huangtou in Pudong District

9,700

4. Luodian in Baoshan District

9,500

5. Close-by area in the Hongkou District (Rainbow Bay) 20,000
Source: Hongkou No. 1 Housing Requisition Center 2012

The district government was only able to garner about 5 locations of resettlement
housing for the Block 59 project after negotiation with the municipal housing authorities
(Table 6.4). The district government purchased the relocation housing from the municipal
level and followed the plan with the municipal housing authorities on resettlement
housing allocation. The negotiation between the district government and municipal
government depends on the availability of resettlement housing at the municipal level and
the competition from other districts who also want to purchase resettlement housing from
municipal housing authorities. The municipal housing authorities considered the distance
from the project site to resettlement site and allocated the housing to the site with shorter
distance. Another factor the municipal level considered was the financial ability of the
district government. District government with better financial ability such as the Huangpu
District could get more resettlement housing.
The more resettlement housing choices the district provides, the earlier the
residents might want to move out. The Rainbow Bay Apartment in the same district of
Hongkou has subsidizes from the district government in housing unit price as the market
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price of Rainbow Bay is over 25,000 Yuan per square meter, much higher than 20,000
Yuan in other resettlement sites (Interview with Official 2).
As the incentive compensation is set up by each district and differs, residents
asked about the compensation in other districts and figured out the compensation was
lower in the Hongkou District. As a result, Hongkou residents complained about their
own district leaders (Interview with Official 2; Resident 2 and 3). The director from the
district housing authorities explained that if housing compensation differs just by
location, it is fine. As Huangpu District is in the right center of the city, the market-rate
housing price is higher than other districts, and the residents will accept that fact.
However, the incentive fee and other compensation items (see Table 6.5) are set by each
district, and the district with better financial ability will be able to provide more
incentives to their residents.
Table 6.5: Detailed Compensation Classified Items Based on One Sample Compensation
Package for a Household in Block 59
Housing price (Unit)
22,000
Incentive fee for signing contract

10,000

Incentive fee for moving out

20,000

Incentive fee for moving out earlier

15,000

Renovation costs

3,000

Moving expenses

2,000

Facility relocation costs

varies

Subtotal

varies

Source: Hongkou No. 1 Housing Requisition Center 2012 (Note: Coefficient for
subsidized price=0.3; the sale price for the original apartment on the site was assessed as
22,000 RMB/m2 in Block 59 project.)
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The 2011 regulations make the process more transparent than before so residents
might have less to fight for. There are few bargains “under the table” that residents
should care about. As one resident indicated:
It is okay. Everyone can monitor and no one can get more compensation than what
you deserve according to the policy. However, I did not check other people’s
information because I do not care that much. I just tried to get what I wanted. As I
cannot argue for more and the policy is very strict this time, I did not even care about
and ask about other people’s situation (Interview with Resident 5).

In Block 237 project in the Putuo District, one family had a big house with the
floor area of 400 square meters and only an 80-year old sister and her brother stayed at
this house. The original property title of the housing was missed during the time period
when the People’s Republic of China was established. The working staff negotiated with
this household from the beginning of the second round public hearing. One resident
questioned the transparency of the policy,
“My question is whether the policy is transparent and clear, why talking to this
household first and much earlier than when the project started? And finally this
household only got one resettlement apartment but their original housing size is
huge. I feel like the working staff paid much attention to this household and talked to
them many times which lasted for half a year. It should be at least two resettlement
housing for this household because the two senior persons are brother and sister, and
they are separate families. Sometimes I did not understand the policy and how they
implemented it” (Interview with Resident 6).

Around 10-15% disadvantaged households received bonus compensation in this
project. According to one selection criterion, it is hard to “identify” who owns other
properties in the city of Shanghai. Some families purchased the apartment with a
1,000,000 RMB loan, then it is hard to decide whether they are qualified for the bonus
compensation or could be categorized into vulnerable groups19 (Interview with Official

Vulnerable (disadvantaged) group in housing requisition project can be defined as one person averagely occupies less
than 22 square meters in a household (Document No. 71 Shanghai Municipal Government)
19
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7). The district government offered 20,000 RMB for senior residents who were over 70 as
well as those veterans.
The residents could purchase more resettlement housing if they wanted or had
cash. After calculating the compensation formula, if the households had even just one
square meter area extra, they could purchase another resettlement housing in the outskirt
(Interview with Project Manager 3).
6.4.3 The Assignment of Resettlement Housing
According to the resettlement housing policy for project in Block 7, one property
title certificate (Fangchan Zhen) can only get one resettlement apartment from Hongkou,
Baoshan or Minhang because these resettlement sites were very popular among relocated
residents while the other four sites were much less popular. The district government has
to set some limitation on the provision of the resettlement housing. For those families
who wish to stay together in one district, they might have to break the rules. The
supervisory review panel voted for the decision that one household was eligible to
purchase two resettlement apartments in Baoshan because the elderly parents were sick
and the daughter would take care of them living in a nearby place. The supervisory
review panel posted the decision in the community and no one was opposed to that.
The Impact of Resettlement Housing
For those households who do not own property in other parts of the city,
resettlement housing is a big deal.
“It affected my decisions a lot. I am not able to move because one of my resettlement
housing [units] is not available yet. They do not have enough resettlement housing
for us to select. We signed the contract the last day before the deadline but got our
compensation half a year later. The government did not follow the policy at all
because the policy mentioned the ratio of household to the resettlement housing is
1:1.2. The government should avoid paying the extra compensation money for
temporary stay before the residents get the resettlement housing. The issue is the
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district government cannot allocate the resettlement housing in time. The
resettlement housing in the same district of the Hongkou District, the Rainbow Bay
won’t be delivered until at least 3-4 years. The senior people sometime cannot wait
that long and they finally do not have the opportunity to live in new apartments”
(Interview with Resident 3).

For those who had moved out of old lilong housing already, they enjoyed staying
in their other properties and used the resettlement housing for investment.
“It (the resettlement apartment) sounds like some extra bonus for me. Our old
housing was assessed 24,000 RMB/M2. Under the new policy, it is ideal that the
housing floor area is relative large and the number of the residents is around 1-3 per
household, and then the compensation amount is relatively okay. We got 3,000 Yuan
each month before the new resettlement housing is delivered. The apartment is not
yet built and will be available in 2018 so the district government has to pay us 3,000
a month for 3 years and they paid us the money altogether (a lump sum) in June 2014
for around 108,000 RMB” (Interview with Resident 4).
“I signed among the first group of residents because I want to get a resettlement
apartment on a good floor number and direction (windows facing south). We have to
draw lots to decide who will choose which room you want among the residents who
already signed the contract. I was waiting on a queen and waited for 2 hours before I
can enter in the hall to choose the resettlement. They told us if we do not make a
decision immediately we will not get the housing we want. I got the resettlement
housing I wanted which is on the 14th floor in a 22th floor high building facing west.
The numbers of the resettlement housing are limited therefore we were asked to sign
the contract as early as possible; otherwise we might miss the opportunity to get the
resettlement housing we want. I wanted to buy a three-bedroom apartment in the
same district but I was not allowed by the working staff to buy this larger apartment
than my original floor area. Although I wanted to pay more cash, I could only get a
two-bedroom apartment according to the compensation I received from my original
housing (calculated through assessed price and floor area). They do not count the
incentive amount when I purchase the resettlement housing. The government will
pay me around 100,000 RMB incentive fee for moving early, signing the contract
early and other reasons. But I cannot use that incentive fee for purchasing
resettlement housing” (Interview with Resident 4)

This interview shows some characteristics of citizen participation in urban
redevelopment that residents are more concerned about their own interests, and less
concerned about the public interest such as historic preservation. On the other side, the
participation is limited by the incentive mechanism on compensation. Residents get more
money if they move out even one day earlier. The working staff encouraged the relocated
residents to sign the contract and left everything behind. One resident signed the contract
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with the district government and was one of the 85%, he was still staying on site because
he was not satisfied with the resettlement housing assigned to him by the government. It
had been 1 year and half since it reached 85% deadline in 2013. Except for those who had
not signed the contract, the remaining issues were huge for the signed households.
6.5 Quality of Coalition (Congruence of Interests)
6.5.1 Consulting the Lawyers: Legal Advisory Services
The district government of Huangpu hired a legal consulting team to provide legal
advisory services to the relocated residents. From July 25 to November 6, 2012, a total of
over 1,000 residents consulted the lawyers about relocation and compensation issues. The
residents sent over 180 petition letters to the lawyers on the issues of housing requisition.
Among the roughly 1,000 residents who consulted lawyers, nearly half (47%) faced
conflicts among the family members, 15% concerned about accounting floor areas rather
than counting the registered population, and 5% were concerned about compensation
(Zheng 2013).
In May 2014, one household from Luxiang Yuan Road project sued the Huangpu
District over the housing requisition (Xinmin 2014). The relocated household questioned
the legal basis of the district government taking the use right of his apartment because the
government already leased the land to the developer. The district head interpreted the
legitimacy of the housing requisition project under the 2011 regulations and apologized
for the incomplete paper work in the document file. This was the first time in housing
requisition that the district head showed up in the court to defend the case (Xinmin
Wanbao 2014), though it was not the first time that the relocated resident sued the district
government. Residents were not aware of the incomplete paper work the governments
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might have in conducting the public projects. The role of the residents in inspecting the
government changed under the participation scheme set by the regulation.
6.5.2 How Residents Affected the Decision-making and Their Efforts
Those residents who did not sign the contract wanted to pursue huge economic
benefits from the housing requisition project because they did not believe the government
would provide fair compensation package to everyone (Interview with Project Manager
2; on-line forum). Those residents otherwise thought that those who stayed to the last
minute would get more benefits. This group of residents could affect the result of the
decision-making of housing requisition project (as it was over 15 percent).
Once the project is turned down by the residents, the whole neighborhood has to
wait for another 2-5 years before the government decides to solicit on housing requisition
and relocation again. The adjacent blocks of Block 59 in Hongzhen Laojie finished the
public hearing procedures in 18 days. Residents used the slogan that “we do not want to
wait for another 5 years to move” and they hung the slogan in the neighborhood during
the public hearing and voting period. This showcases that residents mobilize around and
try to influence those who are not in the same campaign with them.
6.5.3 Trust and Credibility
6.5.3.1 Why the project failed
Many reasons could explain why block 59 project in the Hongkou District failed
in 2013. In this project, one property title occupied an average area of 27.7 square meters,
and resident population per title was 4.25 persons. Some of the residents paid some
money to transfer the registered residence into the household many years before the
district government froze the Hukou which meant residents could not transfer their hukou
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freely out and in; therefore they could not understand why the new policy did not count
and compensate the number of persons under the property title anymore but only counted
the size of the housing unit. Moreover, nearly 30% of households in this project were
considered part of a disadvantaged population that needed extra compensation and
assistance (Interview with Project Manager 2). It requires much work from the district
government to understand the need of the residents. Since the policy follows the topdown model, the residents might not like the locations of resettlement housing and the
compensation plan. For example, some residents thought one of the locations were too
close to the cemetery and people did not like it. The third reason was that the residents
still believed that the later you moved, the more benefits you would get. This Block 59
case was among the first few cases started right after the new regulation of housing
requisition. Propaganda surrounding housing requisition projects is very important in
China. Some of the residents sent wrong information on the Internet that others believed
(Interview with Project Manager 2). Trust is an important issue. The district government
lacked credibility among project residents because the compensation package varied a lot
under the previous development schemes. Credibility and trust play a big role in failing
this project (Interview with Project Manager 2).
From the perspective of the government or policy, there are several reasons the
project failed. First, the district government did not spend enough time to understand
what the community and relocated residents really needed. For example, only 6.8% of
resettlement housing was located in the same district, much lower than the standard 30%.
(The municipal regulation requires that the resettlement housing in the same district
should account for 30% of the total supply of resettlement housing). The supply of
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resettlement housing involves working with municipal government and much
mobilization effort unless the district has land resources in its own district to resettle
residents such as the Yangpu District. Second, a single compensation and relocation plan
for a large and diverse population pool was not feasible. The population size, with around
1,300 households was huge for the housing requisition firm to deal with; especially right
after the central and municipal government issued the new 2011 Regulation and
Implementing Regulations. The working staff lacked the experience to work with the
relocated residents under the new regulation. For other housing requisition projects, the
Hongkou District government set up a weekly meeting platform and a resident mediators’
forum to solve the conflicts at the outset of the requisition process.
Residents offered their thoughts on why the project did not receive 85% support
from the residents on an online community forum, libaclub.com. Some residents
mobilized to achieve their goals, while others held on to the idea that if you bargained
with the government, you could get better deal. Residents in support of the project
worked to change the minds of their neighbors holding out for more compensation:
Resident A: We did everything we could. We were trying our best to persuade our
neighbors to sign the contract with the district. We even thought of paying those
people who did not want to move and meeting their needs.
Resident B: Some residents volunteered to explain the policy to their neighbors.
However, the project still failed and those 23% did it (On-line forum).

Block 237 (south) is another project that did not reach 85% in the second round
with 80 property titles registered in the south lot. Both the east lot of Block 237 and the
south lot reached 100% for the first round public hearing. The relocation standard and
compensation for Block 237 south was the same as for the east, however the housing
condition is different according to the affected/project residents (Interview with Resident
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8). Residents regarded their housing as new lilong rather than old lilong as the district
government assessed it. Fifty percent of native residents were still living there in 2015,
and the housing used to be the dormitory of a university. The whole area is alongside a
railway line and the area was cut off by the railway line and the unit price of second hand
commercial housing nearby reached 30,00020 Yuan in 2015 but around 25,000 Yuan in
2013 (Interview with Project Manager 3).
6.5.3.2 (Dis)trust and Credibility
The relocated block 237 (east) is still an empty piece of land with some nail
houses standing there. In May of 2015, the district government was taking procedures on
forced relocation and the district government would sue the nail households in court by
July 2015 (Interview with Project Manager 3). The big issue of this piece of land of block
237 was that there was a huge freezer standing there and the negotiation between the
owner of the freezer and the district government could not reach a deal (Interview with
Resident 8). This issue also slowed down the development plan of the district government
on renovating this area into a high-end residential area because the land was not ready.
For those who did not stay in the old lilong housing, the participation approach
did not affect them much. They believed the district government should sponsor the
projects otherwise the area where their housing was located would never be redeveloped.
“I had to sign a lot of paperwork. I did not participate in the public hearing for
compensation scheme and plan (this is not required for each household). They said
the residents from Block 7 were hard to deal with. We can hardly believe the whole
process took only 18 days to reach 85%, as this area has been back and forth for 18
years”.
“Yes, my neighbors would tell me how many people have already signed the contract
and how to calculate the compensation. They helped us calculate the compensation
and I trusted their opinions. Most of my residents wanted to move because they felt
The housing price around this area was a bit under the average housing price of inner-city of Shanghai from January
to July in 2015: 32,000-34,000 Yuan/m2.
20
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depressed staying there in such a small apartment. People built extra floor area year
by year. When I married into this community, we can drive a truck into the lane but
now we can only ride a bicycle. Some resident occupied lots of public area to build
some extra area for their apartments, and now our community looked like a slum”
(Interview with Resident 4).

Many residents who had lived in the old lilong housing for a long time took
advantage of the policy and voiced their concerns/support during the public hearing.
“I participated twice in the public hearing for compensation scheme and plan. We
had around 100 residents attending the public hearing. There were some squabbles
during the public hearing. The developer had a poor attitude. After the public
hearing, the district government made some changes in the relocation and
compensation plan but did not take all the comments from the residents. They
changed the assessed price as the old one came out in 2012 which did not apply to
the real situation in 2013. They also refined some of the items and made them in
detail. ”
“However, there is a bad case; the street office asked one household to select a
representative to persuade other family members in the household. And finally the
street office appointed one representative for this family. This representative turned
out to get much more compensation than other family members, such that, the whole
household got 1,000,000 RMB for 10 persons, and each one should get 100,000.
However, the representative alone got 400,000 RMB.”
“For the household which has many people, the compensation scheme is a failure
and it cannot solve the problem at all. It was 3,000 RMB for each household for
moving and relocation alone. If the household has 3 family members, they can get
3,000. And if the household like us has 16 family members, we still get 3,000 for
moving incentive. Each of us get only less than 200 RMB for this incentive. I
mentioned this issue in the public hearing” (Interview with Resident 3).

This negotiation was not successful for the residents who gained more relocation
incentive although it was proposed in the public hearing. However, some residents
bargained for their family successfully on the issue of bonus compensation for vulnerable
groups.
“Our family was not qualified with the low-income bonus compensation under the
2011 regulations. However, I negotiated with those people who were pushing our
project forward and they allowed us to have the low-income compensation. Different
departments in the district government have to sign for us to get this compensation”
(Interview with Resident 3).
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On some occasions, not all the family members could get compensation
(resettlement housing) as the original floor area of the apartment was too small. Such
conflicts could make one household delay moving to the last minute. They represent
some of the situations other “nail households” might face:
“I was concerned that I couldn’t get two resettlement apartments. We signed the
relocation and compensation contract in October 2013. As there was not enough
resettlement housing available for us at that time, we waited and waited. They
offered me an opportunity to select another resettlement apartment in May 2014 but I
am not satisfied with that environment where the housing is relocated. So I am still
waiting for another opportunity. My brothers are waiting for another two apartments,
especially one of my brothers who have less income. We will not move and sign the
final official contract (the supplement contract).”
“I know if we did not sign the contract before the deadline, we might not be able to
get a certain kind of incentive. However the district government tried all means to
make us sign within 18 days (1,450 households), they did not follow the instructions
and policies as they cannot provide enough resettlement housing for us. That is why I
am still not able to move (even though I signed the contract)” (Interview with
Resident 3).

In the lilong area of Block 7, in addition to the slogans for calling for relocation,
there was notice such as, “it will be 2 days to Oct 22, and you will be losing 20,000 yuan
if you do not sign the contract before that date,” and “adhere to the law to enforce the
implementation of justice”. Some interviewees expressed that the new regulation had
made housing requisition operation more normalized (Interview with Resident 5 and 8).
However, the incentive mechanism made residents’ participation less meaningful as the
participation is mostly driven by compensation.
Research shows that payoffs motivate participation (Hooper and Ortolano 2012).
In Shanghai, compensation scheme is one of the major factors that influence the decisionmakings of the residents. Districts with different land prices and resources provide
different compensation packages to their residents. The districts with more financial
resources play a more dominant role in decision-making of housing requisition and
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resident relocation. Statistics showed that in 2012 the Huangpu District resettled more
residential units than other inner-city districts in Shanghai, increased by 18% compared
to Year 2011, while the Hongkou District decreased by 73% (Shanghai Statistical
Yearbook 2013). In 2010, the Huangpu District had fiscal revenue of RMB 6,436 million
Yuan, and fiscal expenditure is 8,073 million Yuan, while the Hongkou District had fiscal
revenue of 4,836 million Yuan and fiscal expenditure of 7,452 million Yuan (SBS 2013).
The rate of revenue to expenditure remained the same level in 2012 in both districts, and
showed that the Huangpu District had better financial conditions. The Huangpu District
offered more incentives to the relocated residents compared to the Hongkou District. The
district officials from the Hongkou District also mentioned district with better financial
ability will give more incentives to their residents, which makes residents in other
districts dissatisfied with their own compensation packages (Interview 2012).
6.6 Urban Redevelopment Regime and Citizen Participation
Housing requisition projects serve as a kind of political achievement in China.
Both the district governments and the agency they hire face political pressure from higher
authorities in economic development or meeting the public interest. Some project
managers complained that if the district government pushed the project to finish within a
limited time, then they would not be able to follow the regulation step by step. However,
if they could follow the regulation strictly, the residents would trust the government and
make it a virtuous cycle. Therefore there is a “relative fairness” in the housing requisition
project (Interview with Lawyer), which is to follow the willingness of the majority. There
is a template about the relocation and compensation plan for the whole city of Shanghai.
Residents’ comments do affect it but not much since the comments are regarding more
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about the incentive fee. Starting in July of 2014, Shanghai Municipal Housing Bureau
issued a new policy that district governments are not allowed to pay subsidy for the
resettlement housing. The Huangpu District offered to pay some subsidy to make the
price of resettlement housing lower and the residents were happy for that. However it is
not fair if some of the districts pay more subsidies to the residents while the others do not.
Resident participation is limited because of the political significance of the housing
requisition project.
“It is more about the political achievement. If No. 2 housing requisition firm can
accomplish, why not our No. 4? However, we do not need to rush. Why do we have
to finish the project in a certain time period and relocate a certain amount of
households? If you let the residents decide, why all the projects should be successful?
Your generation might not know, but to our generation, the political achievement
counts a lot. Second is the political push from the district government. There is a
competition among different stakeholders. The regulation is fine, but we do not
follow it very well. We should eliminate the human factors when we are
implementing the regulation. Also we use to destroy the trust from the residents and
now we have to regain it” (Interview with Official 7).

The 2011 Regulation in the municipal level is much more detailed than the
national regulation. The national regulation requires the close-by principle which means
the relocated residents should move to close-by areas. It is not clear and hard to measure
what “close-by” means in each city of China. Therefore the municipal government of
Shanghai made a detailed requirement: If the original neighborhood is within the innerring area, the close-by area is the adjacent district. If it is within the outer-ring area, the
close-by area is within the same town or neighborhood (No. 71, 2011). Among the four
projects discussed here, not all the districts followed the policy. Even though the
residents can argue for this if they know the policy really well, it might not work if they
are not able to form a coalition. More residents could stay in the same district if they
successfully argued for this item in the policy.
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Local district government defined the housing requisition project as the “interest
of the majority of the residents” (Interview with Official 11):
It is the interest of the majority of the residents. Civilization is built on the materials.
We do not have that good life quality compared to the western countries. Residents
still rely too much on the government. To improve the living condition of the
residents is the purpose of the housing requisition project for livelihood.

The regulation setting caused conflicts and negotiation among the family
members. The previous policy before the 2011 usually took care of everyone in the
household (counting the population). Now one compensation package is delivered to the
relocated household and some family conflicts emerged. If the original housing size was
small and the numbers of the residents registered in the household are more than normal
(3-4 members), the family members could sue each other to argue for more compensation
within the compensation package they received from the district government.
6.6.1 Urban Redevelopment Regime
This chapter focused mainly on the role of the government in shaping urban
redevelopment regimes. The cases of Luxiang Yuan Road, Block 59, Block 237, Block 7
showed that the roles of different stakeholders in housing requisition projects depended
on the leadership of district government, financial resources, or compensation scheme.
Progressive symbolic regime: The Luxiang Yuan Road project was well
organized by the district government. The district government utilized the media and the
relationship with the municipal government to provide positive publicity of the
legitimacy of the housing requisition project in this historic old town of Shanghai. The
district government integrated financial resources and goals of political achievement
through this project. The district government subsidized the resettlement housing to lure
residents out of their original apartments early. The investor, Chengtou Group is a state125

owned enterprise which served as a platform of urban redevelopment in Shanghai and
plays a major role in housing requisition. The nature of the project is for building the city
image of globalizing city and attracting high-income people.
Caretaker regime: Block 59 in the Hongkou District showcases weak government
because the residents stopped the housing requisition project while other parts of the
North Bund area were under tremendous redevelopment. The district government laid
back and maintained simple coordination for the residents. It is not clear who will be the
developer for this project and no private investment so far.
Development regime: Block 237 in the Putuo District had a voice from the
community because the residents proposed the project on the east side; however, on the
south side, the residents stopped the project. The investor, a state-owned company
partnered with the Bank of Shanghai, a joint-stock in this housing requisition project and
provided funding for housing requisition. Development regimes are concerned primarily
with changing land use to promote growth, representing efforts to modify established
social and economic patterns. In this project, the district government and investor only
aimed to redevelop the industrial and residential area into a high-end residential complex
and it did not represent the image of Shanghai as a globalizing city due to the location of
this project.
Urban revitalization regime: Block 7 in the Hongkou District pursues a change in
image to revitalize the dilapidated area. The project could not continue in the past 18
years because of the opposition from the residents as well as the financial resources of the
investor, although regimes concerned with property development become dependent
upon capital resources rather than popular participation. The developer, Shui On Land
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Limited, contracted with the district government to redevelop this area into a flagship of
the company as Rui Hong Xin Cheng, a high-end mixed land project.
6.7 Conclusion
The role of local authorities in urban redevelopment changed under the 2011
Regulation. More actors joined in the decision-making of redevelopment and relocation
process in Shanghai and it showed more cooperation and conflicts among district
government and municipal government. Project One in the Huangpu District showed
strong leadership in organizing the participation schemes of housing requisition projects
and moved the projects forward more efficiently. It was a city image project that attracted
funding from both the municipal and district governments. The project thus provided
more compensation and incentives for relocated residents and provided better locations
and more choices of resettlement sites. The district government launched a sophisticated
outreach effort to build residents’ trust. Project Two of Block 59 in the Hongkou District
showed that the district government did not effectively promote the project. Residents
opposed the project halting its progress. The project was not a priority for the municipal
and district government, thus they provided fewer resettlement sites for the residents. The
district government did not take the initiative to engage the relocated residents in the
process and failed to establish the trust with them. Project Three of Block 237 in the
Putuo District had a weak government role in initiating the housing requisition project
and making a deal with the community. The Street Office played a strong role in working
with the relocated residents but the district government did not make an initiative to meet
the need of the community. It was not a high profile project because the location was less
desirable and housing demand in this area is lower compared to other projects in the
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Huangpu and Hongkou Districts. Some residents went to the district government for
relocation and showed strong resident engagement. Project Four of Lot No. 7 in the
Hongkou District had a long-term partnership between the private developer and district
government. The district government finalized the project under a new leadership of the
district and the developer played a role in financing the project. It was a priority project
in the city because it was the first housing requisition project under the 2011 regulations
involving more than 5,000 households and located in one of the most expensive blocks in
Shanghai. The municipal government appointed a new district head who achieved much
in housing requisition in another district hoping he brought his experience in housing
requisition and residential relocation to this project. The project went smoothly when the
residents had more choices of resettlement housing after negotiation. State-led
participation in housing requisition in Shanghai is a tool for the municipal and district
government to facilitate economic growth through urban redevelopment and it is a
process to strengthen the legitimacy for requisition among the relocated residents and
move the project forward. In the next chapter, the study will discuss the nature of resident
participation in housing requisition and the changing roles of residents in inner-city
redevelopment in Shanghai.
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Chapter 7: State-led Participation in Housing Requisition: A Comparison
7.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to answer whether more “participatory” approaches to housing
requisition for urban redevelopment address power relations and conflicts among local
groups in different districts, and what strategies residents use to negotiate inner-city
redevelopment through a comparative analysis of the Yangpu and Hongkou cases.
Although residents have a more active role in the relocation process under new property
taking regulation issued in 2011, the study argues that residents’ influence is constrained
by compensation policies and participation schemes set by the district governments. It
further argues that state-led participation in housing requisition is a tool for the
government authorities to use to facilitate economic growth through requisition, and it
could also be interpreted as a process to strengthen the legitimacy for requisition among
relocated residents. The roles of the affected residents as participants did not properly
address the power relationship, when the government used the regulatory power to shape
the power dynamics between the local government, the affected residents and the
developers. I define power as the ability to initiate change within the decision-making
processes. I see power relationships at two levels, first, it considers power relations
between institutional partners (municipal government, district government, housing
authorities, private developers and local community), and secondly, it looks at the
governance structure that enables local communities to participate officially within the
regeneration process (Wong 2013).
7.2 Pingliang Project: Housing Requisition Participation in Shanghai
Project Profile
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The Pingliang Block 2, 3 project is located along the Huangpu River (North
Bund) in the Yangpu District, west to Dalian Road, north to Pingliang Road, east to
Tongbei Road, and South to Yangshupu road. It is located in one of the historic areas in
Shanghai, which called Ba Dai Tou. Ba Dai Tou was established in 1863, which hosted
school, church, post office, hospital, cinema, barber shop and various shops. It was a
convenient location for residents to satisfy their daily life.
The housing requisition project started in June 2014 and reached 87% approval at
the second public hearing procedure in October 2014 (Table 7.1). In total, more than
2,900 households are registered in this neighborhood. The Yangpu District government
required that if less than 85% of residents signed the contract before the end of December
31 (three month period from September 12 to December 12 and extend to December 31),
the project would be rejected and all the contracts will be invalidated. The whole project
area was divided into Lot A (835 households) and Lot C (2,159 households). They started
the first round public hearing on June 10, 2014 and reached 90% in seven days. The
implementation policy developed by the Yangpu District government requires that 85
percent of residents agree to move in the second public hearing before the relocation
project can continue. In the Pingliang Block 2 and 3 project 69% and 78% of residents
pre-signed the contract by Saturday, September 13, which was the first day for those
households who already signed the contract to draw an order to select their resettlement
apartments. By October 10, 2014, 2,599 residents in Block 2 and 3 had signed the
housing requisition and compensation agreement with the Yangpu District Housing
Requisition Center when it reached the 86% approval to make this project official
(Observation 2014). In May 2015, around 110 households had not moved out. One
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resident who built his own 3-story high building told me he would move if the district
government compensated him 8,000,000 instead of 5,000,000 Yuan (Interview with
Resident 9). They enjoyed the life in this location and everything was convenient. They
regularly cleaned the streets in front of their apartments, which is public space cleaned by
workers hired by the district governments (Interview with Resident 9). Those residents
who took the initiative to clean the public space in front of their apartments strived for
their rights to the apartments and public space which could be turned into private space in
the near future under district’s redevelopment plan.
The district government prepared around 1,800 resettlement units located in the
same district and signed into contract with the municipal housing authorities for more
than 6,000 resettlement units located in nine districts other than Yangpu (Yangpu Times
2014). The Yangpu District is one of the inner-city districts that provide the most amount
of resettlement housing within the district because of the land resources the district has
given its role as a previous industrial district.
The Financing Mechanism and the Investor of the Project--Zhongwei
The investor for this project has owned the user rights of the land since 2003. Due
to the funding shortages from the developer’s side, the project did not restart until ten
years later. The Yangpu District government implemented a partnership strategy with
permission from the municipal government to allow the district government, the China
Development Bank and the developer to work together to finance the Pingliang project.
This is rare and creative under Chinese financing mechanism for housing requisition
projects because the China Development Bank usually does not participate in a district
level redevelopment project. The Shanghai Municipal Government signed contract with
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China Development Bank in late 2014 on financing over Shanghai inner-city
redevelopment (Jiefang Daily 2014) and the district government signed contract with the
municipal government on that. The developer, Zhongwei Real Estate Unlimited
Company, invested 500 million Yuan in this project. The US company Portman Holdings
planned to participate in the urban design and planning of the complex located in the
demolition area (Yangpu News 2014).
The Legitimacy of Housing Requisition Projects
The demographic information of the community is not available to the public,
thus I am using the demographic information for the whole Street Office of Pingliang.
Around 15% of low-income residents could get the bonus compensation for the
disadvantaged (Tuodi Baozhang). For example, if each member of the household on
average receives less than 220,000 RMB, the disadvantaged residents would receive
220,000 RMB per person. This happens when the population registered in the household
is large but the floor area of the apartment is relatively small:
“We have four households under one property title. I am no longer living
here. I used to live in the attic on the third floor. We can hardly stand up in
the attic, so I changed the structure and made the storey as high as the first
and second floor. In the 1980s I wrote to the housing authorities to make
the floor area officially confirmed after the staff from the housing
authorities checked the floor area for me. I did not realize that I would get
compensation from today’s relocation project at that time. As we only
have the use right of the housing, I was thinking I made a contribution and
renovated the housing for the government” (Interview with Resident 1).

The state regulation on housing requisition provided some residents with an
opportunity to make a profit from housing requisition rather than to improve their living
condition because they would probably stay in their current residence in other parts of the
city, which had a location preferable to the resettlement housing. One of the stated
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purposes of the housing requisition policy is to improve the living condition of relocated
residents. Although the residents living off-site could rent the resettlement housing to
immigrants or just take the cash compensation, and they could be more satisfied with
housing requisition in terms of the economic benefit, their living condition might not
improve.
Table 7.1: Pingliang Project Timeline
Year
First Stage

Second Stage

2003
1. The developer
successfully
leased the land
from the
government.
2. The district
government
initiated the
housing
demolition
project.
1,000 households
(roughly 25% of
the community)
relocated in
2003.

2004
The developer
quit because of
the shortage of
development
funding

The project
aborted.

2013
The district
government
started making
the relocation
plan and applied
for a loan from
the state-owned
bank.

The district
government got
the loan from the
bank using
government
guarantees.
Source: Created by author with data from the Yangpu District

2014
1. June 3, the
district
government
restarted the
redevelopment and
relocation project.
2. First round
public voting
started on June 9
and reached 97%
in one week.
September 12, the
second public
hearing started and
it reached 85% on
October 10.

The Impact of Resettlement Housing
In the Pingliang Block 2 and 3 project, 69% (Lot A) and 78% (Lot C) of residents
pre-signed the contract before the official signing day. Seventy-eight percent is very close
to eight-five percent where there is a gap of 150 households in the sample of 1,836.
According to the policy adopted by the Yangpu District, 2,000 households who already
signed the contract need to draw an order to select their resettlement apartments.
Relocated residents gathered around the place where the ballot was going on. Only one
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representative from each household was allowed to enter the hall to do the draw.
However, some residents mentioned that the number of 78% might not be real as
residents asked around and figured out fewer neighbors than they expected actually
signed the contract. Some people complained about the rule that those who did not sign
before the first official signing day could not choose their resettlement apartments.
The Selection of Appraisal Company
Voting for the appraisal company happened on June 19 2014, and each household
had one ticket to enter a parking lot where they could draw the vote for the appraisal
company (1 out of 5). Both Pingliang Block 2-3 Lot A as well as Lot C started the
process at the same time. The two lots finished the first round public hearing on June 11,
2014. Over 90% residents agreed to move. Some residents mentioned that those whose
housing condition was acceptable did not want to move because they enjoyed the easy
location of the residence. Many residents came to the voting site by private cars, which
meant a certain percentage of residents did not live in the area any more. The surrounding
areas of the housing requisition projects were filled with cars. The voting event started at
7 pm and continued to around 8 pm. Police and security staff had to maintain order on the
site because thousands of residents were around the area. Five stakeholders were
supposed to be present on the rostrum; representatives from the Pingliang Street office,
No.1 Resident Committee, and Yangpu District Housing Bureau, the developer and the
lawyer. There was a limit line that protected the area where people voted. Staff counted
the ballots afterwards. There was no microphone but a speaker, so the residents could not
hear what the official was talking about except for the first line. Some residents left
immediately after they cast their vote at 7:05 pm. before the final results came out. I
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asked them why they did not wait for the voting results on site and they responded that it
did not matter; the company might be selected beforehand if it had a close relationship
with the district government. It took time for the district government to regain the trust
from the relocated residents because the relocation process was not transparent before the
new regulations.
When the selection result was announced and the appraisal company selected,
some residents felt like they were not sure if the whole process was fair although they
were watching the process. Residents had the right to vote, but the result was given by the
staff who counted the ballot in a circled area. Some residents questioned that the selected
company, Shen Yang, is associated with the Yangpu District. The residents were
concerned whether the company would assess the housing fairly. Other residents argued
that it was not a big deal which company was selected because the prices of the housing
would be assessed in a certain range (Observation 2014). The final compensation
package is a big deal but not the housing price alone. Some residents felt like the voting
process provided a platform for the residents to share the information and communicate
with each other.
The Story of Resident Wang (Pseudonym)
Resident Wang’s family has 7 people registered in one household and its floor
area is 52 square meters. Wang was born there and stayed there for over 40 years. Wang
used to be an engineer working in the space satellite field. Wang was not among the first
few who pre-signed the contract with the government before the official signing date,
because he was worried he did not have other apartments in the city and he had more
concerns about the location of resettlement housing.
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When asked about how his household would share the compensation benefits
from relocation, Wang mentioned everyone would get some compensation, but not
enough. He was planning to get a three-bedroom apartment in the Baoshan District, and
for his brother’s three members, they might get a two-bedroom apartment. Wang was
concerned that they were compensated with a smaller than average package. The district
government tried to use a pilot study for this project, one big piece of cake, which means
they would not walk into each household in conflicts among family members. One
household got one compensation package and you divided the compensation among their
family members (Interview with Resident 6).
The compensation package was determined by the government according to
regulations and formulas: “We are in the community of interests. We released the
compensation amount a month ago. You calculated by yourself according to the
regulations and the formula they provided. If the total amount is almost the same, then it
is done. If not, that means you are smarter than them. The working staff did this for long,
and if you can get different numbers according to those formulas, it is not easy”
(Interview with Resident 6). Wang was not quite satisfied with the relocation and
compensation scheme, and he did an analysis for the advantaged residents and the
disadvantaged for relocation:
“It is complex. Moving into a bigger apartment is better but we will lose lots of the
life here. My mother-in law is 98 and we will not move into the outskirts as she is
used to the life here. Our area is a very good location because it is close to the
Huangpu River where the district government will have the waterfront
redevelopment projects here. We can go to other places in Shanghai from all four
directions but if we move to the outskirt for example the east-north Baoshan District,
we can only go out to one direction—the city center, other directions will go out of
the city, where we usually do not go because all of our family members are living in
Shanghai. The neighbors here are helpful and we will not have those in the new
neighborhood. (Interview with Resident 6)”
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However, Wang did not visit the district government or talk to his neighbors
about his experience in this housing relocation projects. He used some of his personal
relations as he mentioned, “I know people from other demolition companies. We talked a
lot. I thought it over and over. Then I talked to the working staff here for our project and
they had some feedback for me.” The interaction between the expert who had worked in
this field for long and this knowledge helped Wang make his decision. Wang felt like he
got the exact right information by himself. He understood how the power was
decentralized from the municipal government to the district government and the district
government to the street office; therefore he thought there was no need to talk to the
officials in the municipal and district level. Wang believed he should make decisions by
himself and his next step would be leasing an apartment in the close-by area. At that
point, although he had not signed the contract with the government, he felt like the
project would reach 85% finally (Interview with Resident 6).
As for the resettlement housing, Wang mentioned that residents would get
relocation housing built in the outskirts in two years and his mother-in-law would have to
stay in the same location. Even after they get the keys to the resettlement apartment in
two years, his mother-in-law would still stay in the same district by leasing an apartment.
For his own family, wife and daughter, he would like to choose one three-bed room
apartment in the Baoshan District after serious consideration and visiting all the
resettlement housing sites. Wang considered the structure and type of apartment in the
Baoshan District to be the best. Also, the district government priced the resettlement
housing with different prices in different locations. Sijing in the Pudong District is the
lowest. The housing price of resettlement housing in the same district of Yangpu is
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closed to the market price, around RMB 20,000 Yuan/m2. Wang thought the same district
resettlement housing was too expensive for his family. There was less incentive for
popular resettlement housing. His favorite choice in the Luodian, Baoshan District cost
RMB 8,500 Yuan/m2 (Table 7.2). Wang further explained (Interview with Resident 6):
“Only households with more than 5 people can have three-bedroom apartments. Less
than 4 people can get two-bedroom apartments. If you have only one resident
registered in one household, you would better get one apartment in the same district
in the Yangpu District which is more expensive but not large compared to those in
the outskirts. Yes, the government regards this as fair that you are not allowed to pay
much more than standard to get three-bedroom apartment. The subsidized
resettlement housing has limited supply.”

When commenting how to get the resettlement Wang would like to get, Wang
mentioned that relocated residents had to sign the contract before residents drew to
decide who would select the apartments first. Wang regarded this process as fair. Some
people do not know the policy, and they are trapped. When they pre-signed the contract,
they put information such as 2-bedroom or 3-bedroom apartment in which district, but
did not know which specific apartment they would get. The residents had to draw the
ballot and select the apartments. “If someone else gets it, we have to choose another one.”
Wang mentioned, “And I think it is fair. If you are lucky, you can get the apartment you
want. But in the past, if you know some officials or managers, you will get a better
compensation package.”
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Table 7.2: Location and Prices of Resettlement Housing in the Pingliang Project
Resettlement Housing

Housing Price（RMB Yuan/m2）

(Neighborhood Names and Districts)
1. Xinchang in the Pudong District

10,600

2. Hangtou in the Minhang District

9,200

3. Sijing in the Songjiang District

7,700

4. Huaxin in the Qingpu District

7,800

5. Luhui in the Minhang District

9,100

6. Zhoupu in the Pudong District

9,200

7. Sanlin in the Pudong District

13,800

7. Luodian in the Baoshan District

8,500

8. Close-by area in the Yangpu District 21,000~26,000
Source: Created by author with data from the Yangpu District
The Role of Lawyer
The Yangpu District government worked with one volunteer lawyer group on the
housing requisition project. The lawyer team worked on the family conflicts for the
relocated residents, provided free consultation services and answered questions regarding
legal issues. This lawyer group set up 10 years ago the first organization that provided
legal services for relocated residents and they defined “public interest” as “related to
improving residents’ living condition” (Interview with Lawyer):
“The State Council required in 2011 Regulation that housing requisition projects
should improve residents’ living condition. However, the Shanghai government
compensated even more and improved much of residents’ life quality”.
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The law agency has its concentration on land rights and property rights and
started service in April, right after the first round public hearing for the Pingliang Project.
Within the 5-month time period, they had talked to over 800 households, almost 10 cases
a day. The model as described by one lawyer on the mechanism of how different parties
work together to assist the district government is “four agents work together (Si Wei Yi
Ti)”, “first is the street office; the second is resident committee; the third is the lawyer;
the fourth is the demolition company. The four parties play together and try to do fair to
the residents” (Interview with Lawyer).
Trust or Mistrust-- Mobilizing Residents
Relocated residents normally gathered together by 5 to 10 people in the
community or in front of their apartments discussing the relocation issues. In most cases,
the residents were complaining about the compensation package or comparing the
benefits in the Pingliang project with other projects. The residents also discussed
resettlement housing issues and compared which locations were better in terms of the
environment, housing structure and subway connections (Observation 2014 and interview
with Resident 3, 4 and Official 9).
Someone printed some TV news from the Internet regarding the relocation
policies and sold them to the residents for 0.20 RMB Yuan (the cost of printing one piece
of paper). It said one judge from the Supreme Court was interviewed by the national TV
stations, and the compensation package from a housing requisition project should refer to
the market housing price of the commercial housing in the same locations. According to
the Second Article of the 2011 Regulation, if the compensation package is lower than the
market cost replacement housing, even it involves thousands of residents, it will be
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revoked. Some residents believed this information after reading the material handed out
by the neighbor, other residents questioned that it was still too general that it did not
mention the housing size and some other criteria. Then those residents feel like they
could hardly argue with the government using this material (Interview with Resident 6).
Fairness
Before the 2011 Regulation, residents who stayed to the end received more
compensation. Therefore the majority of the residents would rather stay. It was not good
that the project lasted for a long time period, over several years even. Both municipal and
district government understood they could no longer work in this way to conduct a
housing requisition project. Moreover, residents did not trust the government any more as
they believed that you could bargain for more (Interview with Resident 6 & Official 11).
Furthermore, the old regulation was not good for the government image. District
government was hesitant to undertake too much forced relocation (Interview with
Resident 6). At the experimental stage of the 2011 regulations, the percentage set by the
government for the second round hearing is 70% rather than 85%. It was not feasible
because the more residents stayed in the community; the more it cost the government to
solve the remaining issues (Interview with Project Manager 1 & Resident 7).
Some residents complained that households that did not pre-sign the contract
within the time period (ten days for this project) the government set, would not be able to
select the resettlement apartments they liked. They argued that everyone should have the
same opportunities to select the resettlement housing (Interview with Official 8 and
Observation 2014).
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Among those who held out, are those households that built extra areas that were
not counted for in the compensation formula. It made the residents angry about the
relocation policy as well. Those extra areas which were not confirmed by the housing
authorities were built in a special period. It was under the situation that more people had
to squeeze into one apartment; therefore residents had to build a second floor or even a
third floor (Interview with Official 6).
Another prominent contradiction for the residents in the housing requisition
project is family conflict. Some families could not decide who should get the
resettlement housing, especially for those big families whose parents have passed away.
The old regulation before 2011 usually compensated up to three families registered in the
same household. This Pingliang project under the new 2011 regulations provided
compensation package to only one household no matter how many people were registered
in it (Interview with Resident 6).
Compensation and Incentives
Another factor mentioned repeatedly in the interviews is that compensation and
incentive plays a big role in residents’ decisions (Interview with Resident 2-5). The
Pingliang Project provided all kinds of incentives to encourage residents to move earlier.
The project divided the area into several pieces. The district government numbered those
residents who were hard to deal with into the same blocks such as Block One or Block
Two. Therefore other pieces will reach 85% or higher easier and earlier. This strategy
made the relocation process quicker. Once the whole block reached 100%, all the
households got a 300,000 RMB Yuan extra incentive to move. But if the blocks reached
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only 85% then they got only 80,000 RMB as an extra incentive. And once the residents
moved out of the apartment in time, they would get an additional incentive.
The project offered 20,000 RMB for senior residents who were over 70 as well as
for those who were veterans. The district government also paid for the residents when
they transferred their registration from the Yangpu District to the district where their
resettlement housing would be located which was further from the city center. People in
China need registration to go to a public school, go to a public hospital and go to the
community center. Therefore many residents do not want to transfer their registration
with the inner-city districts to districts on the outskirts. Then on the other side, it was hard
to count those who had no dwelling place in an inner-city district (Interview with
Resident 9).
Another reason why the district government wants to speed up the project and
offer more incentives is that each year the district government has to demolish old lilong
housing for around 5,000 square meters within the district. The municipal government
has a quota for each district each year. The district government officials need to please
the higher authorities to excel their political career.
The Concept of Home and the Impact of Resettlement Housing
Several residents were concerned that their resettlement housing was too far away
from the city center. They also did not want to live in the neighborhood that was far away
from their relatives or family members. Taking two buses was considered too far. One
resident mentioned: “If the apartment housing is too far away, it cannot be called a home
as it is separated from my family network” (Interview with Resident 5). When asking
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whether the resettlement housing affected the decision-making of relocation, the resident
answered,
“It did not affect that much. I was planning to get the cash compensation. In our
household, we had me, my sister and my daughter listed on the certificate of title of
our original apartment. For the old policy, which was implemented in and before
2011, we should be able to get three resettlement apartments as it counted population
rather than the floor area of the apartment. My daughter, my sister and me are three
separate families so we should be able to get three apartments. For the new
regulation after 2011, it counted floor area only so we got 2 resettlement apartments
in the outskirt of the city because our original floor area (apartment size) was
relatively small (13 square meters). I can stay with my mother in law if I get the cash
compensation. My sister would like to have the resettlement housing for
compensation so I followed her. I do not want my sister to hate me for the rest of her
life therefore I followed her opinion. The new policy made many households
complain a lot as it transferred all the conflicts and contradictions to the residents
within their families rather than between the residents and the government”
(Interview with Resident 5).

This resident prioritized family interests ahead of monetary compensation and
tried to solve the conflicts among family members rather than turn to the district
government for help. Economic compensation does not play as important role as the other
factors in the decision-makings of this household. There was a conflict between
economic compensation and family interests under the new regulations for large
households.
7.3 Block 158-161 in the Hongkou District
Project Profile
The Block 158-161 project, located along the Huangpu River (North Bund) in the
Hongkou District, started in March 2014 and reached 96% approval for the first round
public hearing and 85% at the second public hearing procedure in January 2015. In total,
more than 1,329 households registered in this area.
When the district started the second round public hearing of Block 158-161
project, the district government had met its housing requisition quota for year 2014 and
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met the goals set by both the municipal government and district government on the
numbers of the households relocated.
Two-round Public Hearing Mechanism
The project finished the first round public hearing in March 2014. Between March
22 and March 29 (Table 7.3), residents could submit the survey for the first stage of
seeking public opinion. The district government officially announced the result of the
first round public hearing as 96% approval (1,292 out of 1,306 households) in April
(Interview with Official 5). The project started the housing assessment in the summer of
2014. For the selection criteria for the appraisal company, it should have at least 50
appraisers if they want to be the candidate for the housing requisition project with a
population of over 1,000. Block 158-161 had 1,308 households and the resident
committee handed out the voter’s ballot for the appraisal company. If the assessed price
of the apartment is higher than the average one, it is the final one. If the assessed price is
lower than the average one, the household will receive the average one. The average
assessed price was announced in December as RMB 28,539 Yuan/m2.
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Table 7.3: Percentage Signing the Contract in Block 158-161, the Hongkou District
Block 158-161 Project
Date
Percentage of signing the contract
12.20-12.26, 2014
0-74% Pre-sign
12.27.2014
74.34% 1st Day
12.28.2014
75.62%
12.29.2014
76.52%
12.30.2014
77.65%
12.31.2014
80.36%
01.01.2015
81.41%
01.02.2015
82.62%
01.03.2015
85.03% APPROVED
01.04.2015
86.16%
01.05.2015
87.13%
per property title receives 20,000 Yuan bonus
01.06.2015
90.01%
when reaching 90%
every 1% increase after 90%, per property title
01.07.2015
90.44%
receives 6,000 Yuan bonus
every 1% increase after 95%, per property title
01.08.2015
90.44%
receives 10,000 Yuan bonus
03.27.2015 (deadline for
85% approval)
Source: Created by author with data from the Hongkou District government

Funding and resettlement housing are the two keys issues in the preparation of a
housing requisition project, according to the district government (Interview with Official
2 & 5). The district government halted the project for more than 6 months because the
district government did not feel ready for the project when funding issue was not solved
before the district government started the second round public hearing—signing the
compensation and relocation contract. The working staff from the district government
input all the information of the residents into the computer system. Then the
compensation and relocation contract was generated automatically from the computer
into an e-file. If the household information was input wrong in the computer/software, the
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working staff had to complete a written report to the district government and they would
consider changing or correcting the information.
According to the district official, the Hongkou District had met the quota in April
of 2014 for the amount they need to demolish in a year. Therefore the district government
did not need to push those projects if they did not feel ready.
“Some projects reached 85% but you might never reach 95% or 100% because some
of the conflicts the residents suffered at home. We cannot wait many years for them
to move, so we have to do a good preparation beforehand or finally sue the residents
to the court if necessary” (Interview with Project Manager 2)

During the six months between the first and second round public hearing, the
district government held 7-day informal meetings for every resident in the community
regarding the relocation policy in October 2014. The meanings provided opportunities for
the residents to talk to all the project managers about resettlement issue. Besides that, the
district official and agencies worked to solve the resettlement housing shortage. There
was frequent contact and negotiation between the municipal level and the district level on
resettlement issues.
“We are making a new plan to solve the increased resettlement housing prices. The
resettlement housing in the same location rose from 9,000 to 12,000 per square meter
in the past few months. This price has very little advantage over the market price
which might be 13,000 per unit area. The new plan has to be approved by the district
government and municipal government and it takes time” (Interview with Official
10)

The Dilemma of Lining Up
The second round public hearing started in mid-December. Residents waited
outside of the housing requisition center 4 days before the first day of pre-signing the
compensation and relocation contract because they wanted to select the resettlement
housing earlier than other residents. For this project, they did not draw a ballot but tried
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another way--those who signed the contract first could choose the resettlement housing
first. It was deep winter in Shanghai in late December, many senior residents lined up
outside for several days. When the journalists reported this, some of the residents
mentioned the project manager asked them to line up here. The district official organized
the resident representative and sent out public notice on WeChat21 that they did not ask
residents to line up. When it turned to be two lines starting from the south and the north,
those resident representatives held a meeting with the district officials and they made a
decision that they would recognize the line from the south side which lined up first.
Those residents who started the line four days before got the chances to pre-sign the
relocation and compensation contract first.
For the Hongkou case, the staff used WeChat, which explained or refuted a rumor
through sending official information to the cell phones of each household. However, even
though the resident might initiate the waiting line outside of the housing requisition
center, it was driven by the interest of resettlement housing (Table 7.4) as the regulation
set the “game rule” that pushed the residents, especially the vulnerable groups to suffer in
the old winter.
The Impact of Resettlement Housing
Resettlement housing affected the decision-making for low-income and
vulnerable groups. Around 300 people gathered in line in front of the relocation office on
Dec 12, 2014. On Monday (December 15) another line was formed from the other side of
the community. Finally the officials decided the line on December 12 was confirmed.
Some residents commented, “people really cared about the resettlement housing and
would like to get some better apartments, therefore they would line up in front of the
21

WeChat: a free messaging & calling app to connect with people across countries
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relocation office even before the official dates to sign the contract” (Interview with
Resident 7).
Table 7.4: Location and Price of Resettlement Housing in Block 158-161
Resettlement Housing

Housing Price

Housing Due Date

(Neighborhood Names and Districts)
Lianqi Jiacheng in Jiading District

（Yuan RMB/ m2）
8,500

December 31, 2016

Huaxin in Qingpu District

7,500

October 31, 2016

Luhui in Minhang District

9,000

March 31, 2018

Xincheng Yizhan in Qingpu District

8,000

March 30, 2017

Gongkang in Baoshan District

9,500

May 31, 2015

Songze Huacheng in Qingpu

8,000

November 30, 2016

Rainbow City in the Hongkou District

20,000

2015-2016

Source: Hongkou Housing Requisition Center 2014
Before the official start of the second round public hearing, 706 out of 1,329
households picked up the numbers for selecting relocation apartments 10 days before the
official date of December 27 to sign the contract with the district government. Residents
who signed before January 6 would get the bonus compensation for moving out early.
Residents’ Views on Compensation Package
One resident pointed out the role of compensation package at a public hearing
with the head of the district housing authorities. In total, 22 resident representatives, 6
project managers and 5 district officials attended the 3-hour information meeting.
“The total economic production is huge in China today; therefore the compensation
standard should be first, high enough to match the economic development and higher
compared to other projects. Second, limit the total apartment numbers each
household could purchase. The housing resource is limited in China according to the
population base. Third, take care of the senior residents. The senior contributed lots
to the society, and we should pay more attention to them. Furthermore, we residents
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felt like the district planned to spend the least money to drive people out of the
central district. Four generations of my family stayed and are staying in this area. We
felt like the government used strong attitude and forced the whole project” (Interview
with Resident 7 and Observation 2014).

Some residents compared the Hongkou project with the Yangpu One,
“The project in the Yangpu District was full of caring. The residents are weak sides
in the project. We would like more attention from different levels of the government.
For example, a single person over 30 years should get some subsidy on housing. We
do not have many demands. We just need a place to stay that is convenient to go out.
The 3-month temporary subsidy could be extended to 6 months. We are not satisfied
with the subsidies, including the interior decoration fee which is too low…”

Many residents considered themselves as weak side of the project because they
were affected by the relocation. Some of the residents might write to the district
government, and even the municipal government, although the letters would transfer to
the local district level if they deal with local issues that the district government usually
takes the responsibility. The residents are long-time recipients under a socialist welfare
system. And now the municipal and district governments adopt a western democratic
system to allow residents to participate in inner-city redevelopment, however, when the
state-led participation only serves as a technical approach of the planning strategies of the
government, the participatory practices fails to address the issues of power and
representativeness (Winkler 2011).
It was not clear what percentage of the residents could get the bonus
compensation for the disadvantaged (Tuodi Baozhang). Not like the Pingliang project in
Yangpu which posted the information before the two-round hearing, the information for
the 158-161 project would post around 6 months after the end of the second-round
hearing when most of the residents would relocate to other locations (Interview with
Project Manager 2).
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Empowered or not?
Some residents asked for participation in the redevelopment plan, which was
composed by the Yangpu District and the developer. However, the planning law in
Shanghai limited residents’ participation in proposing a redevelopment plan and allows
residents to comment on the plan. After several information public hearings, three items
in the compensation and relocation plan at Block 158-161 changed (Revisions, December
12, 2014).
1) Increase the resettlement housing resources from the districts of Baoshan, Qingpu
and Minhang (original Jiading, Hongkou and Qingpu).
2) Increase housing subsidies of 80,000-130,000Yuan per property title for the
households who only purchase one resettlement apartment in the suburban area
(Figure 3).
3) Increase housing subsidies of 1,000-2,300 Yuan per square meter for the
households who purchase resettlement apartment in the suburban area.

Item One provided residents with more housing choices and Item Two and Three
provided more compensation to the relocated residents. Besides that, the district
government organized a resident supervisory review panel consisting over 10 members
who were from different levels of organizations and those representative were selected by
a majority of the residents in the community. One resident mentioned he was not sure
whether the policy would favor the resident representative sitting on the panel, but this
was some types of mechanism that other districts did not share or follow (Interview with
Resident 7). The resident supervisory review panel (steering committee) worked through
the whole process of housing requisition and pressured on district government on
rewriting the compensation plan.
The bonus compensation (incentive) encouraged residents to persuade neighbors
to move out earlier if they happen to be grouped together for incentive compensation:
“This is sometimes not fair and we do not want to walk into the issues of each family
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because they have their difficulty in making the decisions” (Interview with Resident 7).
The district government usually included households that were easy to persuade to move
into the same group. When all the households in a group signed the contract with the
district government, the whole group received extra incentive compensation ranging from
a few thousand to ten thousand Yuan.
Communication Mechanism
Using Weibo (Chinese Twitter) and QQ (Chinese MSN) to set up on-line forums
for the relocated residents, the district government and the street office tried to prevent
someone spreading wrong information. The official channel informed residents of the
process of the projects and all kinds of regulations through on-line communication tools
or sending information door to door. The Hongkou District had the best communication
mechanism in Shanghai in terms of the official website on housing requisition which
posted policies and processes, and organized on-line forum for residents. The district
government set up on-line forum for each housing requisition project and the employees
from the district level served as the administrator for the forum.
Housing Requisition On-line Forum
I joined in the on-line forum for the Block 158-161 project; however, I
participated in the dialogue in the forum. I asked about a piece of TV news on housing
requisition on Block 158-161, but got no response for that question. Residents cared more
about the compensation information. Through a content analysis, I counted the key words
in an on-line forum for Block 158-161 project. And the dialogue started from November
17, 2014 to April 27, 2015 including over 100,000 words (Table 7.5). The purpose of this
on-line forum is to persuade the residents to sign the contract early as well as clarify the
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rumors. Between November and December, a lot of dialogue is about “signing the
contract” and residents watched the percentage of the contract every day. Residents
signed the contract with the representative from the district government who sat in
housing requisition working team. Compensation and money plays a big role in the
dialogue of signing the contract. Residents cared about resettlement housing as well
because it was related closely to the economic compensation. The role of the developer is
“erased” from the dialogue among the residents, and people understand it is the district
government who sponsors the project. Residents do not care who offers the money,
whether it is municipal government, the district government, the bank or the developer
because they only sign the contract and receive the compensation. Even though there
were district administrators participating in the on-line forum, I only saw one join in the
dialogue in the forum. The purpose of the forum is to understand what the concerns of the
relocated residents are. The residents do not need to please the government staff;
therefore they can talk about anything they want. I read some interesting conversation
between the district administrator and all the residents who did not trust him at the
beginning and criticized him as well as the information he posted. However, the residents
seldom talked about rights and participation issues, yet talked about the government
behavior on that platform.
At the beginning of the second-round public hearing, residents were concerned
more about signing the contracts with the district government and watched the updated
percentage of contract signing every day. The bargaining or negotiation happened
between the residents and the housing requisition working staff. The residents talked
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about the working staff quite a lot, around 250 times in the on-line forum within the fivemonth period when I collected this data.
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Table 7.5: Key Words in the Dialogue among the Residents and District Administrator
Key Words

Times

Sign the contract

287

Housing requisition working staff (Dongqian Zu)

246

Money or compensation

240+76

Resident

108

Policy

102

Source of resettlement housing (Fangyuan)

74

Government

69

Place

61

Information

60

Demolition

57

Select resettlement housing (Xuanfang)

35

Deliver(y) of the resettlement housing (Jiaofang)

32

News

25

Interest

24

The Street Office

14

Petition to up-level government (Shangfang)

11

Legitimate

7

Developer

5

Coordinate

3

Participate/participation

2

Rights

1
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Source: Created by author with data from QQ (A Chinese chatting tool)
7.4 Comparison between Yangpu and Hongkou
The differences between the citizen participation schemes in Yangpu and Block
158-161 are summarized in Table 7.6 (Figure 7.1). The Pingliang project was one of the
representative projects in the industrial Yangpu District, and it involved conflicts between
the developer, residents and district government. The Block 158-161 case showcases a
well-organized campaign for the government to mobilize residents to participate in the
decision-making process. Both the district governments made the process open to the
residents; grouped people together for a whole compensation package; and provided
more compensation incentive to those who worked with them. The Pingliang project did
not open a channel for the residents to speak in a public venue and did not form a resident
supervisory review panel for the community leaders to speak for the residents. Although
the residents in Block 158-161 participated in several public meeting organized by the
district and established a resident supervisory review panel, residents’ decision-makings
on housing requisition were constrained by the compensation incentive offered by the
district. The resident representatives sitting on a resident supervisory review panel
partnered with the district government, and they assisted the decision-makings of district
government by summarizing the opinions of community residents, yet it might not
represent the interest of the residents.
The compensation information for the disadvantaged households (Tuodi
baozhang) in Block 158-161 posted six months later after the second-round public
hearing closed. Most of the residents moved out of the community within three months of
the second-round according to the setting of the financial incentive mechanism.
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Community residents could not monitor who would finally get the bonus compensation
for the issue of housing difficulty.
Table 7.6: Comparison of Two Housing Requisition Projects in Yangpu and Hongkou
Project
Pingliang
158-161
The investor owned This piece of land is
the use right of land owned by the district
long before the
government and
Land transfer mode
housing requisition
waiting for auction
project restarted in
(land reserve
2014.
purpose)
The Yangpu District The Hongkou
government, China
District government,
Funding source
Development Bank, and municipal
and the investor
government
Public hearing
None
Hundreds
meetings
Ways to decide the
order of selecting
Ballot
Line up
resettlement housing
The compensation
information for
disadvantaged
households

Post before the
second round public
hearing

Post after the second
round hearing

Resident supervisory
review panel, the
No resident panel
residents and the
district government
Reached 85%
Reached 85%
Project result
approval line in 29
approval line in 13
days
days
Source: Created by author with data from the Yangpu and Hongkou District
Decision-making
mechanism
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Figure 7.1: Locations of Pingliang Project in Yangpu and Block 158-161 in Hongkou
(Black Stars)

Source: http://lemonjoe.blog.163.com/ (edited from a regional map)
7.5 Conclusions
The more “participatory” approaches to housing requisition opened participation
channels for the residents allowing them to participate more actively in the relocation and
requisition process. Although Block 158-161 had resident representatives on a
supervisory review panel with the district government, finished the second round hearing
faster that Pingliang, which had no resident supervision, the resident supervisory panel in
Block 158-161 did not necessarily represent the interests of residents. It showed that the
more the district government contributed to the preparation of a housing requisition
project, the more comfortable the residents felt more like to relocate and leave the old
apartment. The preparation could be measured as having more financial support, more
resettlement housing sites and more public hearings for residents’ comments.
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Nevertheless, in both cases those who were not registered in the neighborhood
had no voting rights or compensation. They are either immigrants from other cities or
apartment renters leasing from registered residents. These people had to look for
residences on their own without any financial assistance. The housing requisition
regulation or policy did not cover this group of people. The excluded actors cannot make
or gain a voice in the decision-making process of housing requisition for urban
redevelopment.
Residents with property stakes received compensation from the housing
requisition projects. The transparency of the policy made it more a neighborhood-based
process of compensation negotiation with the district government hosting public hearings
for the residents. Before the 2011 regulations, the negotiation was an informal process
carried out on a one-to-one basis between residents and district government. The district
government employed strategies such as adding compensation for residents who moved
out earlier, which affected the decision-makings of residents especially who had other
properties in the city. This strategy made the participation process more efficient. The
district government also provided more compensation to disadvantaged groups including
seniors, the disabled and veterans. This showed a social welfare approach to compensate
the disadvantaged through housing requisition projects rather than through a social
welfare channel. The Chinese government still considered housing a social welfare issue
when it transferred towards a neoliberal path of urban development.
The factors influencing residents’ participation in urban renewal can be
understood in Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty model. Hirschman (1970) argues
that there are two ways by which people may address the declining performance of a
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firm, organization, or state. To “exit,” means to abandon it. Hirschman (1970: 30) defines
“voice” as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state
of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management, through
appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or
through various types of actions and protests. Hirschman (1970: 77) defines loyalty as a,
“special attachment to an organization.” In Hirschman’s model, loyalty increases the
likelihood of pursuing voice by effectively reducing the costs of the action. Due to
China’s limited experience with protest and public complaint, and as a legacy of China’s
political history, the cost of pursuing the voice option in China is higher than choosing
the exit option. Relocated residents take strategies such as mobilizing around the
neighbors, sending letters or making visits to the government departments (petitioning),
or conducting informal discussions with government officials in the Hongkou case.
Relocated residents changed the redevelopment and compensation plans; however there
was no open channel for residents to get involved in making the plans. The power
relations are still dominated by the district government.
In conclusion, this chapter examined the complex nature of housing requisition
and the extent of residents’ consultation and participation in the Yangpu District and the
Hongkou District. Two reasons explained ineffective participation from the residents in
housing requisition in Shanghai. First, the participation schemes act as procedures, which
provide less meaning than the expectation from the relocated residents. Second, the level
of economic compensation plays a more important role, however, the relationship
between people and their home and between family members is also important in the
housing requisition; the new compensation schemes sometimes neglect the important
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aspects of an effective participation mechanism. In the next chapter, I conclude by
examining citizen participation rights in housing requisition in Shanghai within the
regulatory power and regime.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions: Towards a Participation Right
8.1 Empirical Results
The 2011 regulations provide a more transparent, open and interactive process for
Shanghai residents who are directly affected by housing requisition projects. The new
policy offers the opportunity of resident participation, which affects the power dynamics
during the housing requisition decision-making process. It is a positive move. However,
there are major factors that may make resident participation less meaningful and disempower certain groups of residents or vulnerable groups such as low-income residents,
and senior citizens. The compensation package, housing condition and place-attachment
can affect the decision-making of residents living in old lilong housing. The existing
lilong housing disappeared by one-third between 2009 and 2014, and continues to be
demolished.
Those residents willing to move in order to improve their housing condition, face
a difficult decision as relocation would destroy their existing social networks and
resettlement housing might lack adequate community services. It is noted that each
district government has played an essential role on residents’ participation and decisionmakings because the compensation package and the resettlement locations could greatly
affect resident decisions. When the majority of the residents are willing partners of the
city in promoting economic development and improving housing conditions, the tworound public hearing process does not guarantee equitable outcomes. The Shanghai
municipal government and district governments dominate the development schemes, and
there is competition among different districts in pursuing economic developments in
globalizing Shanghai.
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The state and local government promotes the “public interest” through inner-city
redevelopment, resettlement housing and affordable housing construction, which could
improve the living environment of some of the affected residents. However,
disadvantaged residents are driven out of the inner-city. The floating population or
migrants without local household registration status receive no relocation compensation.
Given the declining supply of low rent housing in the city center under inner-city
redevelopment, many of those who wanted to stay close to their service sector jobs chose
to double up with their relatives or friends who migrated from the same province
(laoxiang). Large families in small units are no longer compensated by the number of
people in the household. As a result, they received less compensation under the new
regulations than they would have prior to 2011. Residents’ place attachment or
emotional bond to their homes and neighborhoods are broken through the housing
requisition project. There is a need in China to carefully examine and identify the
multiple “public interests” in order to truly promote equitable outcome of citizen
participation in housing requisition.
State-led participation in housing requisition is a tool for the government
authorities to use to facilitate economic growth through requisition. It can also be
interpreted as a process to strengthen the legitimacy for requisition among relocated
residents. The roles of the affected residents as participants did not properly address the
power relationship, when the government used the regulatory power to shape the power
dynamics between the local government, the affected residents and the developers.
8.2 Theoretical Interpretations and Discussion
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It is not a matter of knowing what is the right form of governance but of
identifying the mechanisms and processes which enable a more or less significant, more
or less structured form of governance to be obtained (Bagnasco and Le Gales 2000).
Zhang (2002) argues that motivation and consequences of redeveloping Shanghai reveal
the characteristics of a socialist regime featuring successful government intervention,
active business cooperation, limited community participation, and uneven distribution of
benefits and costs of new developments. Under the new regulations, government
intervention remains very strong at the municipal and district levels, while the
community participation has several characteristics in housing requisition projects. Some
active communities have their own resident supervisory panels where resident
representatives play a big role in community activity and communication. Resident
representatives could have a strong connection with the district government, but they are
not the same group of people who work for the district government such as resident
committee or street office. Some other communities just let the resident committee take
the lead, which usually handed out the survey forms and informed the residents to the
events such as voting for appraisal companies. The excluded actors of the housing
requisition projects were those people who were not able to register in the neighborhood
such as the floating population or renters.
The effectiveness or power of district governments enables the process of housing
requisition to be more efficient. Public officials considered the new regulation, which
required residents to vote for the procedures, a significant change because it provided
residents with the right to participate. Although non-registered residents were excluded
players in the process, residents with property stakes take less time to consider moving

164

out or just receive the compensation and “sell” the apartment to the district government.
Transparency in the policy schemes and compensation standards makes the participation
more efficient because “nail households” cannot hold out for more compensation.
Informal uses of space are mostly associated with the poor (Lefebvre 1991).
Dating back to 1980s, the public space in Hongzhen Laojie or Luxiang Yuan Road
counted much more than that of today. The households having more people usually built
a back room or a kitchen by themselves, most of which areas were not approved by the
housing department of the district government. The lanes in the communities were very
narrow after that. Some places only one person can walk through where it used to fit a big
truck. The privacy could be an issue when the windows of two households were too close.
The shift in the compensation formula from counting the number of people in a
household to the area and value of the apartment illustrates the shift from a social welfare
approach to a market approach. The district government used to try to compensate every
registered resident in the apartment to make sure everyone received some cash
compensation. Because the cash compensation was not enough to purchase a resettlement
apartment, the district government expected residents to pay the rest to get a unit of
apartment through housing requisition. The 2011 regulations compensated the households
with the market price of the apartment. That is a sign of neoliberal turn of Shanghai, and
those households with large families and small housing units complained.
Compared to the negotiations that underpin governing regimes in American cities,
the nature of the negotiating process in the Chinese context is different. First, the district
government plays a central role in the negotiating process while the city officials usually
play a facilitatory role in the U.S. Second, it reveals the characteristics of a socialist
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regime featuring strong government intervention, active business cooperation, limited
community participation, and uneven distribution of benefits and costs of new
developments as the socialist legacy used to rely on bureaucratic system to maintain its
effective control on land redevelopment. Third, the roles of the planning and historic
preservation professionals are marginalized in shaping the discussion of inner-city
redevelopment in Shanghai.
8.3 Policy Implications
The starting point for the local government to conduct housing requisition for
urban redevelopment is to maximize the benefits of land and urban space in China (Xu
2008). The subject of the housing requisition is the resident. For a complex housing
requisition and residential relocation, the local government should consider some issues
before providing better living conditions at the cost of destroying the original life of the
residents.
Relocated residents have served as lobbyists, activists and advocates in today’s
housing requisition projects in Shanghai to pursue their interests. We should note the
influence of compensation and political power in making decisions when there is no
mechanism to offer equal opportunities for residents’ return to the original location.
“Who benefits and who suffers” is always an important part of planning analysis
(Marcuse 2009: 101). Arnstein (1969: 214) argues that the stronger the role of
disadvantaged in implementing policy, the more “redistributional” the outcomes will be.
Local government should work out schemes that are particularly benefiting the
disadvantaged groups of people in housing requisition for inner-city redevelopment to
avoid missing the social mix and the fundamental need of its citizens.
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The agency of “informal actors" (residents with no ownership) overstate the
climate of equal opportunity which would prevail among people who live outside of
state’s reach (Varriale 2014). By the end of 2015, the number of migrants from other
parts of China decreased by 147,700 in Shanghai. It was the first time that the numbers of
migrants decreased in Shanghai. Housing prices have skyrocketed in Shanghai, making it
even harder for migrants to afford. More informal poor housing disappeared under the
massive housing requisition, which also explained partly why migrants from rural areas
left Shanghai. The municipal government should provide some affordable housing to
renters who made contribution to the city but had no registration with the city.
8.4 Summary and Future Directions
In cities today, a key power is the capacity to mobilize a long-term coalition that
is capable of achieving change on the ground (Mossberger and Stoker 2001: 830). The
government is in charge of resources such as resettlement housing and bonus
compensation. A long-term coalition among government and non-government
stakeholders can bring together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks,
although policy agendas can be related to the composition of the participants in the
coalition.
This dissertation examines the complexities of citizen participation in housing
requisition for urban redevelopment in Shanghai. It is especially important in the context
of developing countries, where rising inequality, mobility, and low levels of citizen
involvement make local solutions more pivotal (Hooper & Ortolano 2012). The
dissertation contributes to the existing theories on citizen participation in urban
redevelopment, particularly understanding the participation processes through the impact
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of changes of regulatory regimes on citizen participation, and factors affecting citizen
participation. This dissertation addresses two research gaps by exploring the dynamics of
housing requisition participation in the context of neoliberal urban redevelopment in
Shanghai. First, it draws conclusions beyond citizen empowerment and power
relationship among the stakeholders (government, private sectors and citizens). Second, it
provides practical insights and strategies for residents to use to facilitate more effective
participation in housing requisition.
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Appendix A: Preliminary Interview Guidelines (refer to Appendix in the text)
Note: All interviews will be conducted in Chinese.
Informants
Issues and Purposes
Interview Guidelines
Government
Verification of
 How does the 2011 Regulation differ from
officials
participation processes
previous regulations in influencing the
participation from the community
residents?
 Please tell me if you think the 2011
regulations are important and why?
 What are the main criteria used for
selecting a possible housing requisition
case?
 How do you define public interest?
 What are the changing roles of local
government in shaping the housing
requisition and relocation process?
 In your opinion, what are the factors affect
the decision-makings of the residents?
 What are your perspectives on the process
of the housing requisition projects? Any
improvement?
 Which kinds of residents will be influenced
most in their daily life under the housing
requisition project?
 Do these participatory approaches to urban
renewal address conflicts amongst local
stakeholders? Why or why not?
 Do these participatory approaches
significantly influence transparency and
respond to the needs and interests of the
excluded or disadvantaged groups? Why or
why not?
Government
WThat the informants
 What factors do you think led supporters of
officials, business
think about the level of
the project to feel like they could possibly
leaders, newspaper participation.
enact the proposal?
staff, consultants,
 Do you anticipate lawsuits in this
by-standers,
relocation and renewal project? Why or
academia
why not?
 What role did the comments from the
residents play in the decision making
process? Please provide specific examples
of changes made to the housing requisition
project as a result of comments received?
174



Residents

Perceptions on relocation








Residents



Empowerment





Residents



Participation
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What lessons about public participation
from previous projects did you bring to this
case?
What challenges about public participation
do you have in this case?
What comes first to your mind when you
are informed of the housing requisition
project in your neighborhood?
Are you planning to sign the housing
requisition and compensation contract? If
yes, “Why”. If no, “why not?”
How do you make the decision to move out
of the apartment?
Does the provision of resettlement housing
influence your decision to move? If yes,
“Why”. If no, “why not?”
How does the compensation scheme affect
your decision to move?
How will your life after relocation expect
to be different?
Did you attend the public hearing before
the voting procedure? If yes, “Why”. If no,
“why not?”
How many times have you attended the
public hearings?
Do you feel you are empowered in the
public hearing? If yes, “Why”. If no, “why
not?”
Do you feel you are empowered in the
voting procedure? If yes, “Why”. If no,
“why not?”
Have you communicated with
neighborhood committee members about
this housing requisition project? Why or
why not?
Have you tried to get information on your
own about the housing requisition project?
Why or why not?
Have you discussed with your neighbors
about the housing requisition project? Why
or why not?
Have you consulted with the local
authorities about the housing requisition
project? Why or why not?





Residents



Compensation




Residents



Place-attachment






Residents



Mistrust






Resident

Refining of interview
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What are your specific interests and
concerns?
Can you fully express your concerns? Why
or why not?
How other ways you can participate and
have a say in the housing requisition
project?
Are you satisfied with your compensation
package on relocation? If yes, “Why”. If
no, “why not?”
To what extent had the compensation
influenced your decision to relocate?
How do you feel about the compensation
information being available to the public?
Is this better than the prior system?
Are you the first generation of your family
who lives here (Years of residence)? If not,
why are you still living here under this
kind of housing condition?
How do you imagine this area in Shanghai
as a globalizing city?
What are your connections with this area?
What substitute conditions would you like
to have if you leave this place?
What is your (belonging, happiness, pride,
or love) in this area which might not be
measured by money or material?
Do you feel like the housing condition here
can meet your requirement? Why or why
not?
Have you participated in any other
activities, besides official
meetings/hearings organized by the city, in
response to the siting proposal, including
letter-writing campaigns, protests? Why or
why not?
In your opinion, what is public interest?
Do you think the project is for the sake of
public interest? Why or why not?
What challenges are most pressing in the
housing requisition and relocation project?
Do you think if you stay to the last minute,
you will get more compensation? Why or
why not?
Is there anyone else you think I should

Committee
member; Resident
Committee Chair,
Street Officer

questions
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contact to talk about these issues?
Recommendations on additional or
alternative questions
Are there any important issues in terms of
housing requisition that we haven’t
covered?

Appendix B: Interview List
No.

Interviewee

Sex / Age

1

Official 1

All projects on the
district level

Yangpu

7-Dec-12

2

Official 2

All projects on the
district level

Hongkou

20-Dec-12

3

Project Manager 1

Luxiang Yuan Rd
2012-2014

Huangpu

20-Dec-12

4

Official 3

All projects on the
district level

Xuhui

26-Dec-12

5

Resident 1

Pingliang Block 2,3
in 2014

Yangpu

9-Jun-14

6

Official 4

Citywide

10-Jun-14

7

Official 5

Hongkou

6-Jul-14

8
9
10
11

Resident 2
Resident 3
Resident 4
Resident 5

Hongkou
Hongkou
Hongkou
Putuo

14-Jul-14
20-Jul-14
23-Jul-14
13-Aug-14

12

Official 6

Luxiang Yuan Rd
2012-2014

Huangpu

22-Aug-14

13

Official 7

Project in 2013

Putuo

25-Aug-14

14

Resident 6

15

Female / 50-60

Female / 40-50
Male / 60-70
Female / 50-60
Female / 55

Projects

City Level
Block 18, Block
158, 161 in 20142015
Block 18 in 2014
Block 7, 2013-2014
Block 7, 2013-2014
Block 237

Location

Date

Pingliang Block 2,3
in 2014

Yangpu

3-Sep-14

Official 8

All projects on the
district level

Hongkou

10-Sep-14

16

Lawyer

All projects on the
district level

Yangpu

17-Sep-14

17

Project Manager 2

Block 59, Block 18,
Block 158, 161

Hongkou

23-Sep-14

18

Official 9

All projects on the
district level

Pudong

24-Sep-14

19

Official 10

City Level

Citywide

28-Nov-14

20

Resident 7

Block 158-161 in
2014

Hongkou

17-Dec-14

21
22

Official 11
Project Manager 3

City Level
Block 237

Citywide
Putuo

23-Dec-14
15-May-15

Male / 50-60

Male / 65
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23
24

Resident 8
Resident 9

Female / 30-40
Male 50-60

179

Block 237
Pingliang Block 2,3

Putuo
Yangpu

15-May-15
16-May-15
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